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Introduction 
Opportunistic behavior ( or opportunism) is a selfish behavior that intention-
a lly takes advantage of relevant knowledge asymmetry to achieve own gain, 
regardless of other agents ' value. In the context of multi-agent systems, know-
ledge is distributed among different agents, which creates the opportunity for 
agents to perform opportunistic behavior to other agents . Since opportunistic 
behavior has undesirable results for other agents in the system, the aim of 
this thesis is to eliminate such a selfish behavior from the system. In order to 
reach this goal, we will perform the investigation of opportunism with the 
notion of values for different issues. 
1. 1 Motivation 
Consider a common social scenario. In a market a seller is trying to sell a 
cup to a buyer and it is known only by the seller beforehand that the cup 
is actually broken (e.g. there is a crack at the bottom of the cup). The 
buyer finally buys the cup for its good appearance, but immediately gets 
disappointed when he fills it with water. In this example, the seller earns 
money from the buyer by exploiting the opportunity of having more knowledge 
about the transaction than the buyer, while the buyer didn't know the quality 
of the cup before he buys it. Such a behavior intentionally performed by the 
seller is first named opportun istic behavior (or opportunism) by economist 
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Williamson [Willia mson , 1975], which is a selfish behavior that takes advant-
age of knowledge asymmetry a nd resu lts in promot ing agents' own value but 
demoting other agents' value. Opportunist ic behavior com monly ex ists in 
business transactions and other types of soc ia l interact ions in various forms 
such as deceit, ly ing a nd betraying. This is because individuals working in 
different positions a re capable to have access to different amounts of informa-
tion , which provides the opportunity for them to gain personal advantage, 
regard less of t he conseq uences to others. Since it has negative results for other 
individua ls involved in the re lat ionship a nd strongly affects the cooperative 
relationsh ip once it is unve iled , it is prevented o r eliminated by social laws 
and norms. In the next chapter we will g ive a brief review of opport unism in 
socia l science. 
Is the investigat ion of opportunism of interest to AI? Social concepts a re 
often used to construct art ificial societ ies. Viewing individuals as agents, 
we mig ht have s imilar phenomena in the context of multi-agent systems. 
Interacting agents were desig ned to behave in a human-like way with char-
acterist ics of self- in terest. When such agents possess different a mounts of 
relevant informat ion about a specific t ra nsact ion a nd try to maximize their 
own benefits, those who are more knowledgeable might perform opportunistic 
behavior to other agents in t heir own in terest, which is against others' benefits. 
lt is important to design mechanisms to eliminate opportunism in multi-agent 
systems, as it has undesirable results fo r other agents in the system. 
In this thesis, we use logic- based formal app roaches to investigate oppor-
tunism with the not ion of values. Many logic-based formal a pproaches have 
been developed in the agent community, such as logics for knowledge and 
belief and logics for mental states (see [Van Ditmarsch et a l. , 2007] and [Cohen 
a nd Levesque, 1990]) . With logic-based formal approaches we can specify 
and reason a bout multi-agent systems. Typically we can prove properties of 
systems that we are intended to have after implementing t he system with 
respect to the specificat ion . The first reason why we use logic-based fo rmal 
approaches in this t hesis is that they a llow us to understand more clearly the 
elements t hat construct opportunism a nd how t hey relate to each other. Lots 
of work has been done on t he logics of act ion and t he logics for agents' mental 
states s ince last century (see [McCarthy and Hayes, 1969] and [B ratman , 
1987]) , which t urn them in to two mature research a reas. Based on t hose 
logics we can have a formal definition of opportu nism. T he second reason for 
t he use of logic-based formal a pproaches is t hat they a llow us to specify our 
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monitoring and eliminating mechanisms for opportunism. The interesting 
properties we prove based on the formal approaches show the characteristics of 
our mechanisms. The third reason why we use logic-based formal approaches 
in this thesis is that it is possible to combine it with other formal approaches 
and theories. For example, in order to reason about agents' opportunistic 
propensity, we combine logic with decision theory in the way that agents 
determine their preferences over different states by evaluating state proper-
ties. Logic-based formal approaches are commonly used in the research of 
Artificial Intelligence and can be seen as appropriate for the investigation of 
opportunism from different perspectives. 
1.2 Research Questions 
The aim of this thesis is to el iminate opportunism in multi-agent systems. In 
order to reach this goal, it is of great importance to understand opportunistic 
behavior in the context of multi-agent systems. Namely, what kind of actions 
can be categorized as opportunistic behavior? In the logic of action, people 
represent an action by specifying its pre- and post-condition: the precondi-
t ion specifies the scenario where the action can be performed , whereas the 
postcondition specifies the corresponding scenario resulting from performing 
the action with the precondition. Besides, it is a lso important to interpret an 
action by considering its mental state when the action is performed , typically 
because intentionality is used to distinguish opportunistic behavior from other 
behaviors. Therefore, we need to define opportunism in a formal way to 
capture its pre- and post-condition a nd the mental state of opportunistic 
agents. 
Research Question 1. How can we formally define opportunistic behavior 
in the context of multi-agent systems? 
Norms have been commonly used to regulate and control the behavior of 
the agents or the system. As opportunistic behavior has undesirable results 
for other agents in the system, norms can be used to prescribe forbidden 
actions that are opportunistic, or forbidden states that opportunistic behavior 
results in. Typically we want to use enforcement norms, which are norms 
that can be violated and lead to sanctions once the violation is detected. 
But then there has to be a monitoring mechanism to detect norm violations. 
On the one hand , it is important to detect it, as it has undesirable results 
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for the participat ing agents and we want to impose sa nc tion to the agent 
who was opportunistic . On t he ot he r hand , s ince opportunism is a lways in 
the form o r ly ing, decept ion a nd betrayal, meaning t hat the system does 
not know wha t the agent performs o r even the motivat io n behind it (for 
example, in a distributed system), opport unistic behavior cannot be observed 
direct ly. Thus, t here has to be a monitoring mecha nism t hat can detect t he 
performa nce of opport unist ic behavior in the system. 
Research Question 2. How can we develop a mechanism for monitoring 
opportunism even though the system is not able lo see its performance object-
ively ? 
In t he investigation of opport unism , it is a lso important to predict and 
specify when a n agent will perform opportunist ic behavio r so tha t the a p-
propriate amount o r monito ring and eliminating mechanisms can be pu t in 
place. Evident ly, not every agent is likely to be opportunistic. An agent will 
perform oppor t unistic behavior when he has the a bili ty a nd the desire of 
doing that. Based on t his assumption, can we design a fra mework to reason 
a bou t agents' opportunist ic propens ity? Once we know when a n agent is 
inclined to perform opportunistic behavior , we know when a n agent will not 
perform opport unistic behavior by making t he a bili ty a nd t he des ire of being 
opport unistic unsatisfied. In other words, this fra mework can a lso be used to 
design a mechanism for elimina ting opportunism. 
Research Question 3. I-low can we develop a fram ework that allows us not 
only to reason about agents' opportunistic propensity but also to design a 
m echanism for eliminating opportunism ? 
The firs t quest ion will be ex plored in Cha pter 3, t he second question will 
be explo red in C ha pter 4, a nd the t hird question will be explored in C hapter 
5 and C ha pter 6. Before we start o ur explorat ion, it is important to clari fy 
t hat we have differen t definitions of o pportunism in different chap ters. We 
propose a form al definition or opportunism in C ha pter 3, which form s a solid 
foundat ion for our fu t ure research . However , we find t hat it is difficult to 
apply t his t horough defini t ion to every research issue. Fo r exam ple, even 
t hough we do defin e the mental state of opport unistic agents in C ha pter 3, 
it is impossible fo r monitors to detect a ny mental states. T hus, we remove 
a ll the references to mental states (knowledge, intent ion) fo r t he defini t ion 
of opport unism in Cha p ter 4. !:<o r C hapter 5 and C ha pter 6 , we define 
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opportunistic propensity based on the definition of opportunism in Chapter 3. 
Moreover, even though in Chapter 3 we define opportunism that consists of 
multiple actions and is situated in a system with norms, in the later chapters 
we only tackle the kind of opportunism that contains only one action and 
happens between two agents for simplification, which influences the way we 
define norms, rational alternatives and so on. To summarize, we will look at 
opportunism from different perspectives to explore different research issues. 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
We will give a brief outline of the thesis: 
• Chapter 2: We give a brief overview on the topics of opportunism, multi-
agent systems, values and action theory. 
• Chapter 3: We propose a formal definition of opportunism with the notion 
of values based on the situation calculus. This chapter is based on our 
paper [Luo and Meyer, 2017]. 
• Chapter 4: We propose a formal framework based on the spec ification of 
actions to specify monitoring approaches for opportunism. This chapter 
is based on our paper [Luo et al., 2016]. 
• Chapter 5 : We introduce a formal framework to reason about agents' 
opportunistic propensity. This chapter is based on our paper [Luo et al. , 
2017]. 
• Chapter 6: We propose a formal framework that allow us to design two 
mechanisms for eliminating opportunism. This chapter is based on our 
paper [Luo et a l. , 2018]. 




In this chapter, we will brieAy review the concepts of opportunism, multi-
agent systems and values, and the logic of action upon which we conduct this 
research. 
2.1 Opportunism 
Opportunism is a economic concept proposed by economist Williamson [Wil-
liamson, 1975]. In his theory of transact io n cost economics, he has proposed 
that economic agents be described as opportunistic where this means self-
interest seeking with guile [Williamson , 1993]. Even though it provides the 
original definition of opportunism, so far there is no general and agreed 
definition or theory of opportunism. The main reason is that sometimes 
opportunism is assessed against some norms and principles, and controversy 
a.bout what that norm or principle shou ld be makes a general definition diffi-
cu lt [Chen et a.I. , 2002]. However, because of the word "guile" , it is common ly 
accepted that opportunism involves deliberate deceit , betrayal, or deliberately 
withholding, shirking or distorting important business information, which 
have been later referred to taking advantage of information asymmetry. Since 
it was proposed by economist Williamson, scholars have studied this typical 
social behavior of economic players from various perspectives i.e. transact ion 
cost economics [Wi lliamson and Mueller, 1986], resource-based view [Conner 
and Pra.ha.lad, 1996], game theory [Cabon-Dhersin and Ramani , 2007], agency 
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theory [Jiraporn eL a l. , 2008] and strategic management [Yaqub, 201 L]. For 
example , LransacLion cost economi cs propose to ex pand t he boundary of a. 
firm s uch that both parties have com mon interests involved in Lhe transaction. 
The investigation of opportunism is new in ArLificial lnLelligence. Even 
Lhough work about opportunism in socia l science is indeed a ll worthwhile, it is 
difficulL Lo direcLly a pply Lhcir conclusions to mulLi-agenL systems for improv-
ing the system 's behavior because most of them a re informal, which makes 
reasoning a bout this behavior in multi-agent systems impossible, and a lso not 
commonly accepted even in their own a rea as we commented a bove. However, 
there is some work on logic o f lying, deception a nd dishonesty [Sakama et al., 
2010] [Saka.ma et a. I. , 2015] [Va n Ditmarsch et a l. , 2012], which a re forms of 
opportunism. In t heir work , modalities for belief a nd intention are commonly 
used for formali zing different types of dishonest communicat ion, which is 
simila r Lo our work. However, Saka.ma's work [Saka ma et a l. , 2010] [Sakama 
et a l. , 2015] only formalizes one agenL's communicat ion to a nother agent and 
his mcnLa l states, regardless of the effect on anoLher agent, which means that 
we cannot reason about t he state transition based on the approach. The 
primary goal of van Ditmarsch's work [Van Ditmarsch ct a l. , 2012] is to model 
lying by modelin g how agenLs ' believes change from Lhe communicaLions. lt 
ana lyses the e ffect of ly ing in public discourse, a nd explains how ly ing can 
be used as an opLimal straLegy through a game-theoret ical a nalysis . For 
providing a form a l model of opportunism, we not only need to form a lize the 
mental states o f interacting agents , but a lso need to reason a bout how the 
physical situations a re cha nged by opportunistic behavior, both of which are 
related lo the a bove work. 
2.2 Multi-agent Systems 
Multi-a.gent systems (MAS) are systems that consist of multiple inte ract ing 
computing elements, known as agents, within a n environment [Wooldridge, 
2009]. Examples of multi-agent systems can be electronic markets where 
sellers a nd buyers can perform transactions, energy systems to supply energy-
services to end-users and so on. Agents are compu ter systems that are 
capable of autonomous act ions in a n environment in orde r to meet their 
delegated objectives [Wooldridge, 2009] . Agents a re react ive in the reveal that 
they are a ble to pe rceive their environment and respond timely to changes, 
proact ive in the reveal tha.L they take the initia tive to satis fy their design 
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objectives, and social in the reveal that they are capable of interacting with 
other agents. Since [Dennett, 1971] put forward the notion of the intentional 
stance, people started to study an agent's choice of action by considering its 
beliefs and desires. [Bratman, 1987] incorporates the notion of intention for 
describing agent behavior, building the foundation of the BDI (belief, desire 
and intention) approach to artificial agents. After Bratman's philosophy was 
published, researchers tried to formalize this theory using logical means. Three 
well-known approaches are [Cohen and Levesque , 1990], [Rao and Georgeff, 
1991] and [Meyer et al., 1999]. An agent will have a set of actions available 
to it. This set of possible actions represent the agent's ability to modify its 
situated environment. Depending on the system, the e nvironments where 
agents find themselves in might have different properties. The environments 
of the systems we will consider in this thesis have the following properties 
[Wooldridge, 2009]: 
• Inaccessible: It is impossible for agents to gather complete and accurate 
information about the environment. Namely, agents have partial views 
about the environment. 
• Deterministic: An action has a single definite effect and there is no 
uncertainty about the state that will result from performing an action. 
• Dynamic: The environment can be changed beyond agents' control. 
• Discrete: There are a fixed , finite number of actions in the environment. 
In this thesis, we use transition systems to represent the underpinning 
semantics of multi-agent systems, which consist of agents , states, actions and 
transitions between states by actions. When an action is performed in a 
certain state, the system might progress to a different state in which different 
propositions might hold. A lot of work on logic formalism has been designed 
for representing and reasoning about the dynamic of the systems such as the 
situation calculus [McCarthy a nd Hayes, 1969], the event calculus [Kowalski 
and Sergot, 1989] and most commonly used modal logic [Blackburn et al., 
2002]. As we will see, we use different logic-based frameworks in different 
chapters: 
• We will use the situation calculus , which is dialect of first-order logic, 
to define opportunism in Chapter 3, typicaJly because it is designed to 
represent and reason about act ions. 
• We will use modal logic in Chapter 4. In order to investigate the monitor-
ing issue that the system cannot directly detect opportunistic behavior, 
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we will develop a framework where an action is specified through its pre-
condition a nd its effect (postcondition), a nd where every state transition 
in the system is defin ed based on act ion specification. 
• We will use modal logic in Chapter 5 and C ha pter 6. Because these two 
chapters a rc closely re lated to opportunistic propensity, agents in the 
system will have their own preferences over states and act ions. 
To summari ze, we use different logic-base fra meworks for different pur-
poses. Even though they a re different , the defi ni tions of opportunism we 
will use based on our fram eworks are consistent in the reveal that the same 
properties can be proved. Another issue we would like to stress here is about 
t he access to the interna l a rchitecture of agents. T n this thesis, we will have 
various access to the interna l a rchitect ure of agents, depending on from which 
perspective we study an issue: In C ha pter 3, we will define opportunism 
with a n agent 's knowledge a nd intention from the intern a l perspective. In 
Chapte r 4, we will remove a ll the references to mental states (knowledge, 
intention) for the definition of opportunism because monitors have no access 
to any mental states, but we assume that the system can reason whether an 
agent 's value gets promoted or demoted along a state transition based on the 
corresponding value systems. In Chapter 5, the system will predict whether 
an agent will perform opportunistic behavior with a n ass umed value system; 
while in C hapter 6 agents ' value systems are unknown to the mechanism 
system designer. 
2 .2 .1 Norms 
Norms have their origins in social sc ience. Sociologist Gibbs defin ed norms 
in [Gibbs, 1965] as "a collect ive eva luat ion of behavior in terms of what it 
ought to be; a collective expectation as to what behavior will be; a nd /or 
part icular react ions to behavior, inc luding attempts to apply sanct ions or 
otherwise induce a particular kind of conduct". In short, norms are the 
prescriptions of desirable/undesirable states of affairs with concepts such 
as obligations, permissions a nd prohibitions. An example can be t hat a 
seller shouldn't sell a broken cup to a buyer. Since last centu ry norms have 
been commonly used to regulate and coordinate agents' behavior in order 
to achieve the overa ll objectives of multi-agent systems. [Therborn , 2002] 
distinguishes among three kinds of norms. Constitutive norms define a system 
of action and a n agent 's membership in it , regulative norms descr ibe the 
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expected contribut ions Lo the social system, and distributive norms defining 
how rewards, costs, and risks are allocated within a soc ia l system. All the 
norms we will use in this thesis are regulative norms and agents in the system 
are able to decide whether to comply with them. Norms can be explicitly 
represented, for example in deontic logic [McNamara, 2014]. Deontic logic 
studies logical relations among obligation, permission, and related concepts. 
Among various sysLems of deontic logic, Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) is the 
most cited and studied one, mainly because it builds upon propositional logic, 
and is a distinguished member of modal logics. 
The investigation of opporLunism cannoL be done without norms. AgenLs 
in multi-agent systems are residing in a normat ive context which provides 
obligations, permissions and other types of norms for guiding agents' behaviors. 
In this thesis, those norms are enforcement norms that agents can obey or 
violate, and Lhat lead to sanctions when Lhey are violated. The setting of 
those norms reflecL Lhe values of the system. We can cons ider the system as 
an entity, agents can perform opportunistic behavior to the system through 
violating norms secret ly. We will tackle t his issue in Chapter 3 and C hapter 
4. When we look for ways to eliminate opportunism in multi-agent systems, 
removing knowledge asymmetry between agents might contradict the privacy 
norms in the system, and norms with enforcement policies can be used to 
switch agents' opportunistic choices. We will tackle this issue in Chapter 6. 
Moreover, we will use Lhe following types of norms in different chapters: 
• State-based norms: State-based norms prescribe the state properties thaL 
should/shouldn ' t be ach ieved. An example is [Lomuscio and Sergot , 2002] 
which uses green and red to co lor a llowed and disallowed states respectively. 
We will use state-based norms as our enforcement norms in Chapter 6 to 
simply the semant ics of system update via norms. 
• Action-based norms: Action-based norms prescribe the particular actions 
that should/shouldn 't be exec uted rather than the state properties to be 
achieved. They are well studied in [Fiadeiro and Maibaum, 1991]. The 
norms we use in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are action-based norms, and we 
represent the ones in Chapter 3 in deontic logic, whereas the other ones 
in a tup le form. 
Not ice that in this thesis we will noL study how norms are to be perceived by 
agents or to be im plemented in the system. We simply assume that there are 
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a set of norms that are enforced by the system designer a nd agents in the 
syslem a re a ble to decide whether to comply with them. 
2.3 Values 
Values a re the perspective fro m which we study opportunism in this thesis. 
Compared to values, goals a re more commonly used in logical form a lizat ion 
(e.g. [Cohen a nd Levesque, 1990] a nd [Rao a nd Georgeff, 1991]), so a rc utili t ies 
in decision theory and game theory (e.g. [Steele a nd Stefa nsson, 2016] and 
[Von Neuma nn a nd Morgenstern , 2007]) , for expressing simila r idea. ITowever, 
the concept of value has been recently disc ussed in the logica l literature, 
especia lly some work in the area of a rgumentation practical reasoning that 
reasons about agents' preferences and decision making by values (e.g. [Bench-
Capon et al., 2012], [Va n der Weide, 2011], [Pitt a nd Artikis, 2015], [Zurek, 
2017] a nd [Lorini , 2014]). For example, [Zurek, 2017] disc usses the issue of 
modeling of values and goals in reasoning a nd argumentation, a nd in [Lorini , 
2014] a logical theory exploring the connections between the concepts of value, 
preference, knowledge a nd rat ionality is provided. Even though goals, utilities 
and values can be used to represent agents ' preferences about s ituations, t hey 
have different features . 
• Goals a nd Va lues: Goals a re concrete a nd should be specified with time, 
place and objects . For example, to earn 1000 euro next month is a 
goal. If one age nt's goal is achieved in one s ituat ion , t hen he has high 
eva luation on that situation. Va lue is described by Schwartz as trans-
s ituat iona l [Schwartz, 1992], which means thal value is relalively stable 
a nd not limited to be applied in a specific s ituation. For instance, if 
honesty is a value of somebody, he will be honest for a long period of time. 
Since state lransitions a re caused by the performance of act ions, we can 
evaluate act ions by whether our value is promoted or demoted in lhe stale 
transition , as what we do in t his thesis. 
• Utilities a nd Va lues: For representing agents' evaluation on states, Keeney 
a nd R.aiffa proposed Multi-Attribute Uti li ty Theory (MAUT) in which 
states are described in terms of a set of attributes and the utilities of the 
states a re calculated by the sum of the scores on each altribule based on 
agents' va lue system [Keeney and Raiffa, 1993]. Apparently, not everyt hing 
can be evaluated with numbers, which is one of the reasons why people 
consider using value syslems as a n a lternative. A value system is like a box 
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that allows us to define its content as we need. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 
4, situations/states are represented through propositions and agents refer 
to a specific proposition based on their value systems to evaluate a state 
transition. Starting from Chapter 5, we will open up the black box of 
value systems. A value is modeled as a formula in our language and a 
value system is constructed as a total order over a set of values. Instead 
of calculating the utility of states, agents specify their preferences over 
states by evaluating the value change that they most care about. 
We will prove that the state preferences we define with value systems obey 
the standard properties we expect from a preference relation. 
2 .4 Logic of Action 
In computer science, people realize that computers perform actions in the 
reveal that executing program statements change computer internals and 
outside world. Hence, a logic of action provides a means to verify programs 
[Seger berg et al., 2016]. Historically, different ways of program verification 
have been proposed. In Hoare logic [Hoare, 1969], the execution of a program 
is described through a Hoare triple {P}C{Q}, where C is a program, Pis the 
precondition and Q is the postcondition, which is quite close to our approach 
of action specification ('ljJ~,1P~l in Chapter 4. 
Representing and reasoning about actions is one of the central topics 
in artificial intelligence, particularly in knowledge representation. One of 
the main problems that one encounters when reasoning about actions in 
AI is frame problem [McCarthy and Hayes, 1969], namely the challenge of 
representing the effects of action in logic without having to represent explicitly 
a large number of intuitively obvious non-effects. Reiter proposed a solution 
within a framework, which is called the situation calculus [Reiter, 200l]. The 
situation calculus is a dialect of first-order logic especially designed to reason 
about actions. Its idea is that we can represent any reachable states in terms 
of actions that are required to reach them, and that the reachable states are 
called situations. There are three elements: actions Act that can be performed 
by agents, situations S that represent a history of action occurrences, and 
fluents F that describe the properties of the situation. Situation So represents 
the initial situation that no action can result in. The properties of situations 
are specified through relational and functional fluents taking a situation term 
as their last argument, which means their truth value may vary from situation 
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to situation. Based on the situation calculus, Reiter 's Basic Action Theory is 
defined as a set of axioms: 
D = EU D ap U D ss U Dso U D ,ma 
E: the set of foundat iona l ax ioms, 
• do(a1 ,s1) = do(a2,s2)-+ a1 = a2 I\ s1 = s2; Two situations are the 
same if a nd only if they a re the same sequence of act ions. 
• (VQ)Q(So) I\ (Vs, a) [Q(s) -+ Q(do(a, s))]-+ (\fs)Q(s); This is a second-
order induct ion ax iom say ing that for a ny property Q, if Q(So) and, 
for any s ituation s a nd action a, property Q remains t he same, t hen 
we have (\fs)Q(s). 
• -.s C:: So; The relation C:: provides an ordering re lat ion on s it uat ions. 
s C s' means that the action sequence s is a sub-seq uence of that of s'. 
T hus, s is a sub-sequence of do(a, s') if a nd only if s is a sub-sequence 
of s' or they have the same act ion sequence. And no situat ion is before 
initia l situa tion So. 
• s c do(a ,s' ) = s i;;; s'; 
D ap: the set of act ions preconditions, 
Poss(a(x) ,s) = 1r(x ,s) 
where 1r(x , s) is a formula uniform in sand whose free variables a re among 
x a nd s. Thus, whether a(x) can be performed in s it uat ion s depends 
entirely on s. 
D ss : the set of successor stale axioms, 
F( do( a, s)) = , fa ( a, s) V (F( s) I\ -., ;; ( a, s)) 
Here ,-J; (a ,s) a nd ,;;(a,s) are two formulas expressing t he conditions 
for the fluent F becoming true a nd false, respectively; the effect of ac-
tion is spec ified through successor state axioms , which consist of positive 
consequences a nd negat ive conseq uences. 
D80 : the sentences uniform in So describing t he initia l situatio n; 
D ,ma: the unique name ax ioms for ac tions. 
The s ituat ion calculus is the technical fra mework of next cha pter , where we 
will formally defi ne opportunistic behav ior based on our understanding of the 
concept from social science. 
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2.5 Possible-world Structure 
Possible-world structure (or Kripke structure) is the model that people ad-
opt to formalize knowledge, belief, intention and obligation in the s ituation 
calculus and modal logic. Therefore, we will briefly introduce this model 
before we use those modalities in our later chapters. A Kripke structure is 
proposed by Saul Kripke [Kripke, 1963] and has b ecome the standard type 
of the models in modal logic and related non-classical logics. Basically it is 
a graph whose nodes represent the possible states of the system and whose 
edges represent accessibility relations. A valuation function maps each node 
to a set of properties hold in the corresponding state. Formally, let <f> be a 
set of atomic propositions. A Kripke structure over <I> is defined as a tuple 
M = (S, R , 1r) , where 
• S denotes a set of states (or situations); 
• R <;;; S x S is a set of accessibi li ty relations; 
• 1r : S -+ 2<1> denotes a valuation function, meaning that for each state 
s ES the set 1r(s) of atomic propositions hold ins. Therefore, flu ents in 
the situation calculus can be interpreted as: given a proposition p, fluent 
p(s) holds iff p E 1r(s). 
By means of a Kripke structure we can represent exactly an agent 's mental 
state in a certain state (or situation). Figure 2.1 is an example of a Kripke 
structure. Suppose that our underlying logical framework is the situation 
calculus. The actual situation where p is true and q is false, represented by 
situat ions E S for which it holds that p(s) and , q(s) . Now the model can be 
represented by S = {s ,s',s"} , wheres is as above, s' is p(s') and q(s'), and 
s" is , p(s") a nd q(s"). The accessibility relation R is illustrated as Figure 
2.1. 
Kripke structures are adopted by the situation calcu lus and modal logic to 
represent agents' mental states (knowledge, belief, intention and obligation) 
and transition systems . Taking knowledge as an example, we assume that 
there is an accessibili ty relation over states, whe re state s' is accessible from 
state s if an agent residing in state s thinks he might be in state s'. So 
something is known in state s if it holds in state s and every states' accessible 









Figure 2.1. Example of a Kripke structure. 
2.6 Neighborhood Semantics 
Neighborhood semantics [Pacuit, 2007], a lso known as Scott-Montague se-
mantics, is another formal semantics for modal logics compared to nor-
mal possible-world semantics. It is developed by Dana Scott and Richard 
Montague. The basic idea behind a neighborhood model is that: at each 
situation, list a ll the sets that are cons idered " necessary". That is, given a 
non-empty set of situations S, each s ituation s is assigned a set of subsets of 
S (these subsets are called neighborhoods). Formally, let <I> be a set of atomic 
propositions. A neighborhood model over <I> is defined as tuple M = { S, N, v }, 
where 
• S denotes a set of situat ions; 
• N is a neighborhood function N : S ---+ 22" which assigns a co llect ion of 
sets of situations to each situat ion in S; 
• v : <I> ---+ 25 denotes a valuation function assigning a set of possible worlds 
to each atomic proposition. Therefore, Jluents in the situation calcu lus 
can be interpreted as: given a proposition p, fluent p(s) holds iff s E v(p). 
Similar to Kripke structures, we can represent exactly an agent's mental 
state in a certain situation by neighborhood semant ics. Fig. 2.2 is an example 
of a neighborhood model. Suppose that s is the actual situation and S con-
sists of the following situations: S = {(p, q, r), (p, ...,q, r), (p, q, ...,r), (...,P, --,q, r)}. 
Neighborhood function N(s) returns a set of subsets of S that are the neigh-
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borhoods in s. Set, {(p,q,r),(p,-.q,r),(p,q, -.r)} is called the truth set of 
p and it is a neighborhood in s. The same with -.q and r. The model is 
illustrated as below: 
s 
N \ __ 
j p 





( p, q, r " \ 
Figure 2.2. Example of a neighborhood model. 
ln Chapter 3, we adopt neighborhood semantics to define intention. Sup-
pose we have a set o f s itua tions labeled with propositions. Proposition p is 
intended to be in the act ua l situation s if and only if the truth set of p is an 
intentiona l neighborhood in s. 
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A Formal Definition of 
Opportunism 
In this chap ter , we in t roduce formal definiti ons o f oppor t unism wit h t he 
not ion of va lue based o n t he s it ua tion calculus. We first propose a model 
o f opportunism tha t only co nsiders a single acl ion between two agents, a nd 
then extend it to multiple actions and incorporate no rm a tive context in 
the model. A s imple example of selling a broken cup is used to illustra te 
our mode ls . T hrough o ur models, we can have a t horough understa nding 
of opportunism , which provides a solid found at io n for t he investigation of 
predicting, moni toring a nd elimina ting opport unism. 
3.1 Introduction 
In order to per fo rm t he investigation of opport unism, we first need to have a 
fo rmal specifi cation of opportunism with a widely a pplicable generalization. 
Through the spec ification, we can understand more clearly the elements in 
the defini t ion, how t hey relate to each ot her , a nd derive in te rest ing properties 
t hat a re useful fo r our fu t ure research . We believe t hat s uch a research 
perspective can ease t he de bates a bout opportunism in socia l science (for 
instance, is t he inte ntion of opportunistic age nts to ha rm other agents? What 
is the asymmet ric knowl edge tha t ena ble t he perfo rm a nce o f opportunistic 
behavior?). Moreover, fu t ure work on its emergence and constrain t mechanism 
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can be conducted based on our formal definition, rendering our study relevant 
for multi-agent system (MAS) research. 
In this chapter, we take the initiat ive to propose formal models of op-
portunism. We integra te the notion of value in our models to represent 
agents' preference on different sit uat ions before a nd after the performa nce of 
opportunistic behavior. We then forma lize opportunism us ing the s ituation 
calculus [McCarthy, 1963] a nd [Reiter, 2001] as our technical framework based 
on our extended definition. We first propose a model of opportunism that 
only considers a s ingle action betwee n two agents, indicat ing three basic 
concepts knowledge asy mmet ry, value opposition and intention in the mode l, 
a nd then extend it to multiple actions a nd incorporate a normative context 
in the model. A s imple example of selling a broken cup is used to illustrate 
our models. 
3.1.1 Chapter Outline 
The rest of the cha pter is organized as follows . 
• In Section 3.2 we have a n informa l definiti on of opportunism extended 
from Williamson's, highlighting the key e lements we need to mode l. 
• ln Section 3.3 our technical framework of the situation calculus is briefly 
introduced. 
• ln Sect ion 3.4 we propose a pre liminary model of opportunism, which 
serves as a basis for t he following ex tensions. 
• In Section 3.5 we extend our model to multiple actions 
• In Section 3.6 we incorporate in our model a normative context. 
• Section 3.7 illustrates our models by a simple example. 
• Section 3.8 disc usses this chapter. 
• Sect ion 3.9 summarizes t he chapter. 
3.2 Defining Opportunism with Value 
In this section , we extend Willia mson's definition of opportunism and suggest 
a more ex plicit one as a prelude a nd basis to proposing a formal model in the 
next section. The classical definition of opportunism is offered by Willia mson 
as "self-interest seeking with guile" [Williamson , 1975], where guile means the 
use of clever but usua lly dishonest methods. While this definition has been 
used in a la rge amount of research, it only mentions two attributes , self-interest 
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and guile, explicitly, leaving other attributes for researchers to interpret from 
different perspectives. For example, Das defined partner opportunism as "a 
behavior by a partner firm that is motivated to pursue its self-interest with 
deceit to achieve gains at the expense of the other alliance members" [Das and 
Rahman, 2010]. In a game-theoretical setting, Seabright defines opportunism 
as 'the behavior of those who seek to benefit from the efforts of others 
without contributing anything themselves' [Seabright , 2010] . Even though 
those definitions are elaborated enough, they come from different theoretical 
settings. 
The example about hiding important information from peers that we 
encountered in Chapter 1 is opportunistic behavior, since it is against others' 
benefits or not allowed by the system . However, if hiding is not forbidden 
by the system, the agent could not be said to have done anything wrong. 
Or if h iding is accepted by peers, it may not be against their interest. We 
can see that both the system and the agents' perspectives can influence the 
judgment of opportunism, and they are the representation of value systems at 
the collective level and individual level respectively, which might be different 
among systems and agents. 
Value is something abstract that we think is important, and various types 
of values together with their orderings form a value system, which is the 
basis of our decision-making. By integrating the notion of value into our 
model, the result of performing opportunistic behavior is represented as 
promoting opportunistic agents' own value and demoting other agents' value. 
Furthermore, even though a value system is relatively stable within individuals, 
it may differ across different individuals and societies. For different societies, 
each has its own value system as part of the context and it serves as the 
basis for any judgment within the society. In this sense, some behaviors 
which are regarded as opportunistic in one society may not be considered as 
opportunistic in another society, if the two societies do not share the same 
value system. A similar idea, although more centering around opportunistic 
propensity, can be found in [Chen et al., 2002]. Given the value system 
of the society, opportunistic behavior promotes the self-interest which is in 
opposition with others' value. 
In this thesis , based on the definition of Williamson, we compare oppor-
tunistic scenarios with non-opportunistic ones, and then redefine this behavior 
in a more explicit way with the notion of value: 
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Opportunism is a behavior that intentionally takes advantage of relevant 
knowledge asymmetry I lo achieve own gain, regardless of other agents ' value. 
First o f a ll , there has been reached conse nsus that opportunist ic behav ior 
is performed with self-interest intention [Das a nd Rahman , 2010]. We ad mit 
that self-interested pursuit is the natura l property of human beings, but 
opportunism is more than that: agents with opportunist ic behav ior do not care 
a bou t the negat ive effects on others. Secondly, relevant knowledge asymmet ry 
provides t he cha nce to agents to be opportunistic. Opportunistic agents may 
break the contracts or the relat iona l norms using the relevant knowledge that 
others do not have. It is importa nt for opportunistic agents to use ly ing, 
deceit o r infideli ty for hiding their self-interest motive. Therefore, agents with 
more re leva nt knowledge will have more potential for being opportunistic. 
Thirdly, principles are ignored by opportunistic age nts. The reason to use 
" ignore" here is to distinguish opportunism from accidenta lly bringing ha rm 
to others. Opportunistic behavior is performed intentiona lly without a ny 
com pensat ion to t he victims. Other agents' value can be represented by the 
contract rules or the re lat iona l norms that a re used for balancing various 
inte rests a nd a lready agreed to by a ma jority of the agents. Fourthly, even 
though we do not explic itly declare the result of performing opportunistic 
behav io r in our extended definition, such a behavior must resul t in gains at 
the expense of others. Any self-inte rested behavior t hat docs not end up in 
a ffect ing other agents should not be co nsidered as opportunism. Last but not 
least, Wathne and He ide [Wathne a nd Heide, 2013] clar ify that s ituat io ns 
where one agent receives compensation in some forms should not be considered 
as opportunism. Since we have to consider whether the age nt who got ha rmed 
receives any compensation later on, we discuss t he iss ue of compensation for 
opportunism for the case with multiple act ions . 
From the a bove elaboration , we can de rive something interest ing a nd 
important about opportunism: opportunistic agents ignore the in terest of 
others, which means tha t it is a lready known by them that the behavior 
will cause ha rm to others; as opportunistic agents intend to gain personal 
advantage, can we say t hat it is a lso t heir intent ion to cause harm to others? 
We will investigate t his problem through our formal models of opportunism. 
1 Many papers in social science use informat ion asym rnet ry to represent t he situation 
where one party in a transact ion knows more com pared to another. W e argue that, o nce 
t he information is stored in ou r mind and can be used appropr iate ly i t becornes our 
knowledge . For th is reason, we wou ld rather revi se the term as knowledge asymmetry in 
the whole thesis, wh ich is a lso cons istent wit h our technical framework. 
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3.3 Technical Framework: Situation Calculus 
The situation calculus provides a formal language for representing and reas-
oning about dynamical worlds based on first-order logic. Its idea is that we 
can represent any reachable states in terms of actions that are required to 
reach them, and that the reachable states are called situations. There are 
three elements: actions Act that can be performed by agents, situations S 
that represent a history of action occurrences, and fluents F that describe the 
properties of the situation. Situation S0 represents the initial situation that 
no action can result in. The properties of situations are specified through 
relational and functional fluents taking a situation term as their last argument, 
which means their truth value may vary from situation to situation. The 
relational fluents can be true or fa lse, while the functional fluents can take 
a range of values. For instance, ontable(x, s) is a relational fluent which is 
true in situations where object xis on the table, and lemperalure(s) is a 
functional fluent whose value in situation s is an integer representing the 
temperature of the environment. 
To represent how situations change, one has to specify in which situation 
an action can be performed and how to reason about the changes in the world 
by performing an action. In the situation calcu lus, we use predicate symbol 
Poss(a,s) to denote the set of preconditions that action a is executable in 
situations, and a distinguished binary function do(a , s) to denote the unique 
successor situation that results from the performance of action a in situation 
s. For example, in order to pick up object x one must have an empty hand 
and object x must be on the table in situation s: 
Poss(pick(x), s) = handempty(s) I\ ontable(x, s). 
And do(pick(x) , s) represents the situation that results from the performance 
of act ion pickup(x) in situation s. One more example : in order to repair 
object x in situation s, the object x must be broken and there must be a glue 
available in situation s: 
Poss(repair(x), s) = broken(x, s) I\ hasglue(s). 
Other special predicates and functions can be introduced as needed. For 
instance, propositions P can be used as assertions from classical proposition 
logic instead of fluents , that is, their truth values are not dependent on the 
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sit uat ion but consistent t hroughout a ll the s ituat ions. 
With t he situation calculus, we can reason about how t he world cha nges 
as the resul t o f the avail able actions. The effects o f act ions are specifi ed 
through successor stale axioms. For example, the effect o n fluent broken of 
object x is: 
broken(x , do(a , s)) = broken(x , s) V (3r)Jragile(x, s) I\ a= drop(r, x), 
which is say ing that object x will be broken in the successor situat ion do(a, s) 
if and only if x is fragile in s a nd the action that Lakes us to the s uccessor 
s ituat ion is someone r dropping x, or x is a lready broken in s. 
This is a brief overview of the s it uat ion calculus, which is t he technical 
pre limina ry o f our forma li zat ion. However , this language can only provide 
informat ion about the history of a situat ion and t here is no way to represent 
the future of a s it uation. For example, propositions like "I sha ll sell t he cup 
now" cannot be represented by situation calculus . Since t his representation is 
of great importance to our formalization, we extend the situat ion to one-step 
further in the future. An extended s ituat ion is a pair (s, s') such thats is a 
situat ion and s' is t he next, situation of s connected with an act ion, and occur 
is a relat ion between act ions and s it uat ions. Here is the semantics of occur: 
(s,s') F occur (a,s) iff s' = do(a,s). T hat is, occur(a,s) holds if act ion a 
occurs in situation s. 
Prom now on, t he sit uation calculus we a re using as ou r tech nical framework 
will be extended with t he semantics above. 
After J ohn McCarthy 's introduction of this t heory, people made extensions 
capable o f representing knowledge, belief, intention and ob ligation in order 
Lo better reason about actions and their effects on t he world [Shapiro cL a l. , 
2000] [Scher! a nd Levesque, 2003] [Demolombe and Parra, 2009]. We will 
introduce a nd adopt those extensions in the following sections as appropriate. 
Since in t he sit uation calculus the last a rgument is a lways a situat ion, we 
will follow this co nvent io n in t his chapter for any definition of flu ents and 
predicates. 
3.4 Formalizing Opportunism 
For better understanding, we first propose a preliminary model of opportunism 
t hat only considers a sing le act ion between two agents, without any legal or 
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moral evaluation. It serves as a basis for the extensions of multiple actions and 
a normative context in the following sections. We will use normal possible-
world semantics to define knowledge and neighborhood semantics to define 
intention. Ones who are unfamiliar with the two types of semantics can refer 
to [Chellas, 1980] and [Montague, 1970] [Scott, 1970] for their introductions. 
3.4.1 Knowledge Asymmetry 
We adopt the approach of Scher! to formalizing knowledge, which is to add an 
agents' possible-world model of knowledge to situation calculus [Scher! and 
Levesque, 2003]. To treat knowledge as a fluent , we have a binary relation 
K(s',s), reading as situations' is epistemically accessible from situations. It 
is reflexive (K(s , s) holds for alls ES), transitive (K(s , s') I\ K(s', s") implies 
K(s,s") for a ll s , s' , s" E S) and symmetric (K(s,s') implies K(s',s) for all 
s , s' E S) . 
Definition 3.4.1 (Knowledge) . 
Know(i, <.p , s) d~ (Vs')K;(s' , s) ➔ r.p[s'] 
This definition shows that agent i has knowledge about <.p if and on ly if <.p 
holds in all the epistemic possible situations of the agent. Then we can have 
the definition of knowledge asymmetry. 
Definition 3.4.2 (Knowledge Asymmetry). 
K ( . . ) d e f nowasym i , J , <.p , s = 
Know(i, <.p , s) I\ , Know(j, <.p, s) I\ Know(i, , Know(j , <.p, s), s) 
Knowasym is a fluent in situation s where agent i has knowledge about 
<.p whi le agent j does not have it and th is is a lso known by agent i. The 
asymmetric situation can be the other way around with i and j. But for 
simplicity of our model, we limit this definition to one case. 
3.4.2 Value Opposition 
From the definition of opportunism, we know that agents have different eval-
uations on the same state transition. For agent i who performs opportunistic 
behavior, his value gets promoted, while the value of agent j gets demoted. 
We argue that this is because agents a lways have the evaluation from their 
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perspect ive, which is part of their value system. This property of state trans-
ition is na med value opposition in this st udy. In order to extend our technica l 
fra mework with value theory, we define a symbol V to represent agents' value 
system and a bina ry relation < over situations to represe nt agents' preference, 
wheres < v s' denotes "s' is preferred to s based on value system V". 
In the s ituation calculus, s ituations can be described in terms of nuents 
F, which are st ructured with objects a nd their properties. For hav ing prefer-
ences on situat ions, we a rgue that agents evaluate the truth value of specific 
propositions, which a re called perspectives in this study, based on their value 
systems. For instance, the buyer tries to see if the cup has good qua lity or not 
in order to have a preference on the situations before and a fter t he transaction. 
In order to specify agents' preference on situations, we first define a fun ct ion 
Evalre[ th a t represents agents' perspect ive for eva luation: 
Definition 3.4.3 (Evaluation Reference). 
Evalref: V x S x S -+ F 
It returns a proposition that an agent refers to for specifying his preference 
on two s ituations based on his value system. It is worth noting that in real life 
agents' specificat ion of pre fe rences on s ituations is based on a set o f fluents 
2F rather than a single fluent. For instance, both whether the cup has good 
quality a nd appearance are importa nt to the buyer. Fo r s implic ity, here we 
restrict the return value to only one proposition without loss of generality. 
We then specify agents ' preferences on situat ions, where V is restricted to 
perspect ive-based value: 
s < v, s' = , p( s) I\ p(s') where p = Evalref(Vi, s, s') 
s >v, s' = p(s) I\ , p(s') w here p = Evalref (Vi, s, s') 
It means that agent i's va lue gets promoted / demoted from s to s' when the 
truth value of the proposition p that he refers to based on his value system Vi 
changes. As for the example a bout se lling the broken cup, the seller's value 
gets promoted when he has earned money from the transact ion , whereas the 
buyer 's value gets demoted when the cup he bought is broken. Because of 
having different value systems, they refer to different propositions and thereby 
evalua te different propositions for spec ifying their preferences. Similar to 
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knowledge asymmetry, we only limit the specification to one case in terms of 
the truth value of p. 
Definition 3.4.4 (Value Opposition). 
V 1 ( . . ') def I I a ueopp i, .7, s, s = s <v, s I\ s >v; s 
We define value opposition as a property of a state transition where a 
state transition from s to s' can promote the value of age nt i but demote 
the value of agent j. In other words, agent i has positive effects from the 
state transition, while agent j has negat ive effects . Again, we only limit the 
definition to one case for simplicity. 
3.4.3 Intention 
Opportunistic behavior is performed by inLenL rather than by accident. In or-
der Lo suggest this aspect in our formal model, we adopt the logic of intention 
to do something for being something in our framework. Do something refers 
to an action and being something refers to a state of affairs represented by 
propositional formula. The notion of Intend is defined through neighborhood 
semantics instead of Kripke semantics. This is because agents need not intend 
all the expected side-effects of their intentions as Bratman argued [Bratman, 
1987]. For example, an agent has a toothache and is go ing Lo see the dentist 
with intention to get his tooth fixed . Although the agent believes that it will 
cause him much pain, we surely cannot say that he intends to get t he pain. 
The formal definition of lnlend lo be r.p by doing a is given as followed: 
Definition 3.4.5 (Intention). 
Intend(i,a,r.p,s) d;j IIAII E N1(i,s), 
where 
IIAII = {s' E S I occur(a,s') /\ r.p[s',do(a,s')]} 
N1(i, s) is an intentional neighborhood function of agent i that returns 
a set of subsets of S, meaning that what is the case in the neighborhood 
is intended to have in situation s. occur(a, s') is true when action a is per-
formed in s ituat ion s', and <pis true in the state transition. An intent ion of 
agent i lntend(i , a, r.p , s) holds if and on ly if the truth set of occur(a, s') and 
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cp[s', do(a, s')] is an intentional neighborhood in s. Notice that cp[s', do(a, s')] 
means <p is true in the transition from s' to do(a, s'). Based on this definition of 
intent ion, we have two instances for value promotion pro(j) = s' < v; do(a, s') 
and value demotion de(j) = s' >v1 do(a, s') by act ion a, which will be later 
used for providing the final definition and proving its properties 
Intend(i,a,pro(j),s) d;f IIAII E N,(i , s), 
where 
IIAII = {s' E S I occur(a, s') I\ s' < v1 do(a, s')} 
and 
lntend(i , a , de(j) , s) d;f IIAII E N1(i,s), 
where 
IIAII = {s' ES I occur(a,s') /\ s' >v, do(a,s')} 
lntend(i ,a,pro(j),s) denotes that agent i intends to promote the value of 
agent j by act ion a in situation s. Similar for Intend(i , a, de(j) , s). When 
i = j , age nt i intends to promote/demote his own value by act ion a. 
3.4.4 Opportunistic Behavior 
The above definitions are basic ingred ients that we need for having the formal 
model of opportunism: knowledge asymmetry as the precondition , value 
opposition as the effect, and intention as the mental state. Besides, based on 
the informal definition we gave in Section 3.2, there are two more aspects that 
should be suggested in the definition . Firstly, the knowledge that the per-
former has while others do not have shou ld be relevant to the state transition. 
Secondly, the performer is aware of value opposition for the state transition 
beforehand but sti ll ignores it. Opportunism is defined as fo llows: 
Definition 3.4.6 (Opportunism). Let D be a Situation Calculus BAT 2 , 1( 
and I be the axioms for knowledge and intention representation in the Situation 
Calculus respectively, V be the value system of agents, Evalref be the ref erence 
function representing the object for an agent 's evaluation on situations, and 
2 See Chapter 2 for an introduction of Reiter 's Basic Action Theories. 
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<v be a preference ordering on situations. Then (DUK U J, V, Evalref, <v) 
is a situation calculus BAT extended with knowledge, intention, value and 
preference. Within this system, we have 
Opportunism( i , j, a , s) d:cj Poss( i, j , a , s) /\ Intend( i, a , pro( i), s) /\ <.p 
where 
Poss(i,j,a,s) = Knowasym(i , j,<.p, s) 
<.p = Valueopp(i,j,s, do(a,s)). 
This formula defines a predicate Opportunism where action a is oppor-
tunistic behavior by agent i to agent j in the situation s. In this concise 
formula, the precondition of action a is knowledge asymmetry about the state 
transition from s to do(a , s), and action a is performed by intent and results 
in value opposition. 
One observation from the model is about the subjectivity of opportunism . 
We can see through the functional fluent Evalref that agents always evaluate 
the situations and consequently the state transition from their own perspect-
ives, which are part of their value systems. If the value systems upon which 
they have evaluation change to other ones, the property of value opposition 
may become false. Opportunism is presented as a "problem" in most social 
science work . However, the above formal model of opportunism implies that 
it depends on from which perspective, or more generally, value system, we 
evaluate the state transition. It is positive from the perspective of agent i, 
while it is negative from the perspective of agent j. In multi-agent systems, 
people usually take the established norms into consideration when they decide 
whether it should be prevented, and the result may be different from society 
to society and from system to system. 
After having the formal model of opportunism, we show how the pro-
positions we informally suggest in text at the beginning is captured by our 
formalization. 
Proposit ion 3.4.1. Given an opportunistic behavior a performed by agent 
i to agent j , each agent evaluates the behavior from a different perspective, 
which is formalized as: 
I= Opportunism(i , j,a,s)-+ Evalref(V;,s, do(a,s)) ¥- Evalref(Vi , s,do(a,s)) 
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Proof. If Opportunism(i,j, a, s) holds, the property Valueopp(i,j, s, do(a, s)) 
also holds. Following the definition of value opposition, we have 
s < v; do(a , s) A s > vj do(a , s). 
The specification of s < v, do( a , s) is 
, p(s) A p(do(a , s)) where p = Evalref(Vi, s, do(a , s)) (3 .1) 
The specification of s > v; do(a , s) is 
q(s) A , q(do(a, s)) where q = Evalref(½ , s, do(a , s)) (3.2) 
Sentence {1) and (2) hold together. Since any formula has only one truth 
value given a situation, we have p =I= q, that is 
Evalref(Vi , s, do(a , s)) =I= Evalref(Vj, s , do(a , s )). 
Proposition 3.4.2. Given an opportunistic behavior a performed by agent i 
lo agent j , agent i knows lhe performance of this behavior demotes agent j 's 
value, bul needs nol intend lo gel this result for agent j , which is characterized 
by: 
I= Opportunism(i , j, a, s) -+ Know(i , s > v; do(a , s) , s) 
Jz' Opportunism(i, j , a , s) -+ lntend(i, a , de(j) ,s) 
Proof. The first formula is already in the definition of opportunism, so we 
are going to prove the second one. i n our model, opportunistic behavior is 
performed with inlenlion and Opportunism(i , j , a ,s)-+ de(j) , then definitely 
de(j) holds in agent i 's intentional neighborhood where Opportunism(i, j, a , s) 
holds {denoted as set 0). In neighborhood semantics, iflntend(i , a,de(j) , s) 
holds, then the truth set of de(j) ( denoted as set D) must be an intentional 
neighborhood of agent i. However, we only know thal O is an intentional 
neighborhood of agent i and D might be bigger lhan 0 (0 c:;: D) so thal 
D might nol necessarily be an intentional neighborhood. There/ ore, we can 
theoretically conclude lhal agent i might not intend to demote agent j 's value. 
We can a lso give intuition to this proof. Free riding is one of the clas-
s ic models about opportunism, and it occurs when someone benefits from 
resources, goods, or services but does not contribute to them, which results 
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in either an under-provision of those goods or services, or in an overuse or 
degradation of a common property resource [Baumol, 2004]. Suppose agent i 
is a free rider, it is rather weird to say that agent i intends to reduce others' 
share of public goods. 
The proposition shows that it is not the intention of opportunistic a.gents 
to harm others even though opportunism is deliberate with self-interest motive. 
The ignored principles are a specific kind of knowledge about the interest of 
others that cannot be considered as an intention to be opportunistic . 
3.5 Opportunistic Behavior for Multiple Actions 
In the previous section , we on ly consider one single action as opportunistic 
behavior. But in more realistic scenario one can imagine that opportunistic 
behavior consists of multiple actions. For instance, unlike the simple selling 
example at the beginning of this thesis, commerce transactions between busi-
nesses usually consist of a sequence of actions, each of which ends up in a 
situation. In this case, the whole sequence of actions could be regarded as 
opportunistic behavior instead of any single act ion individually. Of course, a 
sequence of actions can be seen as one action if we only look at the precon-
dition of the first action and the effect of the last action , but we might also 
be interested in what properties we can derive from opportunistic behavior 
when considering multiple actions instead of a single action. For instance, 
is it necessary for the individual actions to be opportunistic behavior in 
order for the whole sequence of actions to be opportunistic behavior? How 
can we interpret the property of non-compensa tion for opportunism that 
we encountered in Section 3.2? We will study the above issues considering 
multiple actions for opportunism. 
In situation calculus, a binary function do(a, s) is used to denote the 
situation resulting from performing action a in situation s, so for a finite 
sequence of act ions a,, ... , an , the situation resulting from performing the 
sequence of actions in situation s is denoted as do( an, do( an - , , ... do( a1, s))). 
Each action within the sequence brings about a new situation that satisfies 
certain properties. Formally, based on Definition 3 .4.6, opportunism for 
multiple actions is defined as below: 
Definition 3.5.1 (Opportunism for Multiple Actions). Let D be a Situation 
Calculus BAT, K and I be the axioms for knowledge and intention repres-
entation in the Situation Calculus respectively, V be the value system of 
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agents, Evalref be the reference function representing the object for an agent's 
evaluation on situations, and < v be a pref erence ordering on situations. 
Then (DU K U / , V, Evalre f , <v) is a situation calculus BAT extended with 
knowledge, intention, value and pref erence. Within this system, we have 
0 . (. . ) def pportunism i,J,a1,---,an,s1 = 
I\ Poss(i , j,ak,sk) I\ lntend(i ,ak,pro(i),sk) I\ r.p 
1::,; k ::,; n 
where 
Sk = do(ak- 1, .. . do(a1, s1 ))(1 < k S n). 
Because each act ion in t he sequence must be possible to be performed 
a nd it is the property of intention to be persistent a long the whole sequence 
of actions [Bratman, 1987], knowledge asymmet ry and intention is true in 
Sk for l :S k S n. Value opposition is the property of the state transition 
by the seq uence of act ions. A finite sequence of actions a 1, . . . , an , which is 
pe rformed by agent i to agent j in s ituation s1, is opportunistic behavior 
if and only if each action is possible to be p erformed wi t h the intention to 
promote agent i's value and t he whole sequence res ults in value opposition 
for agent i a nd j. 
Regarding the e ffects of opportunistic behavi or , agent j 's value gets de-
moted by the behavior, which can be permanent or repairable. ln the former 
case, it is impossible to compensate the negative effect on agent j (e.g. some-
body dies from it); while in the latter case it is possible in some forms (e.g. a 
broken cup can be returned). Since opportunist ic behavior is performed by 
intent , we argue that agent i will not act ively compensate agent j 's loss, no 
matter whethe r it is pe rm anent or re pa irable. For this reaso n, we introduce 
t he following defi nition non-compensation for agent j, which is a n essentia l 
property of opportunism: 
Definition 3.5.2 (Non-compensation). Given a sequence of actions Seq = 
a1, .. -,an as opportunistic behavior Opportunism(i ,j,Seq,s1) and q = 
Evalref(VJ , s,do(Seq,s)) , we say that Seq is non-compensated for agent j 
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iff :lk : ak E Seq such that for the subsequence of actions SeqB = a1, ... , ak 
q(s1) I\ ,q(do(Seqa, s1 )) 
and for the subsequence of actions SeqR = ak+1, ... , an, '<Im: am E SeqR 
By this definition, we separate the sequence of actions into two parts: 
SeqB that brings about ,q, and Seqn that retains , q. Note that Seqn can 
be empty, which implies that the whole sequence brings about ,q and the 
situation transition is permanent and irreversible . Moreover, as the whole 
sequence of actions is performed by agent i, the compensation for agent j's 
loss comes from agent i rather than agent j itself or someone else. 
Definition 3.5.1 together with its property of non-compensation captures 
some interesting properties, which cannot be derived from Definition 3.4.6. 
First of a ll , 
Proposition 3.5.1. For a sequence of actions Seq = a1, ... , an being oppor-
tunistic behavior Opportunism( i , j, Seq, s ), we have 
F Opportunism(i,j, Seq,s)--+ (:la </c Seqn),(s >v1 do(SeqB, do(a,s))) 
lt implies that the negative effect of opportunistic behavior on agent j could 
have been compensated but is not done by agent i. Typically when SeqR is 
empty, it is meaningless to talk about action a, because the negative effect is 
permanent . 
Proposition 3.5.2. Given a finite sequence of actions a1, . .. , an as oppor-
tunistic behavior, we can prove that 
F Opportunism( i, j, a1 , ... , an, s1) --+ 
Knowasym(i, j, <p, sk) I\ Knowasym(i, j, <p, do(ak, sk) )(1 < k < n) 
Proof. Each action in the sequence is possible to be performed and also 
Combining these two formulas, we can easily get 
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Knowasym( i, j , cp, Sk) A Knowasym(i, j, cp, do(ak , sk) )(1 :S k < n). 
This proposition shows that, when opportunistic behavior consists of a se-
quence of actions, the property of knowledge asymmetry is preserved through-
out the whole sequence. 
Proposition 3.5.3. Given a finite sequence of actions a1, ... , a,, as oppor-
tunistic behavior, we can prove action a; needs not be opportunistic, which is 
characterized by 
~ Opportunism(i,j,a1, ... ,a,,,s1)(n > 1) ----+ 
Opportunism(i,j, ak, sk)(l :S k :S n) 
Proof. In order lo prove this proposition, we are going to find a counter-
example of opportunistic behavior which satisfies condition n > l but each 
action does not satisfy all the properties of opportunism. 
Freeriding is still a suitable model lo prove this properly. Since freeriding 
is one form of opportunistic behavior, Opportunism( i, others, f reeride, s l) is 
true in our model. Now we are going lo split it into a sequence of actions 
a1 , ... , an and suppose a free rider exist in a society with a large population 
and benefits from the public goods without paying. Since the amount that the 
free rider is supposed to pay is shared by a large population, other agents do 
not notice ( or even nol care about) the small change of the current situation 
lhus not gelling lheir value demoted for Lillie amounl of freeriding. That is, 
for action a1;; , 
Evalref(Vothers, Sk , do(ak , sk)) = T 
so that s < v,, , ,.,.,-., do( a, s) does not hold any more. Therefore, il is nol lrue 
that 
Opportunism(i , j,ak ,sk)(l :S k :S n). 
However, once the a mount that the free rider is supposed to pay accu-
mulates to be large enough for getting other agents' value demoted (the 
whole sequence of act ions is considered), it will be regarded as opportunistic 
behavior. By theoretical comparison, this example is quite s imilar to Sorites 
paradox, where grains are individually removed from a heap of sands and the 
heap stops being a heap when the process is repeated for enough times [Hyde, 
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2014]. So it is also interesting to think about when the behavior starts to be 
regarded as opportunistic. In next section , we start to assume a normative 
context for the study of opportun ism. We consider a set of agents as a system 
with norms representing their collective value system. Opportunism is defined 
with respect to an agent and a system with norms. 
3.6 Opportunistic Behavior with a Normative Context 
In the previous sections, we made an assumption for the sake of simplicity that 
there is no legal or moral evaluation being made or implied to opportun istic 
behavior such that we cannot necessarily evaluate it as good or bad. However, 
agents in MAS are residing in a normative context which provides obligations, 
permissions and other types of norms for guiding agents' behaviors. The 
setting of those norms reflect the value system of a MAS . To have a formal 
model of opportunism with a normative context, we can of course replace the 
agent j in our previous models with a system (in this way, we see the whole 
system as an agent) and get similar properties as in la.st two sections, but now 
we are more interested in putting opportunism in a deontic-based normative 
context to see how it relates to norms. Thus, in this section, we are going to 
place opportunistic behavior into a normative context and propose a formal 
mode l of opportunism from this perspective. 
For defining opportunistic behavior with a normative context, we adopt 
the definition of knowledge asymmetry and intention in previous sections but 
redefine value opposition. Firstly, we have three normative statuses, which 
are similar to deontic logic. 
• it is obligatory that (OB) 
• it is permissible that (PE) 
• it is forbidden that (FO) 
Secondly, we define the above deontic notions for specifying the normative 
propositions n. 
Definition 3.6.1 (Obligatory, P ermissible and Forbidden). 
OB(i, a, s) d!;J (Vs')R;(s', s)--+ occur(a, s') 
PE(i , a, s) d!;j (:3s')R;(s', s) I\ occur(a , s') 
FO(i, a, s) d!;f (Vs')Ri(s', s)--+ ,occur(a, s') 
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In t he definition , R,,;(s', s) denotes the deontic accessibility relation o f 
agent i, meaning that what is the case in situation s' is ideal for situat ion 
s, a nd occur(a , s') is true when act ion a is performed in sit uation s'. R-
relation is seria l, which means for all situat ions s there is a t least one possible 
sit uat ion s' such t hat Ili(s', s) holds. This property of R-relation ensures t he 
validity F 0B(i,a,s)--+ PE(i,a,s) to be hold , which is a lso consistent with 
our intuition . Each modali ty can be taken as a basic to define the other two 
modalities. 
We then specify the preference of the system on s ituations, where V is 
restricted to deontic-based soc ia l value. 
s <v11 s' = (:la,i)s' = do(a ,s) /\ OB(i, a,s) 
s >v11 s' = (:la,i)s' = do(a,s) /\ FO (i,a,s) 
Here symbol A represents the whole system, which is a set of agents . The 
firs t equiva lence means that t he soc ia l value gets promoted if t here ex ists 
a n action whose performa nce complies with the norm , while the second one 
means that the socia l va lue gets demoted if there ex ists a n act ion whose 
performing violates the norm. 
Together with the spec ifi cat ion of agents' preferences on s ituations, we 
have t he definition of value opposit ion between a n agent and t he whole system. 
Definition 3.6.2 (Value Opposition with a Normative Context) . 
(
. ') def I I Valueopp i, A , s, s = s <v, s /\ s >v11 s 
For the state trans ition from s to s', the value of agent i gets promoted 
whereas the social value gets demoted. Again , we only limit the definition to 
one case excluding the other way arou nd for simplicity. 
Therefore, s imilar to Definition 3.4.6, we have the definition of opport un-
istic behav ior with a normative context . 
Definition 3.6.3 (Opportunism with a Normat ive Context). Let D be a Situ-
ation Calculus BAT, K and [ be the axioms for knowledge and intention 
representation in the Situation Calculus respectively, V be the value system of 
agents, Evalref be the reference function representing the object for an agent's 
evaluation on situations, n be a finit e set of normative propositions, and < v 
be a preference ordering on situations. Then (DUK U 1, V, Evalre f, TT , <v) 
is a situation calculus BAT extended with knowledge, intention, value, norms 
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and preference. Within this system, we have 
Opportunism( i, A, a, s) d;;j Poss( i, A, a, s) /\ Intend( i, a, pro( i), s) /\ r.p 
where 
Poss( i, A, a, s) = Knowasym( i, A, r.p, s) 
r.p = Valueopp(i , A , s, do(a , s)). 
Action a performed by agent i is regarded as opportunistic behavior if 
and only if it is performed with the asymmetric knowledge <p about the state 
transition from s Lo do(a, s) and the intention of self-interest, a nd results in 
value opposition against the system A where agent i is. 
The definition of opportunistic behavior with a normative context shows 
that, given the value system of a system, opportunistic behavior is considered 
to be bad since its performance results in demoting the social value. Further, 
it implies the moral dilemma concern ing the conflict between desire and 
obligation. More precisely, an agent has the desire "to do what he wants" , 
while the normative context where the agent is residing gives the obligation 
"to do what one ought to do". Opportunistic agents follow their desire but 
ignore the obligation. Hence, it is prohibited by laws or norms from the 
perspective of the whole system. 
Since we assume a normative context in this section, it is worth invest-
igating the relation between deontic notions and mental states. Our model 
governs Proposition 3.6.1 regarding opportunistic agents having knowledge 
about the relevant norms, and Proposition 3.6.2 and Proposition 3.6.3 about 
the intention of opportunistic behavior not being derived from the obligation. 
Proposition 3.6.1. Let action a be opportunistic behavior performed by 
agent i within system A in situations, for the normative proposition associ-
ated wilh action a FO( i , a, s) E fI we have 
F Opportunism(i , A, a , s)-+ Know(i , FO(i, a, s), s) 
Proof. Since Opportunism ( i , A, a, s) holds, by Definition 3. 6. 3, agent i must 
have knowledge about the effect of performing action a , that is, Know(i , r.p, s) 
holds, where r.p = Valueopp(i , A, s, do(a, s)) . By Definition 3.6.2, <p = 
(s <v; do(a, s) I\ s >v.., do(a, s)). Therefore, Know(i , s >v.., do(a , s) , s) 
holds. Because V is restricted to deontic-based social value in our model, 
47 
3 A Formal Definition of Opportunism 
(s >v,1 do(a ,s)) = FO(i,a,s) holds, thereby Know(i,FO(i,a,s),s) holds as 
well. 
Agents have the knowledge about the relevant norms in the system a nd 
decide whether and which to comply with based on their own analysis. Typ-
ically, opportunistic agents behave in their interest, regardless of the norms 
they a re supposed to follow. 
Moreover, as Broersen and his colleagues indicate in their BOID architec-
ture [Broersen et al., 2005], intention might be derived from obligation (e.g. , 
1 ought to go to work this morning, so I intend to go to work this morning), 
or might just come from agents' own desire (e.g., 1 feel thirsty, so T intend to 
get some water). Tn a given sit uation , agents intend to perform opportunistic 
behavior , which is motivated by self-interest. In order to prove this property 
rigorously, we first prove what opportunistic agents care about is not the 
norm they have to comply with . 
Proposition 3.6.2. Let action a be opportunistic behavior performed by 
agent i within system A in situation s, and Vi be agent i 's value system, for 
the norm associated with action a FO( i , a, s) E TI, we have 
F Opportunism(i , A, a ,s) --+ (Evalref(V;,s , do(a,s)) =/=- FO(i, a,s)) 
Proof. By contradiction, we assume that Evalref(V; ,s, do(a,s)) = FO(i , a,s ), 
which means that what agent i cares about is the norm he has to comply 
with. Because of that, he is not performing action a in order to promote his 
value, and if that is the case, the system value will not get demoted. Thal 
is, s <v; s' /\s > v,1 s' does not hold. Consequently, Opportunism(i , A, a ,s ) 
does not hold, either. Therefore, Evalref(V; , s , do(a, s)) = FO(i , a,s) is false 
for opportunistic behavior. 
Using Proposition 3.6.2, we are going to prove it is not the case for 
opportunistic behavior t ha t the intention is derived from the obligation. 
Proposition 3.6.3. Let action a be opportunistic behavior performed by 
agent i within system A in situations, for the norm associated with action a 
OB(i , a, s) E TT, we have 
F Opportunism(i , A,a,s)--+ -. (Intend(i , a , pro(i) ,s)--+ OB(i,a,s)) 
Proof. B ecause formula -. (Intend(i, a,pro(i) ,s) --+ OB(i , a ,s)) is equivalent 
to lntend (i, a, pro(i) , s) I\ -.0B(i, a, s), we need to prove that it is always the 
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case that Opportunism(i, A, a, s) ➔ Intend(i, a, pro( i), s) A,-,QB( i, a, s). From 
Definition 3.6.3 we have Opportunism(i,A,a,s) ➔ Intend(i,a,pro(i),s) A 
FO(i,a,s). Because FO(i,a,s) ➔ -,QB(i,a,s), Opportunism(i,A,a,s) ➔ 
Intend(i, a, pro(i), s) A -,QB(i, a, s) holds. 
3. 7 Example: Selling a Broken Cup 
Recall the example that we used to introduce opportunism at the beginning 
of the thesis. The scenario is simple but sufficient to illustrate our formal 
specification of opportunism. We label the seller and the buyer as s and 
b, who can be in one of the situations: So (the initial situation, before the 
transaction) and do(a , So) (after the transaction). The seller can either sell 
the cup (a = sell(x)) or keep it. If the seller performs the action sell(x) in 
So, then situation will go to do(sell(x), So). 
In situation So, the asymmetric knowledge owned by the seller but not the 
buyer is not only about the broken cup, but also the state transition: once the 
transaction finishes , the situation will go from So to do(sell(x), So), which 
gets the value of the seller promoted whereas the value of the buyer demoted. 
That is, the precondition Knowasym(s, b, <p , So) holds. Now consider the 
value for both parties. In this example we assume that both parties go for 
economic value. However, they have different and contradictory perspect-
ives about the economic value. What the seller cares about is how much 
money he earns from the transaction. When the broken cup has already 
been sold, his va lue gets promoted (So <v, do(sell(x), So) holds). Con-
versely, what the buyer cares about is whether the cup has good quality or 
not. So once the buyer knows the cup is broken , his value gets demoted 
(So >v,, do(sell(x) , So) holds). The above two sentences ensure sentence 
Valueopp(s, b, So, do(sell(x), So)) holds. Further, since it is the seller 's inten-
tion to sell the broken cup to the buyer for promoting his value, sentence 
Intend(s , sell(x),pro(s) , So) a lso holds. With the above formalization, the 
formula for this example Opportunism(s, b, sell(x), So) holds. 
We now discuss two interesting situations extended from the simple ex-
a mple. Firstly, if the buyer buys the cup only for decoration without using 
it, he will never know the cup is broken or even cares about it. That is, the 
buyer's perspective is revised to Evalref(Vb, So, do(sell(x ), So)) = appearance 
and then sentence So >v0 do(sell(x), So) does not hold any more. In this 
case, because the two perspectives are not contradictory, the seller 's behavior 
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is not opportunistic from the perspective of the buyer, if the norms are not 
taken into account. It is a lready proved in Proposition 3.4.1 t hat agents must 
have diffe rent perspectives a bout the same state transition if there is oppor-
tunistic behavior between those two agents. But the above discussion s hows 
t ha t hav ing diffe rent perspect ives does not necessarily lead to opportunistic 
behavio r: they must be contradictory. The s ubject ivity of opportunism is 
re flected by the different judgments on the same action. 
Seco ndly, if th ere is nothing the seller can do except selling the broken 
cup when being in state So, it will st ill be regarded as opportunistic behavior 
based on Definition 3.4.6 , which might be allowed by the system. It is because 
there is no mora l or legal evalua tion in this definition thus no matter whether 
the behav ior is good or bad. However, it will be different if we analyze it with 
Definition 3.6.3. Suppose it is a llowed by the system (PE(i,a,S0 )). Then 
So >vi\ do(sell( x ), So) does not hold , and then selling a broken cup is not 
opportunistic behavior from the perspective of t he system. In our example, 
the options available to the buyer in state So a re { sell , keep}, which means it 
is not the only choice for the seller to sell the broken cup. Moreover , sometimes 
it is our intention to put ourselves in a situation where we only have one 
option to choose. In this case, the whole sequence of actions t hat illustrates 
how the situation a rrives in one option available might be opportunistic. 
Further , with the help of our mode l, we can gain pract ical insights into 
e liminating opportunism. In our case, one important reason why the seller 's 
behavior is seen as opportunistic is that the seller and the buyer evaluate the 
state transition from two opposed perspectives based on their value systems. 
In other words, even though they both go for economic value, they eva luate 
t he act ion from different pe rspectives. When applying this approach in 
coll aborative relat ionships, it is much easier to understand how a rela tionship 
can end up in defection . Therefore, one way of eliminating opportunism 
is to avoid having contrasted value systems in the relations hip . As for the 
precondition of opportunism, even though it is difficult to prevent knowledge 
asymmetry in business transactions, we still need to think about how much 
informat ion we can provide to our colla borating agents, especially during 




In this chapter we attempted to propose a simple but elegant model of 
opportunism for different context settings, our specification might not manage 
to capture every possible scenario. For instance, in Section 3.4 we only talk 
about the interaction between two agents and investigate the evaluation on 
the state transition based on the value system of the two agents who are 
involved in the transaction. But actually such evaluation can also be done by 
others. This is because in the specification of value promotion and demotion 
the proposition evaluated based on an agent's value system is not necessarily 
related to the transactions the agent is involved. Assume that a friend of the 
buyer knows the story about the broken cup. He may get angry with the seller 
for the unfair transaction and then the behavior performed by the seller is 
regarded as opportunistic from his perspective, even though he is not involved. 
In other words, the judgment of opportunism is subjective not only for the 
agents involved , but also for anybody who evaluate the action based on his or 
her own value system. Further, our models only consider intentional actions. 
However, opportunistic behavior can also be intentional inactions such as 
withholding information. In this case, the social value gets demoted for agent 
i's not performing an obligatory action instead of performing a forbidden 
act ion. Of course , our models can capture this scenario in a way that doing 
nothing can be seen as a particular way of doing something. Interesting 
insights can be gained from further study on this part. 
We also propose that the asymmetric knowledge obtained by opportunistic 
agents is value opposition about the state transition, which is out of our 
intuition. The reason can be shown by the example in Section 3.7. Intuitively 
the asymmetric knowledge that the seller has is about the broken cup. Now 
wc assume that both the seller and the buyer know the cup is broken and the 
seller sells it with a high price. Once the buyer knows that the broken cup is 
not worth that price, his value will get demoted . From that, we can conclude 
that it does not matter whether the fact about the broken cup is only known 
by one party beforehand, but whether value opposition about the transaction 
is only known by one party beforehand. In other words, the asymmetric 
knowledge is not about the objective fact, but about agents' evaluation on 
the state transition. 
The definition of non-compensation is introduced for opportunism with 
multiple actions, based on the fact that the negative effect of opportunistic 
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behavior can be re paira ble or perma nent. Given a normative context, the 
norm Lhat opporLunist ic behavior Lriggers (violates) can be repaired or noL 
based on the same fact. In the former case, we can eliminaLe opporLunistic 
beha vior by impos ing punishments or sanctions on Lhe norm. For insLance, 
in the case of free riding, reparation of opportunism can be handled through 
fin e . Opportunistic agents may be forced to repa ir the norm by regimented 
norms a fter the opportunist ic behavior is detecLed . When the norm cannot be 
repa ired once be ing violated, such a n opportunist ic behavior is supposed to be 
prevented from happening. In other words, the norm should be implemented 
in the environme nt, or by des igning no rm-abiding agents. 
3 .9 Chapter Summary 
Agents with knowledge asy mmetry might p erform opportunistic behavior 
to others in their inte rest . Numerous works about such a selfish behavior 
have been done in social science due to its negat ive effect on the relat ionship 
between people. However , most conclusions arc based on a given form of op-
portunism, making it, hard to build a fund amenta l t heory t hat can be applied 
in a ny context. This chapter took the initi a tive to propose a form a l model 
of opportunism in the multi-agent system context, based on t he extended 
informa l definition from Willia mson . The modeling work was done based on 
the situa tion calculus integrat ing the notion of values. We first proposed a 
preliminary model that only considers a s ingle action between two agents, and 
then extended it for multiple act ions with a no rmative co ntext. Each model 
captured interest ing properties that were useful for our future research. IL is 
important to keep in mind that t he a im of this chapLer is not Lo find ouL where 
opportunistic behav ior co mes from a nd how Lo eliminate it,, but raLher to 
have a Lhorough undersLanding of the nature of opportunism before ex ploring 
t hose issues . Therefore, t he main st rength of t his chapLer is definin g s uch 
a behav io r from our s pec ific perspective in a formal way, so as to represent 
the e lements in the definition and the ir re lations a nd reason a bout the state 
transition by the behavior. 
Based on our understanding of the concept of opportunism, we can study 
where a nd when opportunism a rises in a social sett ing. Evaluation based on 
different, value systems is t he reason for value opposition of a state transition. 
So cons iderable ins ights can be achieved from the investigat ion of t he compaL-
ibility of different value systems and the co-evolu t ion of agents' value systems 
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with a normative context or environmental changes. Further, as opportunism 
is a self- interested behavior that may conflict with norms, its emergence 
might come from the way in which agents resolve the conflicts between beliefs , 
obligations, intentions and desires . For instance , an agent whose desires 
always overrule obligations might behave opportunistically. Those conflicts 
and their resolutions corresponding to different agent types are investigated 
in the BOID architecture [Broersen et al., 2001] and [Broersen et al., 2005]. 
A well-designed monitoring mechanism can be used to automatically detect 
opportunism in ( computer-based) human interactions, providing ways to pro-
tect agents' values from being demoted. Another important topic is designing 




Opportunism is a behavior that causes norm violation and promotes agents ' 
own value. In the context of multi-agent systems, we want to eliminate such 
a selfish behavior through setting enforcement norms. Because opportunistic 
behavior cannot be observed directly, there has to be a monitoring mechanism 
that can detect the performance of opportunistic behavior in the system. This 
chapter provides a logical framework based on the specification of actions 
to specify monitoring approaches for opportunism. We investigate how to 
evaluate agents' actions to be opportunistic with respect to different forms 
of norms when those actions cannot be observed directly, and study how to 
reduce the monitoring cost for opportunism. 
4.1 Introduction 
Consider a common scenario. A seller sells a cup to a buyer and it is known by 
the seller beforehand that the cup is actually broken. The buyer buys the cup 
without knowing it is broken. The behavior results in promoting the seller's 
value but demoting the buyer's value. Such a selfish behavior intentionally 
performed by the seller is first named opportunistic behavior ( or opportunism) 
by economist Williamson [Williamson, 1975]. It is a typical behavior that is 
motivated by self-interest and takes advantage of knowledge asymmetry about 
the behavior to promote an agent's own value, regardless of the other agent's 
value (Chapter 3). ln the context of multi-agent systems, we want to constrain 
55 
4 M on i l oring Opportunism 
such a selfish behavior through setting enforcement norms, in the reveal tha t 
opportunistic agents receive a corresponding sanct ion when t hey vio la te the 
norm. On the one ha nd , it is importa nt to detect it, as it has undesirable 
results fo r the pa rt icipa tin g agents a nd we wa nt to impose sanct io n to the 
agent who was opport unistic. On the other ha nd , since opport unism is a lways 
in the form of cheating, deception a nd betrayal, meaning tha t t he system 
does not know wha t the agent performs or even th e motiva tion behind it (for 
example, in a dist ribu ted system), opportunistic behavior cannot be observed 
directly. There fore, t here has to be a monito ring mecha nism tha t can detect 
the performance of opportunistic beha vior in the system. 
This chap ter provides a logical fra mework based on the specification of 
ac tions to moni tor opportunism. Tn pa rticula r , since moni tors canno t read 
agents' mental states and it is demotivated to perform opport unistic behavior 
from the perspective of t he system , we define opport unism as a behavior 
t hat causes norm vio la tion a nd promotes agents ' own va lue. Based on thi s 
definition, we investigate how to evalua te agents' actions to be opportunistic 
with respect to different forms of norms when those act ions cannot be observed 
direct ly, and ex plore how lo reduce t he monitoring cost for opportunism based 
on the monitoring a pproaches we proposed . We study form al properties of 
our moni toring a pproaches in o rder to determine whether t hey a re effect ive 
in the reveal tha t whenever a n ac tion is detected to be opport unistic, it was 
indeed opportunistic, a nd tha t whenever an act ion was opportunisti c, it is 
indeed detected . 
4.1.1 Chapter Outline 
The rest o f t he cha pter is organized as follows: 
• Section 4.2 introduces t he logical fra mework , which is a t ra nsition system 
s pec ified based on t he s pecificat ion of act ions; 
• Sect ion 4.3 defin es opport unism from t he pe rspective of monito rs; 
• Sect ion 4.4 proposes our moni toring a pproaches for opportunism with 
respect to different form s of norms, each following a discuss ion of formal 
prope rt ies; 
• Sect ion 4.5 investigates moni toring cost fo r opportunism based on our 
monito ring a pproaches; 
• Section 4.7 summa rizes t he chapte r. 
56 
4- 2 Framework 
4.2 Framework 
In this seclion we inlroducc the models and lhe logical language we use, a nd 
define t he co ncept of norms by means or our language. 
4.2.1 Monitoring Transition Systems 
Mon itors cannol observe the performance of opporlun ism directly. However , 
ac tions can be represented a nd identified through the informa tion about the 
context where lhe act ion can be perform ed a nd lhe property change in t he 
system. Those kinds of information is called aclion specification [Reiter, 
2001] or action description [Fiadeiro and Maiba um, 1991]. Usua lly an act ion 
can be specified through its precondition a nd its e ffect (postcondition): lhe 
precondition specifies t he scenario where the action can be performed whereas 
t he postcondition specifies the scenario resulting from pe rforming the act ion . 
For example, lhe act ion, dropping a glass to the ground , can be specified as 
holding a g lass as ils precondit ion a nd t he g lass getti ng broken as its e ffect. 
In this chapler , we assume t hat every act ion has a set of pairs of t he form 
('¢;, '¢~), where '¢; is t he precondition of act io n a and '¢~ is the effect o f 
act ion a performed in the context of'¢;, both o f whi ch a re propositional 
formul as. Somelimes a particular act ion a can have different effects depending 
on the contexl in which it is performed. Based o n this idea, we argue thal 
action a can be represented through a set of pa irs D(a) = {('¢;,'¢~) , ... }, 
each element indicat ing its precondition and its co rres ponding effect . T he 
a bsence of a precondit ioon mea ns that the pe rformance of the action is not 
co ntext-dependent. 
In this cha pte r , t he models t hat we use a rc transition systems, which 
consist of agents Agl , stales S , actions Act and transit ions R between states 
by act ions. When a n act ion a E Act is perform ed in a certa in state s, lhc 
system might progress to a different state s' in which different propositions 
might hold. Sud1 a s tate transition is defined based on act ion s pecificat ion. 
Namely, given a state lra ns it ion from state s to state s' by action a, the 
precondition of act ion a is satisfied in state s a nd the effect o f action a is 
satisfied in state s'. We a lso extend t he standa rd fra mework wit h an observ-
a ble access ibili ty relat ion M. T he restriction on the R a nd the extension or 
M make our mode ls different from t he standard ones in [Ke ller, 1976] [Baier 
et a l. , 2008]. Note that in th is chapter we don ' t, talk about concurrent actions 
for si mplifying our model, meaning that we assume there is on ly one act io n 
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to execute in every sta te. Moreover, act ions are deterministic; the same 
act ion performed in the same state will always result in the same new state. 
Forma lly, 
Definition 4.2.1. Let <I> = {p, q, ... } be a finit e set of atomic proposi-
tional variables. A monitoring transition system over <I> is a tuple T = 
(Agt, S , Act , 1r , M , R , so ) where 
• Agl is a finit e sel of agents; 
• S is a finit e set of slates; 
• Act is a finit e sel of actions; 
• 1r : S -+ P( <I>) is a valuation function mapping a state to a set of proposi-
tions thal are considered lo hold in that slate; 
• M ~ S x S is a refl exive, transitive and symmetric binanJ relation between 
stales, that is, for alts E S we have sMs; for alts, l, u E S sMt and 
tMu imply that sMu; and for alts, t E S sMl implies tMs; sMs' is 
interpreted as stale s' is observably accessible from state s; 
• R ~ S x Act x S is a relation between slates with actions, which we 
ref er lo as the transition relation labeled with an action; since we have 
already introduced lhe notion of action specification, a state transition 
(s, a, s') E R if thern exists a pair (1/J~, 1/J~) E D(a) such that 'lj;~ is satisfied 
in slate s and 'lj;~ is satisfied in slate s', and bolh 'lj;~ and 'lj;~ are evaluated 
in the conventional way of classical propositional logic; since actions are 
deterministic, sometimes we also denote slate s' as s(a) for which it holds 
that (s,a,s (a)) E R; for convenience, we use R('P,1/J) = {(s , a, s') E R I 
M , s F 'P and M , s' F 1j;} to denote the transitions going from a ({)- stale 
lo a 'lj;- slate; 
• so E S denotes lhe initial slate. 
Norms are regarded as a set of constraints on agents ' behavior. More 
precise ly, a norm defines whether a possible state tra nsition by an action is 
considered to be demotivated or not. The same as [Agotnes et a l., 2007], we 
s imply consider a norm as a subset of R that is decided by the designers of 
the system. Formally, 
Definition 4.2.2 (Norm). A norm T/ is defined as a subset of R , i.e. T/ ~ R. 
Intuitively, given a stale transition (s , a, s'), (s, a, s') E T/ means that transition 
(s, a, s') is forbidden by norm r, . We say (s, a , s') is an r,-violation if and only 
if (s, a , s') E r, . Otherwise, (s, a, s') is an r, -compliant. 
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From the way that we define a norm, we can realize two extreme cases: if 
norm T/ is an empty set, all the possible state transitions are r,-compliant; and 
it is also possible that a norm leads to states with no legal successor, which 
means that agents can only violate the norm. 
4.2.2 Logical Setting 
The logical language we use in this chapter is propositional logic Lprop exten-
ded with action modality, denoted as Lmodal· The syntax of Lmodal is defined 
by the following grammar: 
'P ::=PI ·'P I 'Pi V c.p2 I (a)c.p 
where p E <P and a E Act. The semantics of Lrnodal are given with respect to 
the satisfaction relation "r=". Given a monitoring transition system T and a 
states in T , a formula c.p of the language can be evaluated in the following 
way: 
• T ,sr=p iffp E1r(s); 
• T, s r= ,c.p iff T , s It c.p; 
• T, s F c.p1 V c.p2 iff T, s F c.p1 or T, s F c.p2; 
• T , s F (a)c.p iff :3s' such that (s, a , s') E Rand T , s' F c.p; 
Other classical logic connectives (e.g.,"/\", " ➔") are assumed to be defined 
as abbreviations by using , and V in the conventional manner. We write 
T F c.p if T , s F c.p for all s E S, and F c.p if T F c.p for all monitoring transition 
systems T. 
Given the language LmodaL, a norm T/ can be defined in a more specific way 
such that it contains all the state transitions that are forbidden by norm r,. 
Norms are described in various ways so that they can represent the forbidden 
behaviors explicitly. Below we define three forms of norms: r,( c.p, 1/J), r,( c.p, a) 
and r,(c.p, a, 1/J), each following an example for better understanding. Notice 
that it is only a choice in this chapter and more forms of norms can be 
described and constructed based on our logical framework. 
• Norm r,(c.p, 'i/J) Let c.p and 'i/J be two propositional formulas and T be 
a monitoring transition system. A norm r,( c.p, 1/J) is defined as the set 
r,r(c.p ,'i/J) = {(s ,a,s') E R I T ,s F c.p I\ (a)'i/J}. In the rest of the chapter, 
we will write r,(c.p, 'i/J) for short . This is the most simple form of norms. 
The interpreted meaning of a norm r,(c.p , 'i/J) is simply that it is forbidden to 
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achieve 'lj; in the states satisfying <.p (,p-state) by a ny actions. The forbidden 
act ions are implicitly indicated in this type of norms. For example, it is 
forbidden to keep the light on when everybody is sleeping, no matter you 
turn on the Aashlight or the lamp or lighten the candle. 
• Norm TJ( <.p,a) Let <.p be a propositional formula, a be a n act ion , and T 
be a monitoring transition system . A norm (,p ,a) is defined as the set 
TJT(<.p, a) = {(s,a',s') E R I T ,s F <.panda' = a}. In the rest of the 
cha pter, we will write TJ( <.p,a) for short. The interpreted meaning of a 
norm ri( <.p, a) is that it is forbidd en to perform action a in a <.p-state. This 
is the most common form in which the act ion and the context where 
the act ion is forbidden are explicitly represented , regardless of the effect 
that the action brings about. For example, it is forbidd en to smoke in a 
non-smoking area. 
• Norm TJ( '-P, a , 'lj; ) Let <.p a nd 'lj; be two propos itiona l formulas , a be an 
action , and T be a monitoring transition system. A norm (<.p , a ,'lj; ) is 
defin ed as the set TJT(<.p,a, 'lj;) = {( s,a', s') E R IT, s F <.pl\ (a' }'lj; and a' = 
a}. In the rest of the cha pter, we will write TJ(<.p,a,'lj;) for short. The 
inte rpreted meaning of a norm ri( <.p, a, 'lj;) is that it is forbidden to perform 
action a in <.p-state to achieve 'lj;. In this type of norms, the action, the 
context where the action is forbidd en and the effect that the action will 
bring a bout a re a ll represented ex plicitly. For example, in C hina it is 
forbidden to buy a house based on mortgage when you a lready own one. 
Sometime propositiona l formula <.p, which is indicated in t hree types of norms 
above, is called the precondition of an action for action prescription [F iadeiro 
and Ma iba um , 1991]. It should be distinguished from the precondition 'lj;; 
we introduced in act ion specification. Formula <.p is used to characterize the 
context where the act ion(s) is forbidden to perform by the system, whereas 'lj;; 
is used to represe nt in which s ituation the action can be physically performed. 
Certa inly there a rc relationships between <.p and 1/J;. For instance, <.p I\ 'lj;; 
should be satisfied for the validity of norm ri( <.p, a). We will take it into 
considerat ion when investigating monitoring approach for opportunism. 
4.3 D efining Opport unism 
Before we propose our monitoring a pproach for opportunism, we should 
formally define opportunism from the pe rspect ive of the system so that the 
system knows what to detect for monitoring opportunism. Tn our previous 
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chapter 3 we emphasize opportunistic behavior is performed by intent rather 
than by accident. However, monitors cannot read agents' mental states, so 
for the issue of monitoring we assume that agents violate the norms always 
by intention from a pragmatic perspective. For example, we always assume 
that speeding is performed with intention. In this paper we remove all the 
references to the mental states from the formal definition of opportunism in 
our previous chapter 3, and also assume that the system can tell whether a 
state transition can promote or demote an agent's value through the facts that 
have been detected. In a sentence, from the perspective of the system, since 
it is demotivated to perform opportunistic behavior, opportunistic behavior 
performed by an agent in a normative context can be simply defined as a 
behavior that causes norm violations and promotes his own value. 
Opportunistic behavior results in promoting agents' own value, which 
can be interpreted as that opportunistic agents prefer the state that results 
from opportunistic behavior rather than the initial state. As what we did in 
Chapter 3, we argue that agents always have preferences over two different 
states through evaluating the truth value of specific propositions in those 
states based on their value systems. For instance , the seller tries to see whether 
he gets the money from selling a broken cup in order to have a preference over 
the states before and after the transaction. After the transaction, the seller's 
value gets promoted, because the proposition he verifies ( whether he gets the 
money) based on his value system becomes true. Based on this interpretation, 
we first define a function Evalref that points to the proposition an agent cares 
about: 
Definition 4.3.1 (Eva! uation Reference). Let V be a set of agents ' value 
systems, S be a finite set of states, and <I> be a finite set of atomic propositions, 
EvalRef : V x S x S -+ <I> is a function named Evaluation Reference that 
returns a proposition an agent refers to for specifying his preference over two 
slates. 
This function means that the proposition that an agent cares about is depend-
ent on his value system and the two differnt states. Note that it is an abstract 
way to have what agents care about in a state transition through function 
Evalref. For a more concrete way, one can refer to function Mpreferred in 
Chapter 5 where we define a value system as a linear order over a set of 
formulas. For simplicity, we assume that for value promotion the truth value 
of the proposition that agents refer to changes from false to true in the state 
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transition. For example, assuming that proposition p represents the seller 
earns money, the seller promotes his value in the way of bringing about p 
through selling a broken cup. Based on this assumption , we define Value 
Promotion, which is an important e lement of opportunistic behavior. 
Definition 4.3.2 (Value Promotion). Given two states s and s', and an 
agent's value system ½, his value gels promoted from stale s lo s' , denoted 
as s < v, s', iff s F , p and s' F p, where p = Evalref(V, s , s') . 
As we already introduced the notion of value for defining opportunism, 
we extend our logical setting with value systems. We define a tuple of the 
form V = (Vi, Vi, ... , \liAgt l) as agents ' value systems. A multi-agent system 
is a com bination of a monitoring transition system and value systems, one 
for each agent, representing the evaluat ion bas is of the agents in the system. 
Formally, a multi-agent system, 9J! , is a tuple: 
9J! = (T, V) 
where Tis a monitoring transition system and V is a set of value systems for 
the agents in Agl. Now the syntax of £ modal still follows the one we defined 
above, and the semantics with respect Lo the satisfaction re lation become of 
the form 9J! , s F cp but is st ill defined in Lhe same way as above. 
Now we are ready to formalize opportunism from the perspective of the 
system. Again, comparing to the definition of opportunism in our previous 
work, we remove all the references to mental states (knowledge, intention) 
because it is impossible for monitors Lo detect any menta l states, but we 
assume that the system can reason whether an agent's value gets promoted 
or demoted along a state transition based on the corresponding value systems. 
Firstly, we extend our language to also include Opportunism(r/, a), a nd then 
we extend the satisfaction relation such that the following definition holds. 
Definition 4.3.3 (Opportunism). Given a multi-agent system 9JI and a 
norm 1J, an action a performed by agent i in state s being opportunistic 
behavior is defined as follows: 9JI, s F Opportunism(17, a) iff stale transition 
(s,a,s(a)) E 1J ands <v, s(a) . 
Intuitively, opportunism is a state transition which is an 17-violation. Besides, 
the state transition a lso promotes the value of the agent who performs act ion 
a (agent i) by bringing about p, which is the proposition that the agent refers 
to for having preference over state s and s(a) . Action a performed in state s, 
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more essentially state transition (s, a, s(a) ), is opportunistic behavior from the 
perspective of the system . We illustrate this definition through the following 
example. 
Example 4.1 (Selling a Broken Cup) . Consider the example of selling a 
broken cup in Figure 4.1. A seller sells a cup lo a buyer. It is known only 
by the seller beforehand that the cup is actually broken. The buyer buys the 
rnp, but of course gets disappointed when he uses it. Here the state transition 
is denoted as (s, sell(brokencup), s'). Given a norm ry( T, sell(brokencup)) 
interpreted as it is for-bidden lo sell broken cups in any circumstance, the 
seller 's behavior v'iolates norm 'I]- Moreover, based on the value system of 
the seller, his value gets promoted after he earns money from the transition 
(Evalref(Vs , s, s') = hasmoney(seller), 9J1 , s F , hasmoney(seller), 9J1, s' F 
hasmoney(seller)) . Therefore, the seller performed opportunistic behavior to 






Figure 4.1. Opportunistic behavior of selling a broken cup. 
4.4 Monitoring Opportunism 
We propose monitoring approaches for opportunism in this section. A monitor 
in this chapter is considered as an external observer that can evaluate a state 
transition with respect to a given norm. However, a monitor can only verify 
state properties instead of observing the performance of actions directly. Our 
approach to solve this problem is to check how things change along a given 
state transition and reason about the action taking place in between. Here we 
assume that our monitors are always correct, which means that the verification 
for state properties can a lways be done perfectly. One who doubts that this 
assumption is too ideal can refer to [Bu lling et al., 2013] for the investigation 
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of correctness of monitors, and we don 't discuss this issue in this chapter . In 
general, we consider monitoring as a matter of observing the system with 
an operator m such that m(cp) is read as "cp is detected" for a n arbitrary 
property cp. Multiple monitors can be combined together in order to deal 
with a monitoring issue. 
We first define a state monitor mstate, which can evaluate the validity of 
a given property in a given state. We define state monitors in this chapter in 
a similar way to we define knowledge in epistemic logic. This is because a 
monitor can be seen as an external observer that observe t he behavior of the 
system objectively. Sentence "cp is detected to be true" can be inte rpreted 
in the way "cp is known" by the monitor; "cp is not detected to be true" can 
be interpreted in the way "cp is unknown " by the monitor in the reveal that 
the monitor cannot distinguish cp and ,cp. We extend our logical language to 
also include mstate('P) and the satisfaction relation such that the following 
definition holds. 
Definition 4.4.1 (State Monitors). Given a proposilional formula cp, a 
multi-agent syslem 9J1, a slale monilor mstate over cp is defined as follows: 
9J1, s I= mstate( cp) iff for all s' sMs' implies 9J1 , s' I= cp. Sometimes we will 
write m state ( cp) for short if clear from lhe contexl. 
Because state monitors are defined in a similar way to knowledge in epistemic 
logic, they correspond ingly adopt the S5 properties of knowledge. 
Proposition 4.4.1 (Properties of State Monitors). Given a multi-agent sys-
tem 911, and a slale monitor mstate over cp, m state is 
• 9J1 I= mstate(cp)---+ cp, meaning lhat whal lhe stale monilor detecls is always 
considered lo be true; 
• 9J1 I= mstate ( cp) ---+ mstate ( mstate ( cp)), meaning that lhe fact thal something 
is detected to be true is always detected to be true; 
• 9J1 I= •1nstate ( cp) ---+ mstate ( •mstate ( cp)), meaning thal lhe fact thal some-
thing is not delected to be lrue is always detecled lo be lrue. 
This proposition holds since our binary relation R is equivalence relation (re-
flexive, transitive a nd symmet ric). We omit the proof for the space limitation. 
State monitors are the basic units in our monitoring mechanism. We can 
combine state monitors to check how things change in a given state transition 
and eva luate it with respect to a g iven set of norms. In Section 4.2, we 
introduced three forms of norms through which certain agents' behaviors 
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are forbidden by the system. As we defined in Section 4.3, opportunistic 
behavior performed by an agent is a behavior that causes norm violations and 
promotes his own value, that is, opportunism is monitored with respect to a 
given norm and a given value system of an agent. Based on this definition, we 
design different monitoring opportunism approaches with respect to different 
forms of norms and discuss in which condition opportunism can be perfectly 
monitored . H is worth stressing that one important issue of this chapter is to 
have an effective monitoring mechanism for opportunism in the reveal that 
• whenever an action is detected to be opportunistic, it was indeed oppor-
tunistic; 
• whenever an action was opportunistic, it is indeed detected. 
We will discuss these two issues every time we propose a monitoring approach. 
Definition 4 .4.2 (Monitoring Opportunism with Norm TJ('-P, 1/J)) . Given a multi-
agent system 9J1 and a norm TJ('-P, 1/J), whether an action a' performed by agent 
i in stale s is opportunistic behavior can be monitored through a combination 
of state monitors as follows: 
mopp(('-P, 1/J), a'): = ffistate('-P) I\ (a')mstate('I/J) 
where 
9J1 F <.p ➔ , p, 9J1 F 1/J ➔ p, and p = Evalref(¼, s , s(a')) 
In order to check whether action a' is opportunistic behavior in state s , we 
check if the state transition (s, a', s(a')) is forbidden by norm TJ( <.p, 1/J ): because 
the interpreted meaning of norm TJ( <.p, 1/J) is that it is forbidden to achieve 1/J 
in <.p-state by any actions, we check whether propositional formulas <.p and 
1/J are successively satisfied in a state transition. Moreover, we assume the 
following implications in our model that <.p implies , p and 1/J implies p , where 
proposition p is the proposition that agent i cares about along the transition. 
Since state s and s(a') are not given and our monitors can only have partial 
information about the two states, we have a candidate set of states for state 
s and a candidate set of states for state s(a') and any two states from them 
satisfy the resulting property of function Evalref, which means that given the 
partial information the execution of action a' in state s brings about p thus 
promoting agent i's value. The forbidden actions are not explicitly stated in 
the norm. Therefore, although the monitors cannot observe the performance 
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of opportunistic behavior, it still can be perfectly detected with respect to 
norm r,( cp, '¢), wh ich can be ex pressed by the following proposition : 
Proposition 4.4.2. Given a multi-agent system 9J1 and a norm r, (cp, '¢), an 
action a' performed by agent i is detected to be opportunistic with respect to 
r,( cp, '¢ ) over M if and only if action a' was indeed opportunistic: 
9J1 I= Opportunism((cp,'¢), a') +-+ mopp((cp,'¢),a') 
Proof. fl trivially holds because the monitors detect exactly what the norm 
indicates and they are assumed to be correct. 
Definition 4.4.3 (Monitoring Opportunism with Norm r, (cp, a)). Given a mulli-
agenl system 9J1, a norm r, ( cp, a), and a pair ('¢;, '¢~) of action a (('¢;, '¢~) E 
D(a) and cp I\'¢; is satisfiable on 9J1) , whether action a' performed by agent i 
in stale s is opportunistic behavior can be monitored through a combination 
of state monitors as follows: 
where 
9J1 I= cp I\'¢; ➔ , p, 9J1 I='¢: ➔ p, and p = Evalref( ½, s, s(a')) 
In order to check whether act ion a' is opportunistic behavior (violates norm 
r,(cp, a) a nd promotes own va lue), we verify if action a' is performed in a 
cp-state. Besides, we check if act ion a' is the adion that the norm exp lic itly 
s tates. Since the monitors cannot observe the performa nce of action a' , we 
only can ident ify act ion a' to be poss ibly action a by checking if formulas '¢; 
a nd '¢~ a re successively sat is fi ed in the state transition by action a', where 
'¢; is act,ion a's precondition and '¢~ is the corresponding e ffect. Similar to 
norm r,(cp ,'¢), we assume t hat cpl\'¢; implies , p a nd '¢~ implies p, where pis 
the proposition t hat agent i cares about a long the transition. Again, with 
this approach we have a candidate set of states for state s a nd a candidate 
set of states for state s(a') a nd any two states from them sat is fy the resulting 
property of funct ion Evalref, which means that given the partial information 
the exec ut,ion of act ion a' in state s brings a bout p thus promoting agent i's 
va lue. 
Given a norm a nd a n agent 's value system , we can evaluate whether a 
state transition by a n action is opportun istic behavior . However , s ince the 
66 
4-4 Monitoring Opportunism 
monitors can only verify state properties instead of observing the performance 
of the action directly, we cannot guarantee that an action that is detected to 
be opportunistic was indeed opportunistic, which is given by the following 
proposition: 
P roposit ion 4.4 .3. Given a multi-agent system 9J1, a norm 77( '-P, a), a pair 
(¢;,7/J~) of action a ((7/J;,¢~) E D(a) and1.p/\'lj;; is satisfiable on9J1), Leta' 
be an action performed by agent i, action a' that is detected to be opportunistic 
was possibly opportunistic, which is characterized as 
9J1 J<' mopp( ( '-P, a), (7/;;, 7/;~), a') -----+ Opportunism( ( '-P, a), a') 
Proof. This is because pair(¢;, if;~) might not be unique for action a within 
the actions that are available in a 1.p-state. That is, we have a set of actions 
Act' = {a' E Act I 9J1 ,s F mstate('-P I\¢;) I\ (a')mstate(if;~)}, and both action 
a and action a' are in Act'. 
Given this problem, we want to invest igate in which case or with what 
requirement the act ion that is detected by the opportunism monitor was 
indeed opportunistic behavior. From the proof of Proposition 4.4.3 we see that 
(¢;, if;~) in D(a) has to be unique for action a. However, such a requirement 
is quite hard to satisfied in reality. For example, we can design mu ltiple 
(probably infinite) computer programs with the same input and output. One 
possible way to solve this problem is to limit the set of actions that might 
have occurred through the context where the action is performed and the 
resu lt that the action brings about. Recalli ng that we have defined R( '-P, 7/;) 
for the transitions going from a 1.p-state to a ¢-state, we have the following 
proposition : 
Proposition 4 .4.4 . Given a multi-agent system 9J1, a norm 77( '-P, a) , a pair 
(¢;, 7/;~) of action a ((¢; , 7/;~) E D(a) and '-PI\¢; is satisfiable on 9J1) , let a' 
be an action performed by agent i, the following statements are equivalent: 
1. 9J1 F mopp( ( '-P, a),(¢;, 7/;~), a') H Opportunism( ( '-P, a) , a'); 
2. there exists only one action a that has pair (7/J;, if;~) within the set of 
transitions R( '-P, T ). 
Proof. 1 ⇒ 2: Statement 1 implies that action a' that is detected to be oppor-
tunistic was indeed opportunistic. If it holds, then a' = a. Because we identify 
action a with pair ( 7/J;, 7/;~), a' = a implies that pair ( 7/J;, 7/;~) is unique for 
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action a wilhin the set of lransitions R ( cp, T) . In other words, we cannot find 
one more action in lransilions R ( cp, T) lhat also has a pair (1/J;, 1/J:) . 2 => 1: 
If action pair (1/J; , 1/J:) is unique for action a within lransilions R (cp, T), lhen 
once lhe pair is detected in the state lransition we can deduce that a' = a. 
Hence, action a' is indeed opportunistic behavior. And from the proof of 
proposition 4-4.3 we can see that action a is wilhin lhe sel of actions lhal are 
detected lo be opportunistic, so if action a' was opportunistic behavior then il 
is indeed detected. 
We can a lso derive a practical implication from this proposition: in order 
Lo better mo ni tor opportunistic behav io r , we should appropriately find an 
action pa ir (1/J;, 1/J:) such that the possible actions that Look place can be 
strongly rest ricted and minim ized. Ass uming that we use monitoring approach 
mopp((cp , a) , (T, T), a'), the possibility that the opportunism monito r ma kes 
a n error is extremely high, because every act ion that is availa ble in cp-state 
will be detected to be opportunistic behav ior given the act ion pa ir (T, T). 
Definition 4.4.4 (Monitoring Opportunism with Norm r,( cp, a, 1/J)) . Given a 
multi-agent system 9J1 , a norm r,(cp,a,1/J), and a pair (1/J;,1/J:) of action a 
(( 1/J;, 1/J:) E D( a) and cp I\ 1/J; and 1/J I\ 1/J: are satisfiable on 9J1 ), let a' be an 
action performed by agent i in state s, whether action a' is opportunistic 
behavior can be monitored through a combination of slate monitors as fallows: 
mopp((cp, a, 1/J), (1/J;, 1/;;), a'): = 
ffi state(cp ) I\ (a' )mstate('I/J) I\ ffi state('I/J~) I\ (a' )mstate('I/J: ) 
where 
9J1 F cp I\ 1/J; ➔ , p, 9J1 F ·¢ I\ 1/;; ➔ p, and p = Evalref(V;, s, s(a')) 
In order Lo check whether act ion a' is opportunistic behav ior ( violates no rm 
r,( cp, a, 1/J) a nd promotes own value) , we verify if act ion a' is performed in a cp-
state and secondly verify if act ion a' brings about 1/J . Besides, as the forb idden 
act ion a is ex plicitly stated in norm r, , we only can identify action a' to be 
possibly act ion a by checking if formulas 1/J; a nd 1/J: are s uccessively sat isfied 
in the state transition by act ion a', where 1/J; is action a 's precondition a nd 1/J: 
is the corresponding e ffect. Similar to norm r,(cp,1/J) a nd r,(cp,a), we assume 
that cp I\ 1/J; implies ,p a nd 1/J I\ 1/J: implies p, where p is t he proposition that 
agent i cares about along t he transition. Again , with t he partial informat ion 
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our monitors have detected we have a candidate set of states for state s 
and a candidate set of states for state s(a') and any two states from them 
satisfy the resulting property of function Evalref, which means that given the 
partial information the execution of action a' in state s brings about p thus 
promoting agent i 's value . 
The same as we do with r,( <p, a), we cannot guarantee that an action that 
is detected to be opportunistic was indeed opportunistic, which is given by 
the following propos ition: 
Proposition 4 .4.5. Given a multi-agent system 9J1, a norm r,( <p, a,'¢) , a pair 
('¢;, '¢~) of action a (('¢;, '¢~) E D(a) and <p I\ '1/J; and'¢ I\'¢~ are satisfiable 
on 9J1), let a' be an action performed by agent i, action a' that is detected to 
be opportunistic was possibly opportunistic, which is characterized as 
9J1 J,' mopp ( ( <p, a,'¢) , ('¢;,'¢~),a') --+ Opportunism( ( <p, a ,'¢), a') 
Proof. Similar to proposition 4.4.3, it is because pair('¢; ,'¢~) might not be 
unique for action a within the actions that can be performed in <p-state to 
achieve'¢ , and action a indicated in norm T/ is one of those actions. 
Because the set of state transitions is finite in our framework , we can 
assume that all the possible state transit ions are known beforehand. As all the 
state transitions in our framework are labelled with an action, we introduce a 
function called Al(a) , which maps each action to a non-empty subset of state 
transitions, denoting all the transitions labelled with action a. Thus we have 
Al(a) E P(R). And then we have the following proposition: 
P roposition 4.4 .6 . Given a multi-agent system 9J1 , a value system set V , 
a norm r,( <p, a , 'If;), a pair ('¢;, '¢~) of action a {('¢;, '¢~) E D(a) and <p I\ 'If;; 
and'¢ I\'¢~ are satisfiable on 9J1) , let a' be an action performed by agent i, 
the following statements are equivalent: 
1. 9J1 I= movv((<p, a, '¢),('¢;,'¢~), a') H Opportunism((<p, a,'¢), a'); 
2. there exists only one action a that has a pair('¢;,'¢~) within the set of 
transitions R( <p, '¢); 
3. R(<pA'I/J;,'¢1\ '¢~ ) C::: Al(a). 
Proof. The proof for 1 ⇒ 2 is the same as the proof of proposition 4.4.4, so 
we are going to prove 2 ⇒ 3 and 3 ⇒ 1. We can consider '1/J; and '¢~ as two 
normal propositional formulas. From statement 2 it is clear that <p I\ '1/J; and 
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'I/; I\ 'I/;~ are successively satisfied in the stale transition. From this we can 
divide the transitions into two classes: one for the transitions that cp I\ 'I/;; and 
'I/; I\ 'I/;~ are successively satisfied ( denoted as R( cp I\ 'I/;;, 'I/; I\ 'I/;~ )), and the other 
do not. Since pair ('I/;;, 'I/;~) is unique lo action a within R( cp I\ 'I/;;, 'I/; I\ 'I/;~), 
all the transitions in R( cp I\ 'I/;;, 'I/; I\ 'I/;~ ) are labeled with action a. Therefore , 
R(cp I\ 'I/;;, 'I/; I\ 'I/;~) is a subset of At(a). From 2 => 3 is concluded. From 3 => 
1, if all the transitions in R(cp I\ 'I/;;, 'I/; I\ 'I/;~) are labeled with action a, then 
a' = a and we can guarantee that action a' is indeed opportunistic behavior. 
Exa mple 4 .1 (continued). We still use the example of selling a broken cup 
Figure 4. 2 to illustrate our monitoring approach. Here the state transition 
is denoted as (s, a' , s') instead of (s , sell(brokencup), s') because the monitor 
cannot obserne the action directly. Given a norm ry( T, sell ( brokencup)) and 
the seller's value system Vs, the system checks whether the seller performed 
opportunistic behavior. Firstly, the monitor doesn't need lo check the context 
where action a' is performed because action sell(brokencup) is forbidden in any 
context as norm 17 says. Secondly, the monitor tries lo identify if action a' is 
indeed sell(brokencup) as norm 17 indicates: assuming that (hascup(seller) I\ 
-,hasmoney(seller) , hascup(buyer) I\ hasmoney(seller)) is the pair we find 
for action sell(brokencup) , we check if both 9Jl, s I= m state (hascup(seller)) I\ 
-,hasmoney(seller) and 9Jl , s' I= m state(hascup(buyer) I\ hasmoney(seller)) 
hold. Moreover, the information we had for slate s ands' implies that the 
seller's value gets promoted, as Evalref(Vs, s, s') = hasmoney(seller). ff they 
all hold, action a' is detected lo be opportunistic behavior. As the action pair 
we find is unique to action sell ( brokencup), action a' is indeed sell ( brokencup) 
thus being opportunistic. 
However, if (hascup(seller ), hascup(buyer) ) is the pair that we find for ac-
tion sell ( brokencup) , then action a' is not necessarily sell ( brokencup) because 
possibly a' = give(brokencup) , meaning that (hascup(seller), hascup(buyer) ) 
is not unique lo action sell(brokencup). 
We proposed three approaches to monitor opportunistic behavior with 
respect to three different forms of norms. Based on the deAnitions of three 
approaches, the fol lowing validities ho ld: given a multi-agent system 9Jl and 
an action a' , 
9Jl I= m opp((cp, a , 'I/;) , ('I/;;, 'I/;~), a') -+ mopp((cp, 'I/;), a') 
9Jl I= mopp((cp, a, 'I/; ), ('I/;;, 'I/;~), a') -+ mopp((cp, a), ('I/;;, 'I/;~), a') 
70 
4.5 Monitoring Cost for Opportunism 









Figure 4 .2. Monitoring opportunism of selling a broken cup. 
The interpreted meaning of the first validity is that, if action a' is detected to 
be opportunistic behavior with respect to norm TJ(cp, a, 'lj;), then it will be also 
detected to be opportunistic behavior with respect to norm TJ( cp, 'lj; ). Similar 
with the second validity. This is simply because, the less information the 
norm gives, the more actions are forbidden to perform. The state transitions 
that violate norm TJ( cp, a, 'lj;) is the subset of the state transitions that violate 
norm TJ( cp, 'lj;) or TJ( cp, a). This gives us an implication that the approach to 
monitor opportunistic behavior with respect to TJ( cp, a, 'lj;) can be used to 
mon itor the other two ones, because TJ(cp,a) can be represented as TJ(cp ,a, T) 
and TJ(cp ,'lj;) can be represented as TJ(cp,a,'lj;)(Va E Act). However, we have to 
consider monitoring cost when choosing a monitoring approach. Apparently 
the approach with respect to TJ( cp, a, 'lj;) is the most costly one because we 
need to verify more things compared to the other two ones . We will study 
our monitoring mechanism with cost in the next section. 
4 .5 Monitoring Cost for Opportunism 
We investigate monitoring cost for opportunism in this section based on the 
monitoring approaches we proposed in the previous section. For designing 
a monitoring mechanism, we not only think about whether it can perfectly 
detect agents' activities, but also consider if it is possible to decrease the 
cost involved in the monitoring process. We first propose several ideas about 
how to reduce monitoring cost in general, and then discuss them with our 
monitoring approaches for opportunism. 
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4.5.1 Monitoring Cost 
There is a lways cost involved when we moni tor something, and t he cost 
depends on what we want to check a nd how accurate the result we wa nt to 
get. For example, recording a video is more ex pensive than taking a photo. 
We would like to use a monitoring approach which can accomplish our task 
a nd is cost-saving as well. Our basic idea in this chapter is that a monitor 
is considered as a n externa l observer to verify state properties, a nd t hat 
given a set of propositional formulas X as state propert ies, we verify the 
conjunction of a ll t he formulas from X through combining state monitors . 
We first define the monito ring cost o f a state property t hrough a fun ction 
c : L- prop -+ JR+. Int ui tively, g iven a state property denoted by a proposit ional 
formul a cp, funct ion c( <p) returns a posit ive real number representing the cost 
that it takes to verify cp. Such costs can be deduced from ex pert know ledge 
a nd a re assumed to be given. 
Definition 4.5.1 (Monitoring Cost for State Properties a nd Sets). Cost cover 
state properties L- prop is a function c : L- prop -+ IR I that maps a propositional 
formula lo a positive real number. Given a set of propositional formulas X , 
we also define c(X) := I:,,,Ex c( <p) fo r having the cost of monitoring a set X. 
G iven a set of propositiona l formulas X , the cost of monitoring X is the 
sum of the moni tor ing cost for each e lement in X . However, t hose elements 
in X might have some properties that can he lp us save the monitoring cost . 
The first property we investigate is inference relat ion. Basically, if it holds for 
cp, cp' E X that <p =/= cp' and cp -+ cp', t hen moni tor ing X \ { cp'} is actually t he 
same as monitoring X: when <p is detected to be true, cp' is a lso true; when cp 
is detected to be fa lse, cp' is a lso false. But c(X\ { cp' }) is less than c(X) if we 
logically assume that there is no inference cost 1• This leads us to have the 
following definition Largest Non-inferential Subset: 
Definition 4.5.2 (Largest No n-infe rential Subset). Given a monitoring trans-
ition system 9J1 and a set of formulas X, let X9Ji be the largest non-inferential 
subset such that for all cp E X9n there is no cp' E X9J1 with cp =I= cp' such that 
9J1 F 'P -+ cp' . 
Proposition 4.5.1. Given a monitoring transition system 9J1, a set of formu -
las X and ils largest non-inferential subset X9J!, it holds that c(X9J1) :S c(X). 
1 [ t is logical to assume that i n ference cost is lower than m onito rin g cost, as we on ly 
need to compute t he inference relat ion among formu las in the machi ne w hile mon itorin g 
usua ll y req uires sett ing up cosU y hardwares (such as cameras). 
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Proof. It holds obviously because X~1 is a subset of X. 
Therefore, given a set of propositional formulas we want to verify, we always 
look for its largest non-inferential subset before checking anything in order 
to reduce the monitoring cost. Certainly, there are more properties among 
those formulas but we leave them for future study. 
For reducing monitoring cost , it is also important to verify a set of pro-
positional formulas X = { r.p 1 , ... , '{!n} in a certain order instead of checking 
each formula ip;(l S:: i S:: n) randomly. Besides, given the truth property of 
a conjunction that a conjunction of propositions returns false if and only if 
there exists at least one false proposition, we can stop monitoring X once a 
proposition is detected to be fa lse because it has already made the conjunction 
false , regardless of the truth value of the rest of the propositions. Therefore, 
it is sensible to sort the propositions in X in ascending order by cost before 
checking anything, when the sorting cost is much lower than the monitoring 
cost. In order to introduce this idea, we first define the function of monitoring 
cost for a sequence and the notion of cost ordered sequence. In total, we have 
n! sequences over X . A sequence over Xis denoted as >-(X) and the set of 
all the sequences over X is denoted as L(X). The function of monitoring cost 
for a sequence and the notion of cost ordered sequence are defined as follows: 
Definition 4.5.3 (Monitoring Cost for Sequences). Given a set of proposi-
tional formulas X = { ip 1 , ... , 'Pn} and a sequence .\(X) , the monitoring cost 
of >-(X) is defined as follows: 
n 
c(>-(X)) := L c(r.p;)d; , 
where 
d; = { O 
1 
i = l 
if m('{!i - i) = fals e or d ;-1 = 0 (i > l); 
otherwise. 
With this function of monitoring cost for a sequence, the monitoring process 
will stop and no more monitoring cost will arise after a false proposition is 
detected. Given a random sequence >-(X) for monitoring, each proposition 
formula in X is likely to be true or false. We call each combination about the 
truth value of the formulas a scenario. Since there are IXI = n propositions 
in X , there are in total 2n scenarios about the truth value of the propositions 
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in X. If t he probability of each scenario to present is p;(i = 1, ... , 2n), the ex-
pected value of the monitoring cost of >- (X) can be computed in the fo llowing 
way: 
n n 
E(c(>-(X))) = P1 L c(>-(X)[i]) + p2 L c(>-(X) [i]) + ... + p2nc(>-(X)[l]) 
i = l i = l 
n 
Formula L c(>-(X)[i]) represents the monitoring cost for t,he scena rio where 
i = l 
n 
all the propositions a re det,ected to be true, a nd formul a L c(>-(X)[i]) rep-
i = l 
resent,s t he monit,oring cost, for t he scenario where a ll t,he proposit,ions are 
detected to be true except, the last one, ... , c(>-(X) [l ]) represents t,he monitor-
ing cost, for one scenario where the first proposition is de t,ected t,o be false. 
The ex pected value of the monitoring cost of >-(X) is the finite sum of the 
probabilit,y of each scenario t,o present timing the moni toring cost for the 
scenario. 
Typically, when the priori proba bility for each formul a '-P E X to be true 
is the same and a ll the formu las are independent, to each other, it, is more 
cost-sav ing to first, verify t,he formul as with low monitoring cost from the 
perspedive of stat, ist ic. In order to propose th is idea, we first introduce the 
notion Cosl Ordered Sequence. 
Definition 4.5.4 (Cost Ordered Sequence). Given a sel of propositional for-
mulas X , a cosl ordered sequence >-(X)e is a sequence over X ordered by the 
moniloring cosl of each element in X such thal X e E L(X) and for O :S i :S j 
we have c(>-(X)e[i]) :S c(>-(X)e[j]). in general, such a sequence is nol unique 
because il is possible for two propositions to have lhe same monitoring cost; 
in this case we choose one arbitrarily. 
A cost ordered sequence >-(X)c represents the monitoring order over X: we 
follow the order in >- (X)e to check t he elements in X one by one. Statistically 
speaking, we can reduce the monitoring cost if we follow t,he cost, ordered 
sequence, which is represented by the fol lowing proposition: 
Proposition 4.5.2. Given a set of propositional formulas X and a cosl 
ordered sequence >-(X)c over X , if the priori probability lhat each formula 
'-P E X is true is 1/2, the expected value of the monitoring cost of X e is the 
lowesl in that of any sequence over X , thal is, E(c(>-(X)e)) :S E(c(>-(X))) , 
where >-(X) E L(X). 
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Proof. Because the priori probability that each formula cp E X is true is 1/2, 
the probability of each scenario to present is l /2n. As we discussed above, 
since there are JXJ = n propositions in X and each proposition can be detected 
to be true or false, there are in total 2n scenarios about the truth value of the 
propositions in X, and the monitoring cost for each scenario can be calculated 
according to Definition 4- 5. 3. Let us use Seen( X) lo denote the set of all the 
scenarios about the truth value of the propositions in X, and each scenario 
from Scen(X), denoted as :jj, contains for each proposition cp E X either true 





: L L c(cpi)di 
;;;EScen(X) i = l 
2: (t c(.\(X) [i])+ tt2n-jc(.\(X)[i])) 
2~ (t c(.\(X)[i])+ t2n-nc(.\(X)[i])+ .. . +2n- lc(.\(X)[1])), 
n 
where L c(.\(X)[i]) represents the monitoring cost for the scenario where 
i = l 
n 
atl the propositions are detected to be true, and L c( ,\ ( X) [ i]) represents the 
i = I 
monitoring cost for the scenario where alt the propositions are detected to be 
true except the Last one, ... , and c(.\(X)[l]) represents the monitoring cost 
for the scenarios where the first proposition is detected to be false. From 
this equation we can see that the monitoring cost of the propositions at the 
front of lhe sequence strongly influence the value of E(c(.\(X))): the lower 
monitoring cost the propositions at the front have, the Less value E(c(.\(X))) 
returns. Thus , the expected value of the monitoring cost of .\(X)c, where atl 
the formulas are sorted in ascending order by monitoring cost, is the lowest 
in all the sequences over X. 
4.5.2 Reducing Monitoring Cost for Opportunism 
Unti l now we investigated how to reduce monitoring cost for any given finite 
set of formulas generally. In this subsection we will app ly the above ideas 
to monitoring opportunism . Recall that opportunism is monitored with 
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respecL Lo a norm a nd a value system. Given a norm TJ( 'P, a, 'lj; ) and a value 
system V; , we eva luate a state transition (s, a', s') by checking wheLher set 
Xi = {cp,'lj;;, p} hold in sLaLe s , and whether X2 = {cp,'lj;~, p} hold in state 
s', where ('lj;;,'lj;~) E D(a) a nd p = Evalref( V;,s,s'). Note that we cannoL 
combine set X1 and X 2 into one set because we verify the Lwo sets of formu las 
in different states. The inference relation among the formul as give rise Lo the 
re lation between different monitoring approaches. 
Proposition 4.5.3. Given a multi-agent system 9Jl , a norm TJ ('P, a , 'lj;), a pair 
('lj;;, 'lj;~) of action a (('lj;;, 'lj;~) E D(a) and cp I\ 'lj;; and 'lj; I\ 'lj;~ are satisfiable 
on 9J1) , and an action a' , if 
then 
9J1 I= ffiopp ((cp,'lj;),a') H ffi opp((cp,a,'lj; ), ('lj;;,'lj;~), a'); 
if 
9J1 I= 1P~ ➔ 'lj;, 
then 
Proof. ff 9J1 I= ( tp ➔ 'lj;;) /\ ( 'lj; ➔ 'lj;~ ) holds, we have the largest non-
inferential subset of Xi , (X1)9Jl = { cp } , and the largest non-inferential subset 
of X 2, (X2)9J1 = { 'lj; } , which means that we only need lo verify tp in the 
initial slate and 'lj; in the final stale of any slate transition. Thus, monit-
oring approach m opp( ( tp, 'lj;), a') has the same result as monitoring approach 
movv((cp,a,'lj; ), ('lj;;,'lj;~), a'). We can prove the second statement similarly. 
This proposi t ion implies LhaL when the above inference holds we can monitor 
opportunism with the approach movv((cp, 'lj;), a') (o r movv((cp, a), ('lj;;, 'lj;~), a')) 
rather than m opp((cp, a, 'lj;), ('lj;;, 'lj;~), a') for sav ing monitoring cost. 
Toget her with our general ideas about monitoring cost, we propose the 
following steps to monitor opportunism: given a multi-agent system 9J1 , a 
norm TJ( cp, (a), ( 'lj;)), a pair ('lj;;, 'lj;~) fo r action a a nd an acl ion a' performed 
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by agent i in state s, in order to check whether action a' is opportunistic 
behavior , 
1. Check if there is a ny inference relation in 9J1 a mong the formulas we 
need to veriry in states X1 = {cp ,'lf'~, p} a nd s(a') X2 = {cp,'lf'~, p} , find 
out the la rgest non-inferential subsets (X1)9n a nd (X2)9ii , and choose the 
corresponding monitoring approach; 
2. Sort all the formulas from (X1)9Jl and (X2)9ii in a sequence ordered by 
monitoring cost >-( (Xi )9n U (X2)1m)c; 
3. Verify all the formulas from ((X1)9Ji U (X2)9ii)c one by one; when one 
formula is detected to be false, the monitoring process stops and action a' 
is detected not to be opportunistic behavior; otherwise, it is detected to 
be opportunist ic behavio r. 
With the above steps, the monitoring cost for opportunism can be reduced 
statistically when the monitoring is performed for lots o r times. For a single 
time of monitoring, we still cannot guarantee that the monitoring cost is 
reduced with the a bove steps . This is beca use possibly (only) we unfortunate ly 
come across t he s ituat ion where the last formula in the cost ordered sequence is 
detected to be false, for which the monitoring cost is the Mpreferred compared 
to any sequence o rdered at random. 
4.6 Related Work 
Apart from related work we introduce in Section 2, this cha pter is also related 
to norm violation monitoring. Norms have been used as a successful approach 
to regulate a nd organize agents' behav iors [Shoha m a nd Tcnnenholtz, 1992]. 
There a re various ways of the specification o r norms a nd norm violat ions 
s uch as [Ande rson, l 958]. Similar to [Agotnes et a l., 2007], we only consider 
a norm as a subset of a ll poss ible system behavi o rs. About norm violation 
monitoring, [B ulling ct a l. , 2013] proposes a general monitoring mecha nism 
for the situation where agents' behaviors cannot be perfect ly monitored. It 
studies different types o f monitors and provides a logical a nalysis of the 
relations betwee n monitors and norms to be monitored. Our work is strongly 
inspired by them , but we focus on the situation where agents ' act ions cannot 
be observed directly but can be reasoned about through checking how things 
change, assuming state properties can be pe rfect ly verified. Our monitoring 
a pproaches a re s imilar to Artikis' methods of complex event recognition in 
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norm-governed multi-agent systems [Artikis et a l. , 2015], which take as input 
streams of low- level events, s uch as a cha nge in temperature, and combine 
them Lo infe r complex high-level events of in terest, such as t he start of a fire 
incident. 
4. 7 Chapter Summary 
For t he issue of monitoring, opportunism is a behavior that causes norm 
violation and promotes agents' own value. ln order to monitor its invisible 
performance in the system , we developed a logical framework based on the 
spec ification of act ions. In particular, we investigated how to evaluate agents' 
actions to be opportunistic with respect to different forms of norms when 
those actions cannot be observed directly, a nd studied how to reduce the 
monitoring cost for opportunism . We proved formal properties a iming at 
having an e ffect ive a nd cost-saving monitoring mechanism for opportunism. 
Future work can be done on value: in our monitoring approaches it is assumed 
that we can reason whether a n act ion promotes or demotes t he value with a 
value system and how things change by the act ion, but a value system is st ill 
like a black box t hat we sti ll don't know how the propositions we detect relate 
to a value system. Moreover, in our framework every state transit ion is labeled 
with an action and a hypothetical agent . We can improve the effectiveness 
of our mon itoring mechanism by attaching capability to agents . In this way, 
g iven an agent with its capability, the possible actions that were performed 
by the agent can be eliminated. About reducing monitoring cost, apart from 
inference more properties among formulas can be studied co ncern ing about 




Opportunism is a behavior that takes advantage of knowledge asymmetry and 
results in promoting agents' own value and demoting others' value. We want 
to e liminate such selfish behavior in multi-agent systems, as it has undesirable 
results for the participating agents. In order for monitoring a nd eliminat-
ing m echanisms to be put in place, it is needed to know in which context 
agents will or are likely to perform opportunistic behavior. In this chapter, 
we develop a framework to reason about agents' opportunistic propensity. 
Opportunistic propensity refers to the potential for an agent to perform op-
portunistic behavior. In particular, agents in the system are assumed to have 
their own value systems and knowledge. With value systems, we define agents' 
state preferences . Based on their value systems and incomplete knowledge 
abo ut the state, they choose one of their rat ional a lternatives, which might 
be opportunistic behavior. We then characterize the sit uation where agents 
will perform oppor tunistic behavior and the contexts where opportunism is 
impossible to occur. 
5.1 Introduction 
Opportunism is a selfish behavior that takes advantage of relevant knowledge 
asymmetry and which results in promoting one's own value and demoting 
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others' va lue (C ha pter 3). In the context of multi-agent systems, it is norma l 
t hat knowledge is distributed a mong pa rtic ipat ing agents in the system, which 
creates the ability for the agents to behave opportunistically. We want to 
eliminate s uch a selfish behavior, as it has undesirable results for other agents 
in the system. Ev ident ly, not every agent is like ly to be opportunistic. In 
social sc ience, ever s ince the theory about opportunism was proposed by 
Williamson in eco nomics, it has gained a large a mount of criticism due to 
over-assu ming that a ll economic players a re opportunistic. [C hen et a l. , 2002] 
highlights the cha llenge on how to pred ict opportunism ex anle and introduces 
a cultural perspective to better specify the assumptions of opportunis m. In 
multi-agent systems, we a lso need to invest igate the interest in g iss ues about 
opportunistic propensity so that the appropriate amount of monitoring [Luo 
et a l. , 2016] and eliminating mechanisms can be put in place. 
Based on decision theory, an agent's decision on what to do depends on 
the agent's a bility and preferences. lf we apply it to opportunistic behavior, 
a n agent will perform opportunistic behavior when he can do it and he prefers 
doing it. Those arc t he two issues that we consider in this chapter without 
discussing any normative issues. Based on this assumption, we develop a 
mode l of transition systems in which agents are assumed to have their own 
knowledge a nd value systems, which a rc related to the ab ility and the desire 
o f be ing opport unist ic respect ively. Our framework can be used to predict 
and specify when a n agent will perform opportunistic behavior, such as whi ch 
kinds of agents a rc likely to perform opportunist ic behavior a nd under what 
circumstances. A monitoring mecha nism for opportunism benefi ts from this 
result as monitoring devices may be set up in the occasions whe re oppor-
tunism will potentia lly occur. We can a lso design eliminat ing mechan isms 
for opportunism based on the understanding of how agents decide to behave 
opportunistica lly. Besides, ou r framework can be used by autonomous agents 
to decide whether to participate in the system , as t heir act ions might poten-
tially be regarded as opportunistic behavior g iven their knowledge and value 
systems. 
In t his chapter, we introd uce a framework to reason about agents' oppor-
tunistic propensity. Opportunistic propensity refers to the potential for an 
age nt to perform opportunistic behavior. More precisely, agents in the system 
a re assumed to have their own value systems a nd knowledge. We specify an 
agent 's value system as a st rict total o rder over a set of values, which are 
encoded within our logical la nguage. Using value systems, we define agents' 
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state prefe rences. Moreover, agents have pa rtia l knowledge about the t rue 
state where they are res iding. Based on their va lue systems and incomplete 
knowledge, they choose one of their rational a lternatives, which might be 
opportunistic. We t hus provide a natural bridge between logical reasoning and 
decision making, which is used for reasoning abo ut oppor t unistic propensity. 
We t hen characterize the sit uation where agents will perform opportunist ic 
behavior and t he contexts where opportunism is impossible to happen . 
5.1.1 Chapter Outline 
T he rest o f the chapter is organized as follows: 
• Section 5.2 introd uces t he logical fram ework, which is a transition system 
extend ed with agents' ep istemic relat ions; 
• Section 5.3 in trod uces how agents form t he ir rational a lternatives for 
decision making with t heir value systems and limi ted knowledge a bout 
the system; 
• Section 5.4 defines opportu nism for ma king prediction; 
• Section 5.5 characterizes the situation where age nts will perform oppor-
tunistic behavior and the contexts where opportunism is impossible to 
happen; 
• Section 5.7 summar izes the cha pter. 
5.2 Framework 
We use Kripke structures as our basic semant ic models of multi-agent systems. 
A Kripkc structure is a d irected graph whose nodes represent the possible 
states of the system and whose edges represent accessibili ty relations. Within 
t hose edges, equ iva lence re lat ion X:(-) <;;; S x S represents agents' epistemic 
relation , while relatio n R <;;; S x Act x S captures the possible t ransitions of 
the system that a rc caused by agents' actions. We use so to denote the initia l 
state of the system. It is important to note t hat, because in this chapte r 
we only consider opportunist ic behavior as a n action performed by an agent, 
we do not model concurrent act ions so that every possible transit ion of t he 
system is caused by an act ion instead of jo int actions. We use <I> = {p, q, .. . } 
of atomic propositional variables to express t he properties of states S. A 
valuat ion function 1r maps each state to a set of properties t hat hold in t he 
correspond ing state. Formally, 
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Definition 5.2.1. Let <I> = {p, q, ... } be a finite set of atomic propositional 
variables. A Kripke structure over <J> is a tuple T = (Agl, S, Act, 1r , K , R , so) 
where 
• Agt = { l , ... , n} is a finite set of agents; 
• S is a finite set of slates; 
• Act is a finite set of actions; 
• 1r : S --+ P( <J>) is a valuation function mapping a stale lo a set of proposi-
tions that are considered lo hold in that stale; 
• K, : Agl --+ 2sxs is a function mapping an agent in Agt to a reflexive, 
transitive and symmetric binary relation between stales; that is, given an 
agent i, for alls ES we have sK(i)s; for all s , l,u ES sK(i)t and tK(i)u 
imply that sK,(i)u; and for alls, t E S sK,(i)l implies lK,(i)s ; sK,(i)s' is 
interpreted as state s' is epistemically accessible from state s for agent 
i. For convenience, we use K(i , s) = { s' I sK(i)s'} lo denote the set of 
epistemically accessible stales from slate s; 
• R <:;; S x Act x S is a relation between stales with actions, which we 
ref er lo as the transition relation labeled with an action; we require that 
for all s E S there exists an action a E Act and one stale s' E S such 
that (s, a, s') E R , and we ensure this by including a stuttering action 
sta that does not change the state, that is, ( s, sla, s) E R; we restrict 
actions lo be deterministic, that is, if (s, a, s') E R and (s, a, s") E R, 
then s' = s"; since actions are deterministic, sometimes we denote slate 
s' as s(a) for which it holds that (s , a, s(a)) E R. For convenience, we use 
Ac(s) = {a I :ls' ES: (s,a,s') E R} to denote the available actions in 
states . 
• so E S denotes the initial state. 
Now we define the language we use. The language LKA , propositional 
logic extended with knowledge a nd act ion modalities, is generated by the 
following g rammar: 
'P ::= PI · 'P I 'Pl V <p2 I K;<p I (a)<p (i E Agt, a E Act) 
The semantics of LKA are defined with respect to t he satisfaction relation F· 
Given a Kripke structure T and a state s in T , a formu la <p of the language 
can be evaluated as follows: 
• T ,sp piffpE1r(s) ; 
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• T, s F -.<p iff T , s if= <p; 
• T, s F <p1 V <p2 iff T , s F <p1 or T , s I= <p2; 
• T , s F K;<p iff for all t such that sK( i)t , T, t F <p; 
• T , s F (a)<p iff there exists s' such that (s, a , s') E Rand T , s' F <p; 
Other classical logic connectives (e.g. ,"/\ ","---+") are assumed to be defined as 
abbreviations by using -, and V in the conventional manner. As is standard, 
we write T F r.p if T , s F r.p for all s E S, and F r.p if T F r.p for all Kripke 
structures T. 
In this chapter, m addition of the K-relation being 85, we also place 
restrictions of no-forgetting and no-Leaming based on Moore's work [Moore, 
1980] [Moore, 1984] to simplify our model. It is specified as follows: given 
a states in S, if there exists s' such that s(a)K(i)s' holds, then there is a 
s" such that sK( i)s" and s' = s" (a) hold ; if there exists s' and s" such that 
sK( i)s' and s" = s' (a) hold , then s(a)K( i)s". Following this restriction, we 
have 
The no-forgetting principle says that if after performing action a agent i 
considers a state s' possible, then before performing action a agent i already 
considered possible that action a would lead to this state. In other words, 
if an agent has knowledge about the effect of an act ion, he will not forget 
about it after performing the action. The no-Leaming principle says that all 
the possible states resulting from the performance of action a in agent i's 
possible states before action a are indeed his possible states after action a. ln 
other words, the agent will not gain extra knowledge about the effect of an 
action after performing the action. We will illustrate our framework through 
the following example: 
Example 5.1. Consider the following example: Figure 5.1 shows a Kripke 
structure T for agent i. in state s , agent i considers slate s and s' as his 
epistemic alternatives. Formula u , -.v and -.w hold in both state s and s' , 
meaning that agent i knows u , -.v and -.w in state s. By the performance of 
action a1 , states ands' result in state s(a1) and s'(a1) respectively, where 
J ormula -.u , -.v and w hold. 
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\ s' • 
I 
{u, -v, -w} 
Figure 5 .1. A Kripke structure T for agent i. 
5.3 Value System and Rational Alternative 
Agents in the system a re assumed to have t he ir own value systems a nd 
knowledge. Based on the ir va lue systems and incomplete knowledge a bout 
t he system, agents form t heir rational a lternatives for t he action t hey are 
going to perform. 
5.3.1 Value system 
Given several (poss ibly opportunistic) act ions availa ble to a n agent, it is the 
agent's decision to perform opportunistic behav ior. Basic decision theory 
applied Lo intelligent agents relies on three things: agents know what actions 
they can carry out , the effects of each act ion a nd agents' preference over the 
effects [Poole and Mackworth , 2010]. In t his chapter, the effects of each act ion 
are expressed by our logical la nguage, a nd we will spec ify agents' abilities 
and preferences in this sect ion. It is worth noting t hat we only study a single 
act ion being opport unistic in t his chapter , so we will apply basic decision 
t heory for one-shot (one-t ime) decision problems, which concern t he situat ions 
where a decision is experienced only once. 
One impor tant feature of oppor t unis m is that it promotes agents' own 
value but demotes others' va lue, a nd age nts ' value systems work as t he basis 
of agents' consideration about performing opportunistic behav ior. A value can 
be seen as an abstract basis according to which agents define t heir preferences 
over states. For instance, if we have a value denoting equality, we prefer 
the states where equal sha ring or equa l rewarding hold. Re lated work about 
values can be found in [Pitt a nd Artikis, 2015] a nd [Van der Weide, 2011] . 
Because of the abstract feature of a value, it is usually interpreted in more 
detail as a state property, which is represented as a n L KA form ula . The most 
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basic value we can construct is simply a proposition p, which represents the 
value of achieving p. More complex values can be interpreted such as of the 
form (a}<.p A (a'}·<.p, which represents the value that there is an option in the 
future to either achieve <.p or •'P· Such a value corresponds to freedom of 
choice. A formula of a value can also be in the form of K <.p, meaning that it 
is valuable to achieve knowledge. In this chapter, we denote values with v, 
and it is important to remember that vis an element from the language LKA· 
However, not every formula from LKA can be intuitively classified as a value. 
We argue that agents can always compare any two values. The rationale for 
this argument is that , when two values are equivalent (or simply incomparable) 
to us, we can consider them as one value. In other words, every element in 
the set of values is comparable to each other and none of them is logically 
equivalent to each other. Therefore, we define a value system as a strict total 
order over a set of values, representing the degree of importance of something, 
which are inspired by the preference lists in [Bulling and Dastani, 2016] the 
goal structure in [Agotnes et al., 2007]. 
Definition 5.3.1 (Value System). A value system V = (Val, -<) is a tuple 
consisting of a finite set Val = { v , ... , v'} <:;;; LKA of values together with a 
strict total ordering -< over Val. When v -< v' , we say that value v' is more 
important than value v as interpreted by value system V. 
We also use a natural number indexing notation to extract the value of a 
value system, so if V gives rise to the ordering v -< v' -< ... , then V[0] = v, 
V[l] = v', and so on. Since a value is interpreted as an LKA formula and it 
can be promoted or demoted by an action, value promotion and demotion 
along a state transition can be defined as follows: 
Definition 5.3.2 (Value Promotion and Demotion). Given a value v and an 
action a , we define the fallowing shorthand formulas: 
promoted(v , a): = ,v A (a}v 
demoted(v, a) := v A (a} , v 
We say that a value v is promoted along the state transition (s, a , s') if and 
only ifs F promoted(v , a) , and we say that vis demoted along this transition 
if and only ifs F demoted(v, a). 
An agent's value v gets promoted along the state transition (s, a, s') if and 
only if v doesn' t hold in state s and holds in state s'; an agent 's value v 
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gets demoted a long Lhe state transition (s , a, s') if a nd on ly if v holds in 
states a nd doesn 't hold in states'. Note t hat in principle an agenL is not 
a lways aware that his or her value gets demoted or promoted, i.e. iL might 
be the case where s F promoted(v, a) but agent i does not know Lhis, i. e. 
s F , (I(; promoted(v , a)). 
Now we can define a multi-agent system as a Kripke sLr ucture togeL her 
with age nts' value systems, represent ing their basis of practical reasoning . 
We a lso ass ume that value systems a re common knowledge in the system. 
Formally, a multi-agent sysLem M is an (n + 1)-tuple: 
M = (T , Vi, ... , Vn) 
where T is a Kripke structure, a nd for each agent i in T , \I,; is a value sysLem. 
We now define agents ' preferences over two states in terms of values, which 
will be used for modelling t he effect of opportunism. We fi rst define a fun ction 
Mpreferred(i , s, s') that maps a value system and two different states to the 
most preferred value that cha nges when going from state s to s' from t he 
perspective of agent i. In other words, iL returns t he value t hat the agent 
most cares about , i.e. the most importa nt change between these states for 
t he agent. 
Definition 5.3.3 (Most Preferred Value). Given a multi-agent system M , 
an agent i and two states s ands' , function Mpreferred: Agt x S x S ---+ Va l 
is defined as follows: 
Mpreferred(i , s, s')M := V;[min{j I Vk > j: M , s F Vi[k] <=> M,s' F \/,;[kl}] 
We write Mpreferred(i,s,s') for short if M is clear from context. 
Note t hat if no values change between sand s', we have that Mpreferred( i, s , s') = 
V;[O], i.e . the function returns t he agent 's least preferred value. Moreover , it 
is not ha rd to see that Mpreferred(i, s, s') = Mpreferred(i , s', s), meaning t hat 
the fun ction is symmet ri c for the two state arguments. 
With t his fun ction we can easily define agents ' preference over two states. 
We use a binary relation "~" over states to represent agents ' preferences. 
Definition 5.3.4 (State Preferences). Given a multi-agent system M , an 
agent i and two states s and s' , agent i weakly prefers state s' to state s, 
denoted as s ~;1 s' , iff 
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M,s F Mpreferred(i ,s,s') ==> M ,s' F Mpreferred(i,s,s') 
We write s ;:5; s' for short if M is clear from context. Moreover, we write 
S ;:5; S 1 for sets of states S and S 1 when ever Vs E S, Vs' E S 1 : s j s'. 
As standard, we also define s ~; s1 to mean s ;:5; s 1 and s 1 ;:5; s, and s -<; s' 
to mean s j; s' and s f; s'. The intuitive meaning of the definition of s ;:5; s' 
is that agent i weakly prefers state s' to s if and only if the agent's most 
preferred value does not get demoted (either stays the same or gets promoted). 
In other words, agent i weakly prefers states' to s: if Mpreferred(i , s, s') holds 
in state s, then it must also hold in state s', and if Mpreferred(i , s, s') does 
not hold in state s, then it does matter whether it holds in state s' or not . 
Furthermore, the interpreted meaning of s ~; s' is that state s and s' a re 
subjectively equiva lent to agent i , not necessarily that they objective ly refer 
to the same state. Thus, given an agent's state preference, a set of states can 
be class ified into different groups with an ordering in between. Clearly there 
is a corres pondence between state preferences and promotion or demotion of 
values, which we can make formal with the following proposition. 
Proposition 5.3.1. Given a model M with agent i, state s and available 
action a in s, and let v* = Mpreferred(i , s, s(a)). We have: 
s -<; s(a) <=? M ,s F promoted(v*, a) 
s "r; s(a) <=? M , s F demoted(v*, a) 
s ~; s(a) <=? M ,s F -,(demoted(v*, a) V promoted(v*, a)) 
Proof. Firstly we prove the third one. We define s ~; s(a) to m ean s ;:5; s(a) 
and s(a) ;:5; s. s j; s(a) m eans that value v* doesn't get demoted when going 
from s to s(a), and s(a) ;:5; s m eans that value v* doesn't get demoted when 
going from s(a) to s . Hence, value v* doesn't get promoted or demoted (stays 
the same) by action a. S econdly we prove the first one. We defin e s -<; s(a) 
to mean s ;:5; s(a) and s f; s(a) . s ;:5; s(a) m eans that value v* doesn 't get 
demoted when going from s to s(a), and s f; s' m eans lhal either value v* 
gets promoted or demoted by action a. Hence, value v* gets promoted by 
action a. We can prove the second one in a similar way. 
Additionally, a part from the fact t hat s -<; s(a) implies that the Mpreferred 
changed value gets promoted , we also have that no other value which is more 
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preferred gets demoted or promoted. We have the result that the ;::5; relation 
obeys the standard properties we expect from a preference relation. 
Proposition 5.3.2 (Propert ies of Sta te Preferences) . Given an agent i, his 
preferences over slates ";:5; " are 
• Refl exive: Vs E S: s ;:5; s; 
• Transitive: Vs, s', s" E S: ifs ;:5; s' ands' ;:5; s", thens ;:5; s" ; 
• Total: Vs, s' E S: s ;:5; s' ors' ;:5; s. 
Proof. The proof fottows Definition 5.3.4 directly. In order to prove ;:5; is 
reflexive, we have lo prove that for any arbitrary slate s we have s ;:5; s . From 
Definition 5.3.3 and Definition 5.3.4 we know Mpreferred(i ,s,s') = V;[O] when 
s = s', and for any arbitrary state s we always have M , s p V; [O] implies 
M , s p V;[O]. Therefore , s ;:5; s and we can conclude that ;:5; is reflexive. 
Tn order to prove transitivity, we have to prove M , s p v* implies M , s" F 
v*, where v* = M preferred(i, s, s"). ft can be the case where v* stays the same 
in state s and s" or lhe case where M, s p ,v* and M , s" F ,v*. Por the 
first case, when s ~ s' and s' ~ s", m eaning that alt the values stay the same 
when going from s lo s' and from s' to s", it is also the case when going from 
s to s". We now consider the case where M , s p ,v* and M, s" F ,v* . 
Pirstly, we denote Mprefcrred(i ,s,s') as u* and Mprefcrred(i ,s1 ,s11 ) as w*. 
It can either be that u* ~; w*, u* -<; w* or u* >--; w*. If u* ~; w*, we 
can conclude that u* ~; w* ~; v*, hence the implication holds. We now 
distinguish between the cases where u* -<; w* or u* >--; w*. 
• If u* -<; w* , we know that w* is the most preferred value that changes 
and gets promoted when going from s' to s", but stays the same between s 
and s'. Hence, we can conclude that M , s p ,w* and M , s" F w*, and 
that w* = v* {i.e., w* is the most pref erred value that changes between s 
and s"). Hence we have M , s p v* implies M , s" p v*. 
• If u* >--; w*, we know that u* is the most preferred value that changes and 
gets promoted when going from s to s', but slays the same between s' and 
s". Hence, we can conclude that M , s p ,u* and M , s" Fu*, and that 
u* = v* (i.e. v* is the most preferred value that changes between s and 
s" ). I-J enee, we have M , s F v* implies M, s" F v*. 
Tn order to prove totality by contradiction, we assume that we can find a 
witness that :ls, s' : s :/:,; s' and s' :/:,; s, that is, :ls, t : s >--; s' and s -<; s'. If 
s >--; s', we know that v* = Mpreferred(i,s,s') gels demoted when going from 
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state s to s'; ifs -<i s', we know that v* = M preferred(i, s, s') gels promoted 
when going from stale s to s' . Contradiction! 
Tn our system, we only look at the value cha nge that is most cared a bout 
Lo deduce state preferences. Certainly, there are other ways of deriving these 
preferences from a value system . Instead of only cons idering the value change 
t hat is most cared about in the state transition, it is a lso possible to take 
into account a ll the value changes in t he state transition. For example, we 
can define a function that tells whether and to what extent a state transition 
promotes o r demotes an agent 's overall value by attaching weights to values, 
and the weights can be the indexes of values in a value system . Then we 
sum a ll the weights for t he state transit ion . The summat ion can tell whether 
and to what extent a state transition promotes or demotes an agent 's overall 
value. With t his approach , a n agent considers a ll the values that are either 
promoted or demoted in t he state transit ion. The higher index the value has, 
t he more t he agent values it. For opport unism, what we want to stress is that 
opport unistic agents ignore (rather than consider less) other agents' interest, 
which bas a lower index in t he agent's value system. ln o rder to a lign with 
t his aspect, we use t he most preferred value approach in this cha pte r. 
5.3.2 Rational Alternatives 
Since we have a lready defined va lues a nd value systems as agents' basis 
for decision making, we can start to apply decision theory to reason about 
agents' decision-making. Given a state in t he system, there a re several act ions 
available to an agent, and he has to choose one in order to go to t he next state. 
We can see the consideration here as a one-shot decision mak ing. In decision 
theory, if agents only act for one step, a rat ional age nt should choose an 
act ion with t he Mpreferrcd (expected ) utility without reference to the utility 
of other agents [Poole and Mackworth, 2010]. Within o ur framework, t his 
means that a rat ional agent will a lways choose a rat iona l a lternative based on 
his value system. We will introduce the notion of rational a lternat ives below. 
Before choosi ng an action to perform, a n agent must think about which 
act ions are availab le Lo him . We have a lready seen t hat, for a g iven state 
s, t he set of avail able actions is Ac(s). However, si nce an agent only has 
partial knowledge about the state, we argue t hat the actions that an agent 
knows to be avai lab le is on ly part of the act ions that a rc physically availab le 
to him in a state. F'or example, an agent can call a pe rson if he knows t he 
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phone number of the person; without this knowledge, he is not able to do it, 
even though he is holding a phone. Recall t hat t he set of states that agent 
i cons iders as being the actual state in states is the set K(i,s). Given an 
agent's partial knowledge about a state as a precondition, he knows what 
actio ns he can perform in that state, which is the intersection of the sets of 
actions physically available in the states in this knowledge set. 
Definition 5.3.5 (S ubject ively Available Actions). Given an agent i and a 
slate s, agent i 's subjectively available actions are the sel: 
Ac(i , s) = n Ac(s'). 
s ' E K (i,s) 
Because a stuttering action sla is a lways included in Ac(s) for any states, 
we have that sla E Ac(i , s) for any agent i. When only sla is in Ac(i, s) , 
we say that the agent cannot do anything because of his limited knowledge. 
Obviously an age nt 's subjectively available act ions a re always part of his 
physically available actions (Ac(i, s) i:;; Ac(s)). Based on agents' rationality 
assumptio ns, he will choose an action based on his partial knowledge of 
the current state and the next state. Given a states and an act ion a, an 
agent considers the next possible states as the set K(i, s(a) ). For another 
act ion a' , the set of possible states is K,( i, s(a') ). The question now becomes: 
How do we compare these two possible set of states? C learly, when we have 
K(i, s(a)) -<; K(i, s(a')), meaning that a ll a lternat ives of performing action 
a' are more desirable than a ll a lternat ives of choosing action a, it is a lways 
better to choose act ion a'. HOwever, in some cases it might be that some 
alternat ives of action a are better than some a lternatives of act ion a' and 
vice-versa. In this case, an agent cannot decisively conclude which of the 
actions is optima l, which implies that the preferences over actions (namely 
sets of states) is not total. This leads us to the following definition: 
Definition 5.3.6 (Rationa l Alternatives) . Given a stale s, an agent i and 
lwo actions a , a' E Ac( i , s), we say that action a is dominated by action a' for 
agent i in state s iff K(i, s(a)) -<; K(i, s(a')). The set of rational alternat ives 
for agent i in state s is given by lhe Junction a: : S ➔ 2A c t , which is defined 
as follows: 
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a: (s) = {a E A c(i,s) I •=la' E Ac(i,s): a#- a' and 
a' dominates a for agent i in state s}. 
5.3 Value System and Rational Alternative 
The set a1(s) are all the actions for agent i in states which are available 
to him and are not dominated by another action which is available to him. 
In other words, it contains all the actions which are rational alternatives for 
agent i. Since it is always the case that Ac(i , s) is non-empty because of 
the stuttering action sta, and since it is always the case that there is one 
action which is non-dominated by another action, we conclude that a1(s) is 
non-empty. We can see that the actions that are available to an agent not only 
depend on the physical state , but also depend on his knowledge about the 
current state. The more he knows, the better he can judge what his rational 
alternative is. In other words , an agent tries to make a best choice based on 
his value system and incomplete knowledge. The following proposition shows 
how an agent removes an action with our approach. 
Proposition 5.3.3. Given a state s , an agent i and two actions a , a' E 
Ac( i, s) , action a is dominated by action a' iff 
,==is' , s" E K..(i , s): s' (a)>-- s" (a'). 
Proof. 
==i s' , s" E K..(i , s): s' (a) >-- s" (a') 
¢? K..( i , s(a)) -I, K..( i , s(a') ) , 
because s' (a) E K..(i , s (a)) ands" (a') E K..(i , s (a')) 
¢? Action a is non-dominated by action a'. 
Agents remove all the options (actions) that are always bad to do, and 
there is no possibility to be better off by choosing a dominated action. The 
following proposition connects Definition 5.3.6 with stuttering action and 
sta te preferences. 
Proposition 5.3.4. Given a multi-agent system M , a state s and an agent 
i , 
sta rfc a*(s) ⇒ Va E a *(s): s -< i s(a). 
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. Statement , (Va E a* (s) : s -<i s(a)) is 
equivalent to statement :=la E a *(s): s !::,i s(a ). We will make the proof with 
the situations where :=la E a*(s) : s >--; s (a) and :=l a E a*(s) : s ~i s (a). ff 
there exists an action a E a *(s) such that agent i 's value will gel demoted by 
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performing it (:3a E a*(s): s r-; s(a)), it wilt be dominated by the stuttering 
action sta. Sinew sta is not in a*(s), action a is not in a*(s) as welt. ff 
there exists an action a E a* ( s) such that agent i's value wilt keep agent i's 
values neutral (:3a E a*(s): s ~; s(a)), sla wilt also be in a*(s), because alt 
lhe actions in agent i 's rational alternatives are equivalent lo agent i and sta 
has the same effect as action a. Contradiction! 
If the stuttering action sta is not in the set of rational a lternatives for agent 
i, meaning that it is dominated by an action (not necessarily in the set of 
rational alternatives), agent i can always promote his value by performing 
any action in his rational alternatives. 
Our approach to comparing two sets of states resulting from two different 
actions is proposed with the assumption that an agent knows what he knows 
and what he doesn 't know, which are the properties of positive introspection 
and negative introspection of agents' epistemic relations. Certainly, there are 
multiple ways of doing it. For instance, instead of removing all the options 
that are always bad to do, we can also do it merely with our limited knowledge 
about the actions. As we know, given a state s' from agent i's knowledge 
set K(i,s), it results in s'(a) and s'(a') by action a a nd action a' respectively. 
Action a is dominated by action a' if a nd only if for all the states s' from 
K,(i, s) we haves' (a) -<; s' (a'). In this pairwise comparison approach, agent 
i compares two states resulting from the same state, which means that he 
only takes into account wha t he knows and ignores what he doesn 't know 
for removing dominated actions. In this chapter, we remove the actions by 
which agents are impossible to be bette r off, because it has natural ties to 
game theory in the context of (non-)dominated strategies [D ixit and Nalebuff, 
2008]. We will illustrate the above definitions and our approach through the 
following example. 
Example 5.1 (continued). We extend Example 5.1 as fotlows: Figure 5.2 
shows a transition system M for agent i. Stales ands' are agent i's epistemic 
alternatives, that is, K(i,s) = {s,s'}. Now consider the actions that are phys-
ically available and subjectively available lo agent i. Ac; ( s) = { a1, a2, a3, sta}, 
Ac;(s') = {a,,a2,sta}. Because Ac(i,s) = Ac;(s) n Ac;(s'), agent i knows 
that only sta, a, and a2 are available lo him in state s . 
Next we talk about agent i's rational alternatives in states. Given agent 
i's value system V; = ( u -< v -< w), and the fallowing valuation: u, -,v and -,w 
hold in K(i,s) , -,u , -,v and w hold in K(i,s(a1)), and u , v and -,w hold in 
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K(i, s(a2) ), we then have the following stale preferences: K(i, s) -< K( i, s(a1) ), 
qi, s) -< qi, s(a2)) and K( i, s(a2)) -< K( i, s(a1)), meaning that action a2 
and the stuttering action sta are dominated by action a,. Thus, we have 
a1(s) = {ai}. 
{u, v, ~w} 
Figure 5.2. A transition system M for agent i. 
5.4 Opportunism Propensity 
Before reasoning about opportunistic propensity, we should first formally 
know what opportunistic propensity actually is. Opportunism is a selfish 
behavior that takes advantage of relevant knowledge asymmetry and results in 
promoting one's own value and demoting others' value (Chapter 3). It means 
that it is performed with the precondition of relevant knowledge asymmetry 
a nd the effect of promoting agents' own value and demoting others' value. 
Firstly, knowledge asymmetry is defined as follows. 
Definition 5.4.1 (Knowledge Asymmetry). Given two agents i and j, and 
an LKA formula <p , knowledge asymmetry about <p between agent i and j is 
the abbreviation: 
It holds in a state where agent i knows <p while agent j does not know <p and 
this is a lso known by agent i. It can be the other way around for agent i and 
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agent j. But we limit the definition to one case and omit the opposite case 
for simplicity. Now we can define opportunism: 
Definition 5.4.2 (Opportunism Propensity). Given a multi-agent system 
M , a states and two agents i and j , the assertion Opportunism(i,j,a) 
that action a performed by agent i is opportunistic behavior is defined as: 
Opportunism(i, j , a) := Knowasym(i, j, promoted(v*, a) 
I\ demoted( w*, a)) 
where v* = Mpreferred(i, s, s(a}) and w* = Mpreferred(j , s, s(a}). 
This definition shows that if the precondition Knowasym is satisfied in state 
s then the performance of action a will be opportunistic behavior. The 
asymmetr ic knowledge that agent i has is about promoting value v* and 
demoting value w* a long the transition by action a, where v* and w* are 
the values that agent i and agent j most care about a long the transition 
respective ly. It follows that agent j is partially or completely not aware of it. 
Definition 5.4.2 about opportunistic propensity is a ligned with the definition 
of opportunism in Chapter 3 in the reveal that the precondition of performing 
opportunistic behavior is modeled in a n ex plicit way. As is stressed in Cha pter 
3, opportunistic behavior is performed by intent rather than by accident. In 
this chapter, instead of ex plicitly modeling intention , we interpret it from 
agents' rat ionality that they a lways intentiona lly promote their own va lues. 
We can derive three propositions from the definition , which a re useful in our 
next section. 
Proposition 5.4.1 (Value Opposition). Given a multi-agent system M and 
an opportunistic behavior a performed by agent i to agent j in state s, action 
a will promote agent i's value but demote agent j's value, which can be 
formalized as 
M ,s F Opportunism(i,j,a) => s --<; s(a} ands 'rj s(a} 
Proof. From M ,s F Opportunism(i,j,a) we have: 
M, s F J<; (promoted(v*,a) /\demoted(w*,a)) 
And thus since alt knowledge is true, we have that M , s F promoted ( v*, a) and 
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M , s F demoted(w* , a). Using the correspondence found in Proposition 5.3.1 , 
we can concludes --< i s(a) ands 'r-j s(a). 
We objectively say that agent i's value gets promoted and agent j 's value 
gets demoted by opportunistic behavior a, but agent j is not aware of it 
even after opportunistic behavior a is performed due to the no-learning 
restriction on agents ' epistemic relations. That is, if M,s F , Kj((a) , w*) 
for M,s F ,Kjdemoted(w*,a), then M , s F (a),K1 (, w*). 
Proposition 5.4.2 (Different Value Systems). Given a multi-agent system 
M and opportunistic behavior a performed by agent i to agent j in slate s, 
agent i and agent j have diff erenl value systems, which can be formalized as 
M , s F Opportunism(i , j , a) =} Vi# V1 . 
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. We denote v* = M preferred(i , s, s(a)) 
and w* = Mpreferred(j , s, s(a)), for which v* and w* are the property changes 
that agent i and agent j most care about in the state transition. If V; = V1 , then 
v* = w*. However, because M , s F K;(promoted(v*, i) Ademoted(w*,j)) , 
and thus M, s F K; ( , v* A w*) , and because knowledge is true, we have 
M, s F , v* A w*. But, since v* = w*, we have M, s F , v* A v*. Contradic-
tion! 
From this proposition we can see that agent i and agent j care about different 
th ings based on their value systems about the transit ion. 
Proposition 5.4.3 (Inclusion). Given a multi-agent system M and oppor-
tunistic behavior a performed by agent i to agent j in state s , agent j's 
knowledge set in state s is not a subset of agent i 's and action a is available 
in agent i's knowledge set: 
M,s F Opportunism(i,j, a) =} K.(j,s) <J:. K.(i , s) and a E Ac(i , s). 
Proof. We can prove it by contradiction. Knowledge set is the set of states 
that an agent considers as possible in a given actual state. Vt E K.( i, s) , agent 
i considers state t as a possible state where he is residing. The same with 
K.(j, s) for agent j. If K.(j , s) </:. K.( i, s) is false, we have K.(j, s) <;;; K.( i , s) 
holds, which m eans that agent j knows more than or exactly the same as 
agent i. However, Definition 5.4.2 tells that agent i knows more about the 
transition by action a than agent j. So K.(j , s) <;;; K.(i , s) is false , meaning that 
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K(j , s) '.l K(i ,s) holds. Further, because from M , s F Opportunism(i,j, a) 
we have M ,s F Ki((a)v* I\ (a)-.w*) , by the semantics of (a)v* and (a)-.w* , 
for all t E K(i ,s) there exists (t,a,s') E R. Thus , we have a E Ac(i,s). 
These three propositions a re three properties that we can derive based on 
Definition 5.4.2. T he first o ne shows t hat opportunistic behavior results in 
value opposition for the agents involved; the second one te lls that the two 
agents involved in the rela tionship eva lua te the transition based on different 
value systems; t he t hird one indicates t he asymmetric knowledge that agent i 
has for behaving opportunist ically. 
Example 5.2. Figure 5.3 shows the example of selling a broken cup: The 
action selling a cup is denoted as sell and we use two value systems V, and 
Vi for lhe seller and the buyer respectively. Stale s1 is lhe seller's epistemic 
alternative, while stale s1 and s2 are lhe buyer's epistemic alternatives. We 
also use a dash line circle lo represent lhe buyer's knowledge K(b , s1) (no l lhe 
seller's). In this example, K(s , s1) C K(b , s1). Moreover, 
hm = Mpreferred(s , s1, s1 (sell ) ), 
-.hb = Mpreferred(b, s1 , S t (sell )), 
m eaning lhal lhe seller only cares about if he gels money from the transition, 
while lhe buyer only cares about if he has a broken cup from the transition. 
We also have 
M , S t F K ,( promoted(hm, sell) I\ demoted(-.hb, sell)) , 
m eaning that the seller knows the transition will promote his own value while 
demote lhe buyer's value in stales, . For the buyer, action sell is available in 
both slate s1 and s2. However, hb doesn't hold in both s, (sell ) and s2(sell) , 
so he doesn't know whether he will have a broken cup or nol after action sell 
is perform ed. Therefore, there is knowledge asymmetry between the seller 
and the buyer about the value changes from s 1 to s 1 (sell ). Action sell is 
potentially opportunistic behavior in slate s1. 
5.5 Reasoning about Opportunistic Propensity 
In this section, we will characterize the s ituat ion where agents will perform 
opportunistic behavior a nd the contexts where opportunism is imposs ible to 
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{~hm_,~hb} {hm,hb} 
i s1 • 
sell • •S1<sell> 
sell 
, 52 . • . s2<sell> 
{~hm,~hb} {hm,~hb} 
Figure 5.3 . Selling a broken cup. 
happen. 
5.5 .1 Having Opportunism 
Agents will perform opportunistic behavior when they have the ability and 
lhe desire of doing it. The ability of performing opportunistic behavior can be 
interpreted by its precondition: it can be performed whenever its precondition 
is fulfilled. Agents have the desire to perform opportunistic behavior whenever 
it is a rational alternative. 
There are also relations between agents' ability and desire of performing an 
action. As rational agents, firstly we think about what actions we can perform 
given the limited knowledge we have about the state, and secondly we choose 
the action that may maximize our utilities based on our partial knowledge. 
This practical reasoning in decision theory can also be applied to reasoning 
about opportunistic propensity. Given the asymmetric knowledge an agenl 
has, there are several (possibly opportunistic) actions available to him, and 
he may choose to perform the action which is a rational alternative to him, 
regardless of the result for the other agents. Based on this understanding, we 
have the following theorem, which implies agents' opportunistic propensity: 
Theorem 5.5.1. Given a multi-agent system M, a states, two agents i and 
j and an action a, agent i will perform action a to agent j as opportunistic 
behavior in states: 
:la E a;(s) : M , s I= Opportunism(i , j , a) 
iff 
1. Vt E K,(i, s) M ,t I= promoted(v*,a) A demoted(w* , a), :ll E 
97 
5 Reasoning about Opportunistic Propensity 
K.,(j,s) : M , l I= -. (promoted(v*,a) /\ demoted(w*,a)), where v* 
Mpreferred(i ,s,s(a)) and w* = Mpreferred(j ,s,s(a)); 
2. s -<; s(a) ands >-1 s(a). 
3. -.::la' E Ac(i, s): a# a' and a' dominates a. 
Proof. Forwards: ff action a is opportunistic behavior, we can immediately 
have statement 1 by the definition of Knowledge Set. B ecause action a is 
in agent i's rational alternatives in slates (a E a1(s)), by Definition 5.3.6, 
action a is not dominated by any action in Ac( i, s). Also because action a is 
opportunistic, by Proposition 5.4.1 it results in promoting agent i's value but 
demoting agent j 's value (s -<; s(a) ands >-1 s(a)). Backwards: Statement 
1 m eans that there is knowledge asymmetry between agent i and agent j 
about the formula promoted(v* , a) /\demoted(w*,a). From this we can see 
the knowledge asymmetry is the precondition of action a. ff this precondition 
is satisfied, agent i can perform action a. Moreover, by statement 2, because 
action a promotes agent i's value but demotes agent j's value, we can conclude 
that action a is opportunistic behavior. By statement 3, because action a is 
not dominated by any action in Ac( i , s), it is a rational alternative for agent 
i in slate s to perform action a. 
Given an opportunistic behavior a, in order to predict its performance, we 
should first check the asymmetric knowledge that agent i has for enabling its 
performance. Based on agent i's and agent j 's value systems, we a lso check if 
it is not dominated by any actions in Ac( i, s) and its performance can promote 
agent i's value but demote agent j's value. It is important to stress that 
Theorem 5.5.1 never states that an agent will for sure perform opportunistic 
behavior if the three statements are satisfied . Instead , it shows opportunism 
is like ly to happen because it is in the agent's rational a lternatives. 
5.5.2 Not Having Opportunism 
As Theorem 5.5.1 shows, we need much information about the system to 
predict opportunism, and it might be difficult to achieve a ll of them. For-
tunately, in some cases it is a lready sufficient to know that opportunism is 
impossible to occur. An example might be detect ing opportunism: if we 
already know in which context agents cannot perform opportunistic behavior , 
there is no need to set up a ny monitoring mechanisms for opportun ism in 
those contexts. The following propositions characterize the contexts where 
there is no opportunism: 
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Proposition 5.5.1. Given a multi-agent system M , a stales, two agents i 
and j and an action a, 
K,(i,s) = K,(j,s) ⇒ M,s j= , Opportunism(i,j,a). 
Proof. When K(i , s) = K(j, s) holds, which means that both agent i and agent 
j have the same knowledge. In this context, Statement 1 in Theorem 5.5.1 is 
not satisfied, so action a is not opportunistic behavior. 
Proposition 5.5.2. Given a multi-agent system M , a stales , two agents i 
and j and an action a, 
V; = V1 ⇒ M ,s I= , Opportunism(i,j,a). 
Proof. When Vi = V1 holds, which means that both agent i and agent j have 
the same value system. In this case, the values of both agents don't go opposite, 




sell • s1<sell> 
,s2 • • s2<sell> 
{-hm,-pc} {hm,pc} 
Figure 5.4. Variation of selling a broken cup. 
The above two propositions show that opportunism is impossible to occur 
when t here is no knowledge asymmetry between agents and they share the 
same value systems. After we defined opportunism , we had Proposition 
5.4.2 showing that two agents have different value systems as a property of 
opportunism. Together with Proposition 5.5.l and Proposition 5.5.2, it looks 
like once having two different value systems and knowledge asymmetry about 
the value changes are satisfied one agent will perform opportunistic behavior 
to the other agent. Now let us go back to t he example of selling a broken 
cup, the buyer's value gets demoted along the state transition, because he 
wants to have a good cup for use, which he finally doesn 't have. Suppose 
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the buyer only cares about appearance in the deal: as we show in Figure 
5.4, the buyer knows it is a pretty cup before he buys it , denoted as pc, and 
he gets a pretty cup (probably not for use) after the seller sells it. ln this 
case, the behavior performed by the seller will not be seen as opportunistic 
behavior. From this variation, we notice that sometimes an action might 
not be seen as opportun istic behavior even though the age nts involved have 
different value systems, because the two value systems arc compatible rather 
than conflicting. This brings us to the notion of compatibility. Intuitively, 
compatibility describes a state in which two or more things are able to exist or 
work together in combination without problems or conflict. We then propose 
the notion of compatibility of value systems with respect to a state transition. 
Definition 5.5.1 (Compatibility of Value Systems). Given a multi-agent sys-
tem M , a slate transition (s , a, s') and two value systems \I,; and Vi 
(\I,; # Vj), the two value systems are compatible with respect to transition 
(s, a, s') if and only if M, s F , (promoted(v*, a) I\ demoted(w*, a)), where 
v* = Mpreferrcd(i ,s,s') and w* = Mpreferred(j,s,s'). 
From th is definition we have s --<; s' and s 'i--j s' don ' t hold at th e same 
time, which means that the values of two agents don ' t go opposite (one 
gets promoted and the other one gets demoted) a long a transition if thei r 
value systems are compatible with respect to the transition. Now we can 
relate the notion of compatibility of value systems to predict ing opportunism. 
The following proposition characterize another context where opportunistic 
behavior will not occur: 
Proposition 5.5.3. Given a multi-agent system M with a states, two agents 
i and j and an action a, if value system \I,; and Vj are compatible with respect 
to (s, a, s'), then 
M ,s F -. Opportunism(i , j , a). 
Proof. This proposition holds because two compatible value systems with re-
spect lo transition (s,a,s') will not lead lo the result that one agent's value 
get promoted and the other agent's value gel demoted (s --<; s' ands 'i--j s'). 
By Theorem 5. 5.1, it implies that action a will not be opportunistic behavior. 
In this section, we specified the situation where agents will perform op-
portunistic behavior and characterized the contexts where opportunism is 
impossible to happen. This informat ion is essential not on ly for the system 
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designers to identify opportunistic propensity, but also for an agent to decide 
whether to participate in the system given his knowledge about the system 
and his value system, as his behavior might be regarded as opportunistic. 
5.5.3 Computational Complexity 
Theorem 5.5.1 shows that whether a given action will be performed by an agent 
as opportunistic behavior, which gives an insight into checking opportunism 
in the system. From the perspective of system designers , given a multi-agent 
system we design, it is important to know whether there ex ists opportunistic 
behavior between agents a nd how difficult it is lo check it. In this subsection, 
we will investigate this issue through proposing an a lgorithm. The decision 
problem associated with predicting opportunistic behavior is as follows: 
PREDICTING OPPORTUNISM 
Given: Multi-agent system M. 
Question: Does there exist opportunistic behavior 
between agents for M? 
Theorem 5.5.2. Given a multi-agent system M, the problem that whether 
there exists opportunistic behavior between agents for M can be solved in time 
O(nmk2 ), where n is the number of transitions, m is the maximal number of 
available actions to a given agent in a given state, and k is the maximal size 
of S5 class. 
Proof. In order to prove the problem can be solved in time O(nmk2 ), we 
need to find an algorithm that allows us to solve the decision problem with 
the same computational complexity. We design Algorithm 5. 1 for verifying 
opportunistic behavior in a multi-agent system M based on Theorem 5. 5. 1. 
The algorithm loops through all the possible transitions in the system, which 
has complexity O(n), where n = IRI. Notice that transitions are executed 
by hypothetical agents, meaning that the value systems we consider for the 
transition is assumed to be known once the transition is given. For each 
transition, it verifies the statements listed in Theorem 5. 5.1 one by one. Line 
21-24 is to verify whether there is no action a' that dominates action a. 
Based on the definition of dominance between actions, the algorithm has to 
perform the comparison K.(i , s(a)) with K.(i,s(a')) for all a' in Ac(i,s). If 
for alls' E K.(i,s(a)) and for alls" E K.(i , s(a')) we haves'-< s" , then 
action a is dominated by action a'. Hence, the complexity of executing line 
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Algorithm 5.1. P red ict ing Opport unism. 
1: procedure HASK NOWASYM(S1, S2, 1r, cp) returns true or fa lse 
2: set g 1 +--- true 
3: set 92 +--- f alse 
4: for each s E S1 do 
5: if cp (/c 1r(s) the n 
6: set 91 +--- false 
7: break 
8: for each s E S2 do 
9: if ,cp E 1r(s) the n 
1 o: set g2 +--- true 
11: break 
12: re turn 91 /\ 92 
13: 
14: proce dure P RED ICTING(M ) returns true or fa lse 
15: set fl ag +--- false 
16: for each (s,a,s(a)) E R do 
17: set v* +--- Mpreferred (i, s, s(a)) 
18: set w* +--- Mpreferred (j, s, s(a)) 
19: if H ASKNOWASYM(K(i,s),K(j,s),1r,promoted(v*,a) I\ 
dem oted(w*,a)) the n 
20: if promoted ( v*, a) /\ demoted ( w*, a) E 1r( s) the n 
2 1: set h +--- 0 
22: for each a' E Ac( i, s) do 
23: if a =I= a' and K(i,s(a)) ::< K(i,s(a')) then 
24: h + + 
25: if h == 0 the n 
26: set flag +--- true 
27: break 
28: re turn flag 
21-24 is O(mk2), where m = JAc(i,s)I and k = JK(i,s)J. The computational 
complexity of the whole algorithm is O(nmk2), which implies that Algorithm 
5.1 can check whether there exists opportunistic behavior between agents for a 
given multi-agent system in polynomial-lime. 
5.6 Discussion 
We reaso n about agents' opport unist ic propensity based on decision t heory ex-
tended with knowledge and value systems, which correspond to some concepts 
from game t heory. In game theory, agents can be situated in a game wh ich 
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is not fully observable, and the notion of information sets is introduced to 
represent the states that the agent cannot distinguish. In this chapter, we use 
a similar concept knowledge sel to represent the set of states that the agent 
considers as possible. Based on the representation of uncertainty, we use the 
notion of dominance to compare two different actions: a dominated action is 
an action that is always bad io perform regardless of the uncertainty about 
the system , which is an approach bridging to ( non-)dominated strategies in 
game theory. It is thus already seen that we can apply techniques from game 
theory based on the concept similarities to enrich the existing decision theory 
and enhance the reasoning capabilities on agents ' opportunistic propensity. 
Further, [Bench-Capon et al., 2012] already pointed out that utility-based 
decision-mechainsms in game theory cannot represent agents ' decision theory 
in a real way. In this chapter, we follow its idea using values and value systems 
as the basis for agents' choice, which allows us to better predict opportunism. 
Given Definition 5.3.3, agent i only cares about the value change that he 
most prefers and ignores other value changes for defining his state preference . 
Hence, if we interprete value promotion as happiness and value demotion 
as sadness, this approach can be seen as the weight between the agent's 
happiness and sadness from the states: he prefers state s' rather than state s 
because his most preferred value gets promoted thus the happiness he gets is 
more than the sadness for being in state s' instead of state s. When talking 
about actions, s --<; s(a) for instance, because among all the value changes 
agent i 's most preferred value gets promoted when going from states to state 
s(a), we can say that he feels more happy than sad by performing action 
a (apparently a =/= sta) instead of doing nothing. This interpretation is of 
importance for the design of e liminating mechanism for opportunism: if we 
want to make it not optimal for an agent to be opportunistic, the sadness he 
will get from it must be higher than the happiness, which implies that the 
value change that is most cared about by the agent must be demotion. 
Moreover, our approach can be used in practice. For instance, in the 
electronic market place, only the seller knows that the product is not good 
for the buyer before he ships it , and he can earn more money if he still 
claims that the product is good. In this context, if earning money is most 
important to the seller, he can and wants to perform opportunistic behavior, 
selling the product, to the buyer according to Theorem 5.5.1. Monitoring and 
eliminating mechanisms should be put there in order to demot ivated such a 
behavior. However, if we can ensure that both the seller and the buyer are 
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aware of the quality of the product before the seller ships it , meaning that 
knowledge asymmetry about the transaction is removed , it is imposs ible for 
the seller to get benefits from the buye r. 
5. 7 Chapter Summary 
The invest igation of opportunism is still new in the a rea of multi-agent sys-
tems. We ultimately a im at designing mecha nisms to e liminate such selfish 
behavior in the system. In order to a vo id over-assuming the performa nce of 
opportunism so that monitoring and e liminating mechanisms can be put in 
place, we need to know in which context agents will or a re likely to perform 
opportunistic behavior. In this chapter, we a rgue that agents will behave 
opportunistically when they have the a bility and the desire of doing it. With 
this idea, we developed a fra mework of multi-agent systems to reason a bou t 
agents' opportunistic propens ity without considering normative issues. Agents 
in the system were ass umed to have their own value systems. Based on their 
value systems a nd incomplete knowledge a bout the state, agents chose one of 
their ra tional a lternatives, which might be opportunistic behavior. With our 
fram ework and our definiti on of opportunism, we characterized the s ituation 
where agents will perform opportunisti c behav io r a nd t he contexts where 
opportunism is impossible to occur a nd prove the computat iona l complexity 
o f predicting opportunism. Certainly there are multiple ways to extend our 
work. One interesting way is to enrich our formalization of value system over 
diITerent sets of values, and the enrichment might lead to a different notion of 
the compatibility o f va lue systems and different results about opportunistic 
propensity. Another way is to consider normative issues in our framework in 
addition to the ability and the desire of being opportunistic. Most importantly, 
this cha pter set up a bas ic fra mework to design e liminat ing mechan isms for 
opportunism , which can be seen in the next chapter. 
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Opportunism is a behavior that takes advantage of knowledge asymmetry 
and results in promoting agents ' own value and demoting others agents ' value . 
We want to eliminate such a selfish behavior in multi-agent systems, as it 
has undesirable results for the participating agents. However, as the context 
we study here is multi-agent systems, system designers actually might not 
be aware of the value system for each agent thus they have no idea whether 
an agent will perform opportunistic behavior. Given this fact , this chapter 
designs two mechanisms for eliminating opportunism given a set of possible 
value systems for the participating agents: in the epistemic approach an 
agent's knowledge gets updated so that the other agent is not able to perform 
opportunistic behavior, and in the normative approach the system is updated 
with a norm so that it is not optimal for an agent to perform opportunistic 
behavior. 
6.1 Introduction 
Opportunistic behavior ( or opportunism) is a behavior that takes advantage 
of relevant knowledge asymmetry and results in promoting an agent's own 
value and demoting another agent's value. On the one hand , it is common in 
distributed multi-agent systems that agents possess different knowledge, which 
enables the performance of opportunism; on the other hand , opportunistic 
behavior has undesirable results for other agents who participate in the 
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system. T hus, we want to design mecha nisms to eliminate opport unism. This 
cha pte r invest igates two diffe rent mecha nisms, which a llow us to elimina te 
t he perform ance of opportunism in the system from different pers pect ives. 
ln our previous chapters, we monitor a nd predict opportunism given a va lue 
system for an agent , i.e. , a n agent performed a nd will per fo rm opportunist ic 
behavio r if he has the va lue system as we assume . Howeve r , as the context 
we study here is open multi-agent systems, system des igne rs mig ht not be 
awa re of the va lue system for each agent before designing a ny mecha nism to 
elimina te opport unism in the system. The goal of t his cha pter is thus to des ign 
mechanisms to eliminate opportunism g iven a set of possible va lue systems of 
agents , which contains t he value systems wi t h opportunistic propens ity. 
In mecha nism design, a mecha nism is a n institute , procedure, o r gam e 
for dete rmining outco mes [Maskin , 2008] [Nisan , 2007]. Differently, we in 
t his cha pter consider a n opera tion to t he system as an indirect mechanism: 
a revealing update that can e liminate opport unism th rough upd a ting the 
knowledge of t he agent , a nd a norm that can eliminate opport unism t hrough 
chang in g the environment o f the system. More precisely, we argue tha t agents 
will perform opport unist ic behavior when t hey have t he a bili ty and the desire 
of do ing it in C hapter 5. Based on the idea, t he first mecha nism we propose 
is to remove the precondition of opportunism (knowledge asy mmetry) by 
revealing knowledge to agents such tha t agents will not be a ble to perform 
opport unistic beha vior, which is called a n epistemic approach in this cha pter; 
t he second a pproach we propose is to update t he state proper t ies ( typi cally 
norma tive properties) s uch tha t it is no t optima l fo r agents to perform it, 
which is called a norma tive approach in t his cha pter. Fo r the epistemic a p-
proach, since agents' va lue systems are unknown to t he system designer, there 
might exist privacy norms that prevent agents from having the knowledge for 
elimina ting opportunism. We prove form a l propert ies t hat a llow us to check 
whethe r we can eliminate opportunism a nd respect agents ' privacy as we ll. 
For the normative approach, we show that the design of t he sanction needs to 
consider a ll t he agents' possible va lue system profiles in order to demotivate 
t he choice of performing opportunistic beha vio r. 
6.1.1 Chapter Outline 
The rest o f the chapter is organized as foll ows: 
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• Section 6.2 introduces our logical framework, which is a transition system 
extended with agents' epistemic re lations and value systems; 
• Section 6.3 defines opportunistic propensity; 
• Section 6.4 introduces the types of norms we use in this chapter; 
• Section 6.5 and Section 6.6 propose two different mechanisms (epistemic 
one and normative one) to eliminate opportunism; 
• Section 6.7 relates our mechanisms to the theory of mechanism design; 
• Section 6.8 compares two mechanisms, highlighting their advantages and 
disadvantages; 
• Section 6.9 summarizes the chapter. 
6.2 Framework 
In this sect ion , we introduce the model we use for multi-agent systems. A 
transition system consists of agents, states of the world , actions, agents' epi-
stemic accessibili ty relations, transitions which go from one state to another by 
an action, and a valuation function that returns for each state the properties 
of the environment. 
Definition 6.2.1. Let <P = {p , q, ... } be a finite set of atomic proposit'ional 
variables. A transition system over <P is a tuple T = (Agt, S, Act , 1r, K, R , so) 
where 
• Agt = {l , ... , n} is a finite set of agents; 
• S is a finite set of states; 
• Act is a finite set of actions; 
• 1r : S ---+ 2<1> is a valuation function mapping a state to a set of propositions 
that are considered lo hold in that state; 
• K, : Agl ---+ 25 x 5 is a function mapping an agent in Agl to a reflexive, 
transitive and symmetric binary relation between states; that is, given an 
agent i, for alls E S we have sK( i)s; for all s, t , u E S sK( i)t and tK(i)u 
imply that sK,( i)u; and for all s , l E S sK,( i)t implies tK,( i)s; sK,( i)s' is 
interpreted as states' is epislemically accessible from states for agent i; we 
also use K( i, s) = { s' I sK( i)s'} to denote the set of agent i's epistemically 
accessible states from state s; 
• R <;;: S x Act x S is a relation between states with actions, which we 
refer to as the transition relation labeled with an action; we require that 
for all s E S there exists an action a E Act and one slate s' E S such 
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lhal (s , a, s') E R, and we ensure lhis by including a stuttering aclion 
sta that does not change the slate, that is, ( s, sta, s) E R ; we restrict 
actions lo be deterministic, that is, if (s, a, s') E R and (s , a, s") E R , then 
s' = s11 ; since actions are deterministic, sometimes we denote slate s' as 
s(a) for which it holds lhal (s,a ,s(a)) E R ; we use Ac(s) = {a I 3s' ES: 
(s, a, s') E R} lo denote the available actions in states; 
• so E S denoles the initial state. 
In the in terest of simplicity, we only consider one acLion that takes place at a 
transition, thus th e model is not concurrent . 
Now we defin e the lang uage we use. The la nguage £,KA , propos it iona l 
logic ex tended with knowledge a nd action moda li ties, is generated by the 
followin g gramma r: 
r.p ::= PI ,r.p I r.p1 V r.p2 I K;r.p I (a)r.p (i E Agt, a E Act) 
The semant ics of LKA arc defin ed with respecL to the sat is faction rela t ion l=-
G iven a transition system T a nd a state s in T , a formul a r.p of the la nguage 
can be eva luated as follows: 
• T ,s I= p iff p E 1r(s); 
• T , s I= ,r.p iff T , s [f, r.p; 
• T ,s I= r.p 1 V r.p2 iff T ,s I= r.p 1 or T ,s F r.p2; 
• T , s I= K;r.p iff for a ll t such that sK,(i) l , T , l I= r.p; 
• T , s I= (a)r.p iff there ex ists s' such t hat (s, a, s') E R a nd T , s' I= r.p; 
Other classical logic connectives (e.g.,"/\ ","-+") a re assumed to be defined as 
a bbrev iat ions by using -, a nd V in the conventional man ner. As standard , we 
write T I= r.p if T , s I= r.p for a ll s E S, a nd I= r.p if T I= r.p for a ll multi-agent 
systems T. Notice t hat we can also interpret (a)r.p as the a bility to achieve r.p 
by act ion a. Hence, we write ,(a)r.p to mean not being able to achieve r.p by 
act ion a. In addition of the X:-relat ion being S5, we also place restrictions of 
no-forgetting and no-learning based on Moore's work [Moore, 1980] [Moore, 
1984] to simplify our model. It is specified as fo llows: g iven a state s in S, if 
t here ex ists s' such that s(a)X:( i)s' holds, t hen there is a s" such that sX:( i)s" 
and s' = s" (a ) hold ; if there exists s' a nd s" such that sX:(i)s' and s" = s' (a ) 
hold , then s(a)X:(i)s11 • Following this restrict ion , we have 
I= K;((a)r.p) H (a) K ;r.p . 
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In other words, if an agent has knowledge about the effect of an action, he will 
not forget about it after performing the action; and the agent will not gain 
extra knowledge about the effect of an action after performing the action. 
Apart from the above elements, we need to provide an extension to enable 
the representation of values from the concept of opportunism. As we did in 
the previous chapter, we define a value as a .CKA formula and then a value 
system as a total order (representing the degree of importance) over a set 
of values, which means that agents can always compare any two values. In 
other words , every element in the set of values is comparable to each other 
and none of them is logically equ iva lent to each other. One can see similar 
approaches in [Bu lling and Dastani , 2016] and [Agotnes et al. , 2007]. 
Definition 6.2.2 (Value System). A value system V = (Val,--<) is a tuple 
consisting of a finile set Val = { v , ... , v'} s;; .CKA of values together with a 
strict total ordering --< over Val. When v --< v', we say that value v' is more 
important than value v as interpreted by value system V. A value system 
profile (V1 , V2, ... , VA 9 t) is a tuple containing a value syslem V;_ for each agent 
i. 
We also use a natural number indexing notation to extract the value of a 
value system, so if we have the ordering v --< v' --< . . . for a value system V , 
then V[0] = v, V[l] = v', and so on. Note that different agents may or may 
not have different value systems. We now define a multi-agent system as a 
transition system together with agents' value systems. Formally, a multi-agent 
system M is an (n + 1)-tuple: 
M = (T, Vi, ... , Vn) 
where Tis a transition system, and for each agent i in T , V;_ is a value system. 
We now define agents ' preferences over two states in terms of values, 
which will be used for modeling agents' decision making and the effect of 
opportunism . We first define how a value gets promoted and demoted a long 
a state transition: 
Definition 6.2.3 (Value Promotion and Demotion). Given a value v and an 
action a , we define the following shorthand formulas: 
promoted(v, a): = , v I\ (a )v 
demoted(v , a) := v I\ (a) , v 
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We say lhal a value v is promoted along the slate transition (s, a, s' ) if and 
only if s I= promot,ed ( v, a) , and we say that v is demoted along lhis lransilion 
if and only ifs I= demoted(v, a). 
An agent,'s value v get,s promoted a long t he state transit,ion (s, a , s') if and 
only if v doesn't hold in stat,e sand holds in stat,e s 1 ; an agent 's value v get,s 
demoted a long the state transition (s, a, s 1 ) if and only if v holds in state s 
and does n't hold in states' . 
We secondly define a function Mpreferred(i , s, s') that, maps a value system 
and two different states to the most preferred value that, cha nges when going 
from state s to s 1 from the perspective of agent i . ln other words, it returns 
t,he va lue t hat the agent most cares a bout, i.e . t he most important, change 
between these states for th e agent. 
Definition 6.2.4 (Most Preferred Va lue). Given a mulli-agenl system M , 
an agent i and lwo stales s and s1 , fun ction Mpreferred : Agt x S x S ---+ Val 
is defined as follows: 
Mpreferred(i , s, s') M := 
V; [min{j I Vk > j : M , s I= Vi[k] <c=> M , s1 I= V;[k]}] 
We write Mpreferred(i, s , s') for short if M is clear from context. 
For example, g iven agent, i's value system u --< v --< w, if form ula 
u , ,v a nd ,w hold in state s and formul a u , v, a nd ,w hold in state s' , 
function Mpreferred(i , s, s') will return v because t he most preferred value w 
remains the same in both states. With this fun ction we can define agents' 
preference over two states. We use a binary relat ion ";:5" over states to 
represent, agents ' preferences. 
Definition 6.2.5 (State Preferences) . Given a multi-agent system M , an 
agent i and lwo slates s and s' , agent i weakly prefers state s' lo state s, 
denoted as s ;:S;-'1 s', iff 
M ,s I= Mpreferred(i ,s,s') ⇒ M ,s' I= Mpreferred(i ,s,s') 
We write s j; s' for short if M is clear from context. As standard, we also 
define s ~; s' to means j; s' ands' j; s , and s --<; s' to means j; s' and 
s rj,; s'. Moreover, we write S j; S' for sets of stales S and S' whenever 
Vs E S, Vs' E S' : s j s'. 
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The intuitive meaning is that agent i weakly prefers states' to s if and only if 
the agent's most preferred value does not get demoted (either stays the same 
or gets promoted). Using the same example for function Mpreferred , given 
agent i's value system u -< v -< w, if formula u, ,v, and ,w hold in state s 
and formula u, v , and ,w hold in state s', what the agent cares about is value 
u. Since it doesn't hold in states but holds in states', agent i will prefer 
state s' to state s. One can refer to Chapter 5 for further discussion about 
the definition. Clearly there is a correspondence between state preferences 
and value promotion or demotion by an action: given a model M with agent 
i, state s and available action a in s , a nd let v* = Mpreferred(i, s, s(a) ), 
s -;; s(a) {=> M ,s F promoted(v*,a) 
s >-; s(a) {=> M ,s F demoted(v* ,a) 
s ~; s(a) {=> M , s F ,(d emoted(v* , a) V promoted(v* , a)) 
One can refer to Chapter 5 for the proof. Moreover, the ~i relation is reflexive, 
transitive and total, which have been proved in our previous chapter. It is 
possible that agents have different preferences over states, since they may not 
share the same value system. 
Since we have already defined values and value systems as agents' basis 
for decision making, we can start to apply decision theory to reason about 
agents' decision-making. Given a state in the system, there are several actions 
available to an agent, and he has to choose one in order to go to the next 
state. Before choosing an action to perform, an agent must think about which 
actions are available to him. We have already seen that, for a given state 
s, the set of available actions is Ac(s). However , since an agent only has 
partial knowledge about the state, we argue that the actions that an agent 
knows to be available is only part of the actions that are physically available 
to him in a state. For example, an agent can call a person if he knows the 
phone number of the person; without this knowledge, he is not able to do it, 
even though he is holding a phone. Recall that the set of states that agent 
i considers as being the actual state in state s is the set K.( i, s). Given a n 
agent's partial knowledge about a state as a precondition , he knows what 
actions he can perform in that state, which is the intersection of the sets of 
actions physically available in the states in this knowledge set. 
Definition 6.2.6 (Subjectively Available Actions). Given an agent i and a 
state s, agent i's subjectively available actions are the set: 
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Ac(i , s) = n Ac(s'). 
s'EIC(i,s) 
Because a st utte ring action sta is a lways included in Ac(s) for any states, 
we have that sta E Ac(i,s) for any agent i. When only sta is in Ac(i,s), 
we say t hat the agent cannot do a nyt hing because of his limited knowledge. 
Obvious ly a n agent's subject ively a vaila ble act ions are a lways part of his 
physically avail able act ions (Ac(i, s) <;;; Ac(s)) . Based on agents ' rat iona li ty 
ass umpt ions, he will choose an act ion based on his partial knowledge of 
the curre nt state and the next state. Given a state s and an action a, a n 
agent considers t he next possible states as t he set K( i, s(a) ). For anot her 
act ion a', the set of possible states is K( i, s(a') ). T he question now becomes: 
How do we compare these two possible set of states? C lear ly, when we have 
K,( i, s(a)) -<; K,( i, s(a') ), meaning that a ll alternat ives of performing act ion 
a' are more desirable than a ll a lternat ives of choosing act io n a, it is a lways 
better to choose action a'. However, in some cases it might be that some 
alternat ives of act io n a are better than some a lternatives of act ion a' and 
vice-versa. In t his case, a n agent cannot decisively conclude which o f the 
act ions is optimal, which implies that the preferences over actions (namely 
sets of states) is not total. T his leads us to the following definition: 
Definition 6 .2 .7 (Rat iona l Alternatives). Given a stales, an agent i and 
two actions a, a' E Ac( i, s), we say that action a is dominated by action a' for 
agent i in slates ijf K(i , s(a)) -<; K(i, s(a')) . The set of rational a lternatives 
for agent i in stale s is given by the function a;: : S --+ 2A ct, which is defined 
as follows: 
a:(s) = {a E Ac(i,s) I ,:la' E Ac(i ,s): a /= a' and 
a' domina tes a for agent i in stale s}. 
The set a:(s) arc a ll the act ions for agent i in states which arc available 
to him a nd arc not dominated by a nother act ion which is available to him . 
In other words, it conta ins a ll t he act ions which are rational a lternatives for 
agent i . More discussion can be found in Chapter 5 We can see that the 
act ions t hat are available to a n agent not only depend on t he physical state, 
but a lso depend on his knowledge abo ut t he state and t he next state. T he 
more he knows, the better he can judge what his rational a lternat ive is. In 
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other words, an agent tries to make a best choice based on his value system 
and incomplete knowledge. 
6.3 Defining Opportunistic Propensity 
An agent will perform opportun ist ic behavior when he has the ability and 
the desire of doing it, which is called opportunistic propensity in [Luo et al., 
2017]. By intuition, we can eliminate opportunism in the system by remov-
ing the ability or the desire. In this section , we will provide the definition 
of opportu nistic propensity. Opportunism is a selfish behavior that takes 
advantage of relevant knowledge asymmetry and results in promoting one 
agent 's own value and demoting another agent's value. It means that it is 
performed with the precondition of relevant knowledge asymmetry and the 
effect of value opposition. Firstly, knowledge asymmetry is defined as follows: 
Definition 6.3.1 (Knowledge Asymmetry). Given two agents i and j, and 
a formula <.p, knowledge asymmetry about <.p between agent i and j is the 
abbreviation: 
Knowasym(i,j, r.p) := K;<.p I\ -,Kj<.p I\ K;( -,Kj<.p). 
It holds in a state where agent i knows <.p while agent j does not know <.p and 
this is also known by agent i. It can be the other way around for agent i and 
agent j. But we limit the definition to one case and omit the opposite case 
for simplicity. Now we can define opportunism as follows: 
Definition 6.3.2 (Opportunism Propensity). Given two agents i and j, the 
assertion Opportunism(i , j , a) that action a performed by agent i is opportun-
istic behavior is defined as: 
Opportunism(i , j , a) := 
Knowasym(i , j, promoted(v*, a) I\ demoted(w*, a)) 
where v* = Mpreferred(i, s, s(a)) and w* = Mpreferred(j, s, s(a)). We use 
OPP(i,j, s) to denote the set of opportunistic behavior performed by agent i 
to agent j in slates. That is, 
OPP(i,j,s) = {a E Ac(i,s) I M,s F Opportunism(i,j,a)}. 
113 
6 Eliminating Opportunism 
This definition shows Lhat if the precondition , Knowasym, is satisfied in a 
given state Lhen the performance of act ion a will be opportu nistic behavior. 
As the definition is g iven with the value systems of agent i and agent j, a 
value system profile (Vi, Vj) corresponds Lo one type of' opportunistic behavior. 
The asymmetric knowledge that agent i has is about the change of the truth 
value of v* and w* a long the transition by action a, where v* and w* are 
the propositions that agent i and agent j most prefer a long the transition 
respectively. It follows that agent j is partially or completely not aware of 
it . Definition 6.3.2 follows our definition of opportunism for reasoning about 
opportunistic propensity of an agent in a state. As is stressed in Chapter 3, 
opportunistic behavior is performed by intent rather than by accident. In this 
chapter, instead of explic itly modeling intention , we interpret it from agents' 
rationality that they always intentionally promote their own values. We can 
derive a proposition from the definition, which is the effect of opportunism. 
Proposition 6.3.1 (Value Opposition). Given a multi-agent system M and 
an opportunistic behavior a performed by agent i lo agent j in states, action 
a will promote agent i's value but demote agent j 's value, which can be 
formalized as 
M , s F Opportunism(i,j, a) implies s --<i s(a) ands >-j s(a). 
Proof. From M, s F Opportunism(i, j, a) we have M, s F Ki(promoted(v*, a)A 
demoted(w*, a)). And thus, since alt knowledge is true, we have that 
M,s F promoted(v*,a) Ademoted(w*,a). Since v* = Mpreferred(i,s,s(a)) 
and w* = Mpreferred(j,s,s(a)), using Definition 6.2.5, we can conclude 
s --<i s(a) ands >-j s(a). 
Example 6.1. We reuse the example in our previous chapters. Figure 6.1 
shows the example of selling a broken cup: The action selling a cup is denoted 
as sell and we use two value systems Vs and Vb for the setter and the buyer 
respectively. Stale SJ is the seller's epistemic alternative, white stale SJ and 
s2 are the buyer's epistemic alternatives. We also use a dashed circle to 
represent the buyer's knowledge K(b, s1 ) (not the seller's). In this example, 
K(s, SJ) C K(b, s1). Moreover, 
hm = M preferred(s, SJ, S J (sell )), 
,hb = Mpreferred(b, s1 , s1(sell )), 
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meaning that the seller only cares if he gets money from the transition, while 
the buyer only cares about if he doesn't have a broken cup from the transition. 
Nale that having a broken cup {hb) is not the same as the cup is broken. We 
also have 
M, s1 p= Ks(promoted(hm, sell) I\ demoted(-.hb, sell)), 
meaning that the seller knows the transition will promote his own value while 
demote the buyer's value in state s1. For the buyer, action sell is available in 
both slate s1 and s2. However, hb doesn't hold in both si(sell) and s2(sell) , 
so he doesn't know whether he has a broken cup or not after action sell is 
performed. Therefore, there is knowledge asymmetry between the seller and 
the buyer about the value changes from s1 to s1 (sell). Action sell is potentially 





Figure 6.1. Selling a broken cup. 
6.4 N orms 
Research has shown that we can regulate and eliminate agents' behavior 
through setting norms in the system [Moses and Tennenholtz, 1995] [Shoham 
and Tennenholtz , 1992]. Due to the undesirable result of opportunistic be-
havior, it is valuable to study mechanisms for eliminating opportunism with 
norms. In Gibbs's influential article, norms are defined as a collective evalu-
ation of behavior in terms of what it ought to be and/or particular reactions 
to behavior such as sanctions and a particular kind of conduct [Gibbs, 1965]. 
It means that norms should prescript desirable or undesirable states or actions, 
and that the enforcement policies can be separated from the specification of 
norms. We will follow this definition to formalize norms in this chapter. 
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There are two types of norms we will consider in the following sections. 
One is called privacy norms that a re implemented for respecting agents' 
privacy. For insta nce, we wouldn 't req uire the seller to sha re the original price 
of the cup to the buyer. Hence, it is about knowledge asy mmetry be tween 
different agents. It is form a lized as follows: 
Definition 6.4 .1 (Privacy Norms). Let i and j be two agents, and I be a 
formula in LK A, a privacy norm is in the form of Knowasym(i,j, 1 ), staling 
that agent i should have pr·ivacy about lhe fact I from agent j. Given a multi-
agent system M with a stales, we say that privacy norm Knowasym(i , j , 1 ) 
in states is respected if M ,s F Knowasym(i, j , 1 ), and we use U(s)M to 
denote the set of privacy norms that are implemented in slates . We will write 
IT(s) for short if il is clear from context. 
Tn this cha pter , we assume that there are some privacy norms that arc 
supposed to be respected in the system. For insta nce, privacy norm 
Knowasym(s , b, oprice) is interpreted as the seller should have privacy about 
the original price from the buyer. Privacy norms are state-sensitive in the 
reveal that a privacy norm can be active in a state while dis-active in another 
state. 
The other type of norms we consider is enforcemen t norms, which are 
associated with ap propriate sanction to mot ivate or demot ivate a state. We 
will give a language to construct norms. We first user <;;; <I> to denote a set of 
sanction propositions. Given a multi-agent system , we construct the la nguage 
of norms in the following way: 
V :: = ('P, SA) where 'PE L prop, SA E P(r). 
The intuitive meaning of norms in this form is that whenever the system 
ends up in a (f)-statc, it will be updated with set SA that consists of sanction 
propositions, regardless the act ion that brings a bout the (f)-state. Note that 
a sanction not only can be negat ive for demotivat ing (f)-states, but a lso can 
be positive for encouraging (f)-states, depending on an agent 's preferences 
with his value system. For example, we can construct a negative norm 
(moneys /\ brokenb, {line}) to demotivate the state where the seller has money 
a nd the buyer has a broken cup with a fine to the seller. This is the only form 
of norms we consider in t his cha pter. The reason why we use it in this chapter 
is because it simplifies our semantics of update logic so that we can focus on 
the investigation of how to eliminate opportunism with a norm. One can refer 
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to Chapter 4 for the specification of more forms of norms, and [Knobbout 
et al., 2016b] for the update semantics when actions are explicitly stated in 
the norm. 
There are relationships between the two types of norms. Both of norms 
prescribe the desirable state of affairs. However , we use them in this chapter 
for different purposes: the enforcement policies are not stated in the privacy 
norms, as the issue we want to tackle with privacy norms is whether our 
revealing update might reveal the information that we want to keep secret 
through privacy norms, which is irrelevant to enforcement policies (Section 
6.5) ; for enforcement norms, we simplify the prescription of a desirable state of 
affairs as a formula and state sanctions in the language as enforcement policies, 
since we want to study how agents' decision to be opportun istic is affected 
by sanctioning (Section 6.6). Note that , according to the basic schemes of 
normative implementat ion, both norms belong to soft constraints that it is 
possible to violate. The two sections below will invest igate mechanisms for 
eliminating opportun ism with the two types of norms in detail. 
6.5 Eliminating Opportunism Using an Epistemic Ap-
proach 
One possible way to eliminate opportunism in the system is to remove the 
possibility of being opportun istic for agents. Since the precondition of op-
portunistic behavior is knowledge asymmet ry, we can s imply prevent the 
satisfaction of knowledge asymmetry in a ll states so that it is impossible for 
agents to pe rform opportunistic behavior. If we are interested in how the 
system will behave after upd a ting agents' knowledge, we ente r the field of 
dynamic ep istemic log ic. Dynamic Epistemic Logic is the study of modal 
logics of mode l change by epistemic and doxastic consequences of actions 
such as public announcements and epistemic actions [Baltag and Renne, 
2016] [Van Ditma rsch et a l., 2007]. Opportunism can be el iminated through 
a nnouncing certain information to the agent involved , such that knowledge 
asymmetry is removed. This requ ires the system or someone else in the system 
to be aware of the information that needs to be announced. Since the system 
is not aware of the value system of each agent but has a finite set of possible 
value systems for each agent, we argue that it is st ill practical for the system 
to reveal the importa nt facts to the agent involved. F'or example, given two 
possible value systems of the buyer, namely one that cares about the usage 
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of the cup a nd the other one that cares about t he ouLlook of the cup, the 
system can make a 3D scan of t he cup a nd Lhen send ii Lo the buyer , so t hat 
Lhe buyer gets valuable information abouL the transaction to decide whether 
to buy the cup. The event or the procedure is called a revealing updaLe 
t hat is performed by t he system and res ulLs in updat ing agents' knowledge, 
a nd we wanL to stud y how Lo eliminate opportunism by revealing updates in 
this sect ion. In this chapLer, we denote a revealing update as reveal(ip) t hat 
reveals whether or not formula tp is true . Given a multi-agent system, our 
logica l la nguage LKA [I is an extension of LKA as follows: 
'P ::= PI -,'PI tp1 V 'P2 I Ki'P I (a)ip I [reveal(ip)i] "P (i E Agl, a E Act) 
As is standard , formulas with revealing updates are evaluated as follows: 
g iven a mu lti-agent system M and a sta tes in M , 
• M , s p [reveal(ip) i]"P iff M l reveal(ip)i, s p 7P 
where M l reveal( ip)i = (Agi , S , Act, 1r, K,', R , so, V1, ... , Vn) and K,' is defined 
as fol lows: 
sK'(i)s' iff (sK,(i)s' a nd (M ,s F 'P iff M , s' F ip)) . 
The above sema ntics shows that, after the system performs the revealing 
update reveal( ip) to agent i, agent i's knowledge about tp gets updated , in the 
way that the access regard ing io the indisiingu ishability of t he t ruth value of 
'P is removed while t he rest of t he model remains unchanged. In other words, 
if tp is true in state s, Lhe epistemic access of agent i Lhat connects states 
with the states where tp is fa lse will be removed; if 'P is fa lse in states, t he 
epistem ic access of agent i that connects states with the states where 'P is true 
will be removed . Not ice Lhat, after performing a revealing update, it is a lways 
possible Lo make the system consistent with our no-learning and no-forgetting 
restriction by repeated ly re moving corres ponding epistem ic access. As this 
part of mak ing consistent is not what we want to study in this chapter, we 
skip its formal definition. We can a lso see update reveal(ip) as a process of 
moni toring 'P performed by t he system for the given agent , distinguishing 
states which satisfy tp from t hose which do not sat isfy tp. Note t hat this 
monitor retu rns a value from t he set { tp, -,'P}, while the monitor we defined in 
4 returns a tr uth value from t he set { true, false} indicating whether an given 
formula is detected. Hence, in the rest of t he chapter we a lways discuss two 
118 
6.5 Eliminating Opportunism Using an Epistemic Approach 
cases where <.p holds and doesn't hold in the act ua l state for a ny definition 
and proof. We have the following va lidity, g iven a multi-agent system M , a 
revealing update reveal(,p);, 
M F <p---+ [reveal(,p);]K;<p, 
which means that if <.p holds then agent i knows <.p a fter <p is revealed. Further, 
if t he system reveals somet hing to a n agent t hat he a lready knew, t he model 
will remain t he same. We formalize it as 
if M F K ;<.p, t hen M l reveal(,p); = M . 
This is because the revealing update will not cause any epistemic access 
removal from t he model. 
In this cha pter, we wa nt to investigate how to eliminate the performa nce 
of opportunism , typically t hrough removing knowledge asym metry in the 
system in t his sect ion. In order to do that , we firstly in trod uce t he notion 
Eliminating Opportunism by a Revealing Update: we say that a revealing 
update can e liminate opportun ism if and only if the revealing update disables 
its performance, namely precondition Knowledge Asymmetry is removed by 
the revealing update. F'ormally, 
Definition 6.5.1 (Eliminat ing Opportunism by a Revealing Update). Given 
a multi-agent system M , an opportunistic behavior a performed by agenl i 
lo agent j in slale s, and a revealing update reveal ( ~) j, we say lhe revealing 
update can eliminate opportunistic behavior a iff 
M , s F [reveal(~)j] -, Knowasym(i, j , promoted(v*, a) I\ demoted(w* , a)) , 
where v* = Mprefe rred(i, s, s(a)) and w* = M prefe rred(j , s, s(a)). 
This definition shows how a revealing update e liminates opportunistic beha-
vior: revealing update reveal(O j disables the performance of opportunistic 
behavior a by making knowledge asymmetry false in t he new system. Not ice 
t hat based on the semantics of our framework , action a, which was opportun-
istic, is st ill not removed. However , since t here is no knowledge asymmetry 
between agent i and agent j , agent j can prevent agent i from performing 
opportunist ic behav ior a, or can still accept it. In t he latter case, act ion a 
is no longer opportun istic as knowledge asymmetry is fa lse. For instance, 
sell and buy are synchronized to be one act ion. Afte r t he system reveals to 
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the buyer t hat the cup is broken , the buyer will not buy the cup so that 
t he deal cannot be done, or the buyer will sti ll buy the broken cup as it is 
his only choice, but the latter case is not opportunistic behavior since there 
is no knowledge asymmetry about the deal. We can immediately have the 
following proposition, which shows the relationship between revealing updates 
and asymmetric knowledge: 
Proposition 6.5.1. Given a multi-agent system M , an opportunistic be-
havior a perf armed by agent i to agent j in stale s and a revealing update 
reveal ( O j, the revealing update can eliminate opportunistic behavior a if 
• in the case M , s I= e, M I= Ki(e -+ (promoted(v*, a)/\ demoted(w*, a))), 
• in the case M, s I= ,e, M I= Kj(•e -+ (promoted(v*, a) /\ 
demoted(w*, a))), 
where v* = Mpreferred(i ,s,s(a) ) and w* = Mpreferred(j,s,s(a)) . 
Proof. In the case where e holds in states , we have M ,s I= Kie after 
reveal(e)i is perform ed. Because M I= Ki(e -+ (promoted(v*,a) A 
demoted(w*, a))) implies M I= Kie -+ Ki(promoted(v*, a)t\demoted(w*, a)) , 
we have M ,s I= Kj(promoted(v*,a) /\ demoted(w*,a)). Thus, there 
is no knowledge asymmetry between agent i and agent j about J ormula 
promoted ( v*, a) /\ demoted ( w*, a). There! ore, according lo Definition 6. 5.1, 
revealing update reveal(e)j eliminate opportunistic behavior a. We can prove 
it in a similar way when ,e holds in states. 
That is what we can directly derive from the defin ition of opportunism: to 
eliminate opportunism by removing Lhe precondition of knowledge asymmetry 
between different agents. Notice that agent j is not aware of the whole formula 
promoted( v*, a) /\ demoted( w*, a) but might know part of the formula, for 
example demoted(w*, a) . Tn that case, Lhe system needs to reveal ,; to agent 
j and agent j knows,; -+ promoted(v*,a) or , ,;-+ promoted(v*,a). 
Ideally we can let every agent have exact ly Lhe same knowledge such 
that there is no knowledge asymmetry thus opportun ism will never occur . 
However , it is difficu lt to implement such an extreme case in reality, because 
sometimes we wou ld like Lo design a system that can respect agents' privacy, 
which is reali zed through the implementation of privacy norms. However, 
since the system designer is not aware of agents' value systems thus doesn 't 
know to reveal to agents for eliminat ing opportun ist ic behavior, there might 
exist privacy norms that prevent the system from revealing to agents the 
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information that can e liminate opportunism. Namely, lhe revealing update 
performed by t he system might reveal the informat ion t hat the system wants 
to keep secret through setting a privacy norm. One simple example is that the 
system wants to reveal r.p to an agent for eliminat ing opportunistic behavior 
but as is stated in a privacy norm the agent s hould not be aware of t he 
informat ion about r.p. Hence, there exists a balance between resp ect ing of 
agents' privacy and e liminating of opportunism. In othe r words, t he system 
can perform revealing updates to agents for eliminat ing opportunistic behavior 
but a lso lower t he privacy level in the system. In principle, given a set 
of possible value system profiles and a privacy norm, t he system has lo 
consider every poss ible value system profil e in orde r lo identify an action 
to be opportunistic, a nd then t hink a bout whe th e r there exists a revealing 
update t hat can eliminate opportunistic beha vio r a nd respect the privacy 
norm as well. Since the identification of opportunism has closer relationship 
with t he normat ive approach we will discuss next sect ion, in this section we 
assume that opportun istic behavior is given a nd we will focus on lhe study 
about t he trade-off between e liminating opportunist ic behavior a nd respecting 
t he privacy norm. Namely, suppose we a lready identifi ed a n action to be 
opportunistic behavior with a possible value system profile, a question a rises: 
Research Problem 1. Given opportunistic behavior and a privacy norm, 
does there exisl a revealing updale lhal can eliminale opportunistic behavior 
and respect the privacy norm as well? 
Intui t ively, an agent gets to know something after something was revea led 
to the agent , bul the revealing update might disrespect a not he r agent's 
privacy, which is stated by ou r privacy norms in the system. The following 
proposition shows t ha t in which case a revealing update respects a privacy 
norm: 
Proposition 6.5.2. Given a multi-agenl sys lem M in a state s, a privacy 
norm Knowasym(i,j, 1 ) E U(s) with respecl lo formula 1 , and a revealing up-
date revea l(l;)j , lhe revealing update respecls privacy norm Knowasym(i , j, 1 ) 
if: 
• in the case M , s I= I;, M , s I= , K j(I; -+ 1 ), 
• in the case M , s I= • I;, M , s 1= • K j (• I; -+ , ) , 
Proof. In order lo respect privacy norm Knowasym(i , j , 1 ) , we have lo en-
sure M , s I= [reveal(l;)j] • Kn so thatM , s I= [reveal(l;)j] Knowasym(i, j , 1 ) 
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(Definition 6. 3.1) . in the case where ,; holds, M , s p= [reveal (,;) j] K j <; after the 
revealing update is per/ armed to agent j. Furthermore, M , s p= -,K i (,; --+ 1 ) 
implies that there exists s' E K(j , s) : M , s' F -, (,; --+ 1 ) , which is equi-
valent to M , s' F ,; /\ -,, . Since agent j 's epistemic access which con-
nects -,,; -slate to stale s gels removed after the revealing update is per-
form ed, state s' where ,; /\ -,, holds is still in agent j 's knowledge set . 
in other words, there exists s' E K(j, s ) : M [ reveal(<;) j, s' F ,; /\ -,,. 
Therefore, we can conclude that M, s p= [reveal(,;) j J-,K n and it leads to 
M , s p= [reveal(,;) j] Knowasym(i, j , , ). We can prove it in a similar way when 
-,,; holds in state s . 
The proposition shows th a t privacy norm Knowasym (i, j , 1 ) is respected if 
agent j is not aware of th e inference. Reversely, if the a bove sta tement doesn't 
hold , the revealing upda te wi ll reveal the information tha t the system wa nts 
to keep in priva te between agents. From Proposition 6.5.l and Proposition 
6.5.2, we can see our research problem is equivalent to the problem whether 
there exists a formula ,; such tha t the formul as from both propositions hold. 
Therefore , 
Proposition 6.5.3. Given a multi-agent system M in state s, an op-
portunistic behavior a per/ armed by agent i to agent j , a privacy norm 
Knowasym(i, j ,1 ) E rr(s) and a revealing update reveal(Oi, reveal(Oi can 
eliminate opportunistic behavior a and respect privacy norm K nowasym( i , j , 1 ) 
if: 
• in the case M ,s p= ,;, M ,s p= K j(<; --+ (promoted (v*, a ) /\ 
demoted(w*, a))) f\-, K j (<; --+ 1 ) , 
• in the case M , s p= -,,; , M ,s p= Ki (-,,; --+ (promoted(v*, a) /\ 
demoted(w*, a))) /\ -, Ki (-,,; --+,), 
where v* = Mpreferred (i,s,s(a) ) and w* = Mpreferred (j ,s,s(a) ). 
Proof. The statem ent is the combination of the statem ents from Proposition 
6.5.1 and Proposition 6.5. 2. When agenlj is aware of,; -+ promoted(v*, a) /\ 
demoted(w*, a), reveal(,;) j can eliminate opportunistic behavior a; when agent 
j is not aware of,; --+ 1 , revealing update reveal(Oi respects privacy norms 
Knowasym (i, j ,1 ) . Again, we can prove it in a similar way when -,,; holds in 
slates . 
Essentia lly, the a bove proposition shows the rela tion among a revealing 
upda te, agents' value systems and a privacy norm : if what an agent cares 
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about, which his value system reflects, is not respected by the system through 
setting corresponding privacy norms in the system, such a revealing update to 
the agent doesn't ex ist . Jn other words, it is dependent on the compatibility 
between agents' value systems and the privacy norms in the system. For 
example, for the case where ~ holds, in order to eliminate opportunistic 
behavior a, the system has to reveal (verify) ( to agent j , who knows that 
( implies value opposition a long the transition. However, if he is also aware 
of the formula ( ---+ 1 , such a revealing update will reveal to agent j the 
information about 1 , which is against the privacy norm. Hence, there is no 
revealing update that can e liminate opportunistic behavior a and respect 
the privacy norm with respect to I as well . Purther, sometimes formula 
( ---+ 1 is valid in M thus it becomes universal knowledge in the system. 
Tn that case, revealing update reveal(() will a lways reveal the information 
about I we want to keep in private. Thus, we have to remove privacy norm 
Knowasym(i , j , 1 ) so that it is a llowed to perform revealing update reveal(() 
to eliminate opportunistic behavior a, which can be seen as an alternative 
normative approach apart from using enforcement policies as in Section 6.6. 
Example 6.2. We again consider the scenario shown in Example 6.1. There 
is knowledge asymmetry between the seller and the buyer, 
Knowasym(s, b, promoted(hm, sell) A demoted( ,hb, sell)), 
which is equivalent lo 
Knowasym(s, b, , hm A (sell)hm A , hb A (sell)hb). 
In this scenario lhe seller knows the transition will promote his own value 
while demote the value of the buyer, but the buyer is not aware of the demotion 
part, as (sell )hb doesn't hold in both state s1 and slate s2. Now the buyer 
performs revealing update reveal(broken)b to check whether lhe cup is broken 
or nol, and he also knows lhal his value will gel demoted while lhe buyer's 
value will gel promoted if lhe cup is broken, that is, 
M , s F Kb(broken---+ (promoted(hm, sell) A demoted(, hb, sell))), 
which implies 
M , s p= Kbbroken ---+ Kb(promoted(hm, sell) A demoted( , hb, sell)). 
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Since the cup is actually broken (M , s p broken), the buyer knows lhe cup 
is broken after lhe system performs revealing update reveal(broken)b to him 
( M, s p K bbroken) and thus he knows his value will gel demoted while lhe 
buyer 's value will get promoted, 
M , s p Kb(promoted(hm , sell) /\ demoted( -,hb, sell)) . 
Therefore, lhere is no knowledge asymmetry about the transition between the 
seller and lhe buyer (shown in Pig. 6.2), which prevents lhe seller from selling 
lhe broken cup lo lhe buyer, according to Definition 6. 3.2. Next we suppose 
a privacy norm Knowasym(s, b, oprice) in the system , which m eans that the 
seller should keep lhe original price in private. Since inference broken --+ 
oprice is not valid 'in M intuitively, lhe buyer is not aware of it, 
M , s p -,K b(broken --+ oprice ). 
Therefore, revealing update reveal(broken)b won'l reveal lhe original price to 
the buyer and privacy norm Knowasym(s , b, oprice ) is slill respected in the 









Figure 6.2. U pdate by revealing update reveal (broken )b-
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6.6 Eliminating Opportunism Using a Normative Ap-
proach 
The firs t a pproach we discussed in the previous section is to remove know-
ledge asymmetry so t ha t it is impossible for age nts to perform opportunistic 
behavior in t he system. However , as we ment ioned before, sometimes we a rc 
supposed to respect agents ' privacy in the sense t hat age nts a re a llowed not 
to sha re certa in informa tion with other agents, which creates t he possibility 
of opportunism. Instead of finding a ba la nce between respecting of agents' 
privacy and e limina ting opportunism, we may consider a noth er approach t ha t 
makes it not optima l for agents to perform opport unistic behavior. Na mely, 
the pain or sadness o f being opportunis tic is more tha n the happiness or 
benefits of be in g opportunistic in order to dete r agents from choosin g to 
perform opportunistic behavior. 
In Chapter 5, a n agent forms his rat iona l a ltern a tives based on his limi ted 
knowledge a bout the current sta te and his va lue system without conside ring 
a ny norm. The a pproach we propose in this section is to elimina te oppor-
t unism through adding a no rm to the system s uch tha t it will direct agents 
not to be opportunisti c. G iven the la nguage in which we construct a norm in 
Section 6.4, we s how how to upd a te a multi-agent system using this form of 
norms, whi ch is inspired by [Knobbout e t a l. , 2016b]. We use (M , s)[v] to 
denote t he upda ted system. Given a multi-agent system M in state s and a 
norm v = (cp , S A), (M ,s)[v] = (M [v],s[v]) such that,: 
• M [v] = (Agt , S , Act ,1r1, K , R , so, Vi , .. . , Vn) , where fo r every s E S : 
• s [v] = s. 
1r (s)USA 
1r( s) 
if :li E Agt: s E K(i, s') a nd M , s' F cp; 
otherwise. 
The semanti cs s how tha t, we only upda te the s ta te properties while the 
frame of the syst,em st ill remains unchanged. ln o rde r to implement the 
norm in t he sys t,em , we not only upda t,e the s t,a t,e whe re cp is sat is fi ed (the 
norm is a pplicable) , but a lso update all t he possible sta t,es for a ll t,he agent,s 
in t ha t sta te. In this way, agents a re aware o f t he no rm , whi ch influe nces 
their dec is io n ma king in the new sys t,em. Tha t is, if M , s F cp, then for a ll 
i E Agt , p E SA, 
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(M ,s)[v] I= K ;p. 
Based on our update logic wi t h norms a nd agents' dec is ion ma king, we 
will investiga te how norms can elimina te opportunism . Firstly, we need to 
consider whether a n update with norms can cha nge agents' decis ion ma king. 
Regarding t he subjectively ava ilable act ions, s ince agents ' epistemic access-
ibility structures a nd the physically ava ila ble ac tions in each sta te remain 
the same a fter we update the system with a norm, agents' subject ive ava il-
a ble act ions a re not cha nged by the update. T hat is , Ac(i, s) = Ac(i, s[v]). 
However, agents' rationa l a lternatives a re not necessarily the same as before 
the update. This is because state properties a re updated with sanctions , 
which might lead to t he cha nge of agents ' state preferences. For example, if 
.K( i, s(a) [v]) -<i .K( i, s(a' ) [v]) doesn't hold a fte r t he upda te, act ion a is not 
domina ted by act ion a'. We will e limina te opport unism based on this idea. 
Like wha t we did wi t h our epistemic approach, we firstly introduce t he notion 
Normative Elimination : we say tha t a norm ca n elimina te opportunism if and 
only if the opport unistic behavior is not in a n agent's rat iona l a ltern a tives 
a fter t he system is upda ted wi t h the norm. Forma lly, 
Definition 6.6.1 (Eliminating Opportunism by a Norm). Given an oppor-
tunistic behavior a perform ed by agent i lo agent j in stale s, and a norm v, 
we say that norm v can eliminate opportunistic behavior a iff 
a rf_ a:(s[v]). 
It is no longer optima l to perform opportunistic behavior a a fter th e system 
is updated wi t h norm v . Following Definition 6.2. 7, opportunistic behavior a 
is not in agent i's ra tiona l a lte rna tives whenever it is domina ted by a nother 
action a'. Notice that the domina tin g act ion is not necessarily a n ra ti ona l 
a lternat ive. Addi t iona lly, if norm v can e liminate oppor t unistic behavior a, 
t he agent knows t hat t here a re at least two different act ions ava ilable to him , 
i.e. IAc(i, s[v])I 2: 2. 
In our prev ious work , we monito r a nd predict t he performa nce of oppor-
t unism wi t h t he g iven agents ' va lue systems as a n ass umpt ion. However, since 
the context we consider here is multi-agent systems, the system designers 
might not be awa re of t he preferences of t he pa rt icipating agents. For example, 
wha t t he seller most cares a bout in the transaction might be his repu tation , 
no t necessarily money. T his informat ion must s lowly be generated as the 
126 
6.6 Eliminating Opportunism Using a Normative Approach 
Table 6.1. Eliminating opportunism by norm v. We use O and N to denote 
being opportun istic and n6n-opportunistic respectively with respect to an action 
and a value system profile. Notation O or N with an underline means that the 
corresponding act ion is in agent i's rational a lternat ives .. 
a a I a a' 
(V; , Vi) Q N ~ (V; , Vi) 0 Ji 
(V/,Vj) N Q (V,', VJ) Ji 0 
system is exec uted. The system designer is to design a mecha nism given a set 
of possible an agent 's preferences; the agent cannot do better by trying to 
manipulate the mecha nism for its own gain . As we mentioned before, given a 
set of possible va lue system profiles, the system has to consider every possible 
value system profile in o rder to identify a n act ion to be opportunist ic. Once 
the precondi t ion o f knowled ge asymmetry is sati s fi ed , a n agent is capable 
to be opportunistic to a nother agent ; but the system d esigner has no idea 
which action the agent prefers and whether a g ive n action is opportunistic 
behavior, as the value systems of both agents a rc unknown to the system 
des igner (according to Definition 6.3.2). Therefore, the proble m becomes: 
Research Problem 2. Given a set of possible value system profiles V, can 
we design a norm v with appropriate sanction such that for every value system 
profile (V;, V_; ) E V norm v can eliminate opportunistic behavior? 
Based on Definition 6.6.1, norm v can eliminate a n agent 's opportunist ic 
behavior if a nd o nly if for every value system profile sanct ion SA removes 
a n action, which was opportunistic behavior in the o rigina l system, from the 
agent 's rat io na l a lte rnat ives. For example , g ive n two possible value system 
profiles for agent i a nd age nt j {(V; , ½), (V,' , VJ)} a nd two actions a and 
a' that arc subjectively avail a ble to agent i, agent i will perform action a, 
which is opportunistic, with va lue system profile (V;, Vj); while agent i will 
perform act ion a' , which is o pportunistic, with va lue system profile (V,' , VJ). 
We need to des ign a norm v such that agent i will perform act ion a' , which is 
non-opportunistic, with value system profile (V;, VJ, a nd agent i will perform 
action a, which is non-opportunist ic , with value system profile (V/ , VJ) , as 
illustrated the table below. 
Based on Derinition 6.6.1, we can cha racteri ze o ur research problem as 
follows: given a multi-agent system M with two agents i a nd j in states, a 
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set of possible value system profiles V , a nd a norm v , whether 
V(V;, VJ) EV: a !/. a:(s[v]). 
We will use a n example to show how a norm with sanction can or cannot 
eliminate opportun ist ic behavior. 
Example 6.3. We again discuss lhe scenario shown in Example 6. 1, where 
lhe seller only considers slates as possible for simplification. Apart from lhe 
notations lhal were used, we use hr lo denote having good reputation from 
the deal and hp to denote having a pretty cup. The seller knows that he can 
either sell the broken cup with a normal price (se ll) or keep it ( keep). Note 
lhal action keep is actually stuttering action sta . Suppose lhe seller has lwo 
possible value systems: Vs where hr -< hm, and v; where hm -< hr, and lhe 
buyer has one possible value system Vb where hp -< -.hb. Thus , we have lhe 
set V = {(Vs, Vi), (V;, Vb)} containing two value system profiles for the seller 
and lhe buyer. The problem is that we have no idea which value system the 
seller has, thus we can only say that il is possible for the seller lo sell the 
broken cup lo the buyer without letting him know the cup is broken , which is 
possibly opportunistic behavior. 
For value system profile (Vs, Vb), the seller will sell the broken cup lo the 
buyer with a normal price and it is regarded as opportunistic behavior, because 
it most promotes the seller's value (bringing about hm) but demotes the buyer 's 
value (bringing about -.hb). For value system profile (V;, Vb), the seller will 
keep the broken cup, because selling a broken cup to the buyer will demote his 
most pref erred value (bringing about -.hr). However, il is interesting lo see 
that the sel ler will never be opportunistic no matter whether he will perform 
sell or keep, because action sell will bring about -.hr thus demoting his most 
pref erred value and action keep will not lead lo value opposition. The above 
analysis is illustrated through the fallowing figure and lab le. 
Table 6.2. Buyer 's decision-making with different va lue systems. 
sell k eep 
(Vs, Vi) Q N 
N N 
Next we are going to update the system with norm v such that action sel l 
128 
6.6 Eliminating Opportunism Using a Normative Approach 
{hm,hb,~hr,hp} 
{~hm,~hb,hr,~~ 
• s<se ll> 
5 e ~m,~hb,hr,~hp} 
• s<keep> 
F ig ure 6 .3 . System before update. 
will be dominated by action keep, where v = (hmAhb, {sanction}), illustrated 
through the following table: 
Ta ble 6.3 . System updated with norm v. We use O and N to denote being oppor-
tunistic and non-opportunist ic respect ively with respect to an act ion and a va lue 
system profi le. Notation O or N with an underli ne means that the corresponding 
action is in agent i 's rational a lternatives .. 
sell keep sell keep 
(V,, Vi) Q N 
V 
(Vs, Vb) N .!'i ---+ 
(V; , Vb) N .!'i (V;, Vb) N N 
Let us first consider value system profile (Vs, Vb)- Because M, s(sell) I= 
hm A hb and the seller only considers stale s(sell) as possible, stale s(sell) 
gels updated with set {sanction}. If the seller has value system V, , action 
keep will be dominated by action sell , because action sell will promote his 
most preferred value hm. i n order to en/ orce action keep in the new system, 
we can either motivate action keep or demotivate action sell by norm v. 
Since we have the restriction that norm v Junctions directly on opportunistic 
behavior, we will not consider the latter case. In other words, sanction has to 
be negative for the seller and thus value , sanction has lo be more pref erred 
by the seller than value hm in all cases, that is, for all l E K(s , s(sell)[v]) 
and t' E K(s , s(keep)[v]) : M,t I= ,sanction and M , l' I= sanction, where 
, sanction = Mpre f erred(s, t , t'). Note that in the new system action sell 
is not opportunistic behavior any more, as it will demote the seller 's most 
preferred value if he per/ arms it. 
We now consider value system profile (V; , Vb)- If the seller has value 
sytem v; , it really doesn't matter whether the seller cares about the sanc-
tion or not, because: if , sanction --< hr , then for all t E K(s , s(sell) [v]) 
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and t' E K(s, s(keep)[v]) : M , t F hr and M , t' F , hr , where hr = 
Mpreferred(s, t, t') , which means that the seller still perfers action keep. 
If hr --< ,sanction, then ,sanction = Mpreferred(s, l, t'), which is the same 
as the case where the seller has value system Vs. Thus, no matter how big the 
sanction is for the seller with value system v;, he will always choose action 
keep , which is not opportunistic behavior before the update. 
in summary, given a set of possible value system profiles, in order lo 
remove action sell from the seller's rational alternatives, we have to consider 
the sanction for every possible value system profile. 
{hm,hb,-hr} 
{-hm,-hb,hr~ 
• s<se ll> 





{hm, h b, -hr,sanction} 
{-hm,-hb,hr~ 
• s<sel l> 
5 e ~-hm,-hb,hr} 
• s<keep> 
Figure 6.4. Update by norm v. 
6. 7 Relation to Mechanism Design 
Mechanism design is a fi e ld to design a game wilh desirable properties (oul-
comes) for various agents to play [Maskin , 2008] [Nisan, 2007]. Given agents' 
preferences ;:::S and an assumed solution concepl g that defines agents' way of 
finding optimal outcomes, we can make a prediction of lhe outcomes that will 
be achieved, which is represented as g( ;::S) . Given agents ' preferences ;:::S and a 
social choice rule f that specifies the criteria of the desirable outcomes, we 
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say that J( j) a re lhe set of social optimal outcome, which are the outcomes 
we want to have occur. Since agents' preference might be unknown to us, 
our goal is lo design mechanisms such thal for all lhe possible preference ;:-; 
the predicted outcomes g(j) coincide with (or is a subset of) the desirable 
outcomes J( j) (more elaboration can be found in [Knobbout et al., 2016a]). 
Tn lhis chapter, we lake a s lightly different view of mechanism design from lhe 
lraditional one above: we consider a mechanism as an operation or an update 
to the system, which can be a revealing update or an enforcement norm.When 
applying the theory of mechanism design to e liminal ing opportunism, we see 
agents' rational alternalivcs as predicted outcomes, opportunistic behaviors 
as undesirable oulcorncs, a nd our goal is lo design updates (revealing updates 
or a norms) to the system such that for all the possible value syslem profiles 
the intersection of an agent 's rational alternatives (using our decision theory) 
and opportunislic behaviors in the new system is empty. In this section , 
we will discuss how revealing updates and enforcement norms implement 
non-opporlunism respectively. 
Given an opportunistic behavior, we know whal kind of information the 
system needs lo reveal to an agent for eliminating il. However, if we take 
into accounl a n agent's decision-making, it can be the case where it is not 
optimal for the age nl to perform such an opporlunistic behavior thus it is 
nol necessary to eliminale it. In that sense, we connect revealing updates 
with rational a llernatives as what we did with enforcement norms previously. 
Hence, the goal of lhis chapter is to find oul a n update (a revealing updale 
or an enforcemenl norm) such that it is nol oplimal for the agent to behave 
opportunistically after it is implemented. Given a value system for agent 
i, we kn ow the set o f agent i's rational alternatives a;'(s). Given a value 
system profile for agent i and j, we can identify the sel of opportunistic beha-
viors OPP(i,j, s) lhat agent i and j are involved in. We use a;(s)I revea l(o;)J 
(a;(s)lu) and OPP(i,j, s)I reveal(,;)J (OPP(i,j, s)lu) to denote the set of ra-
tional alternatives a nd lhe set of opportunistic behaviors after reveal(,;)J 
is performed in slale s (norm u is implemenled) respectively. Because op-
portunistic behavior is undesirable from the perspective of the system and 
agents form their rat iona l a lternatives (possibly opportunistic) based on their 
value systems, it is imporlant to know whether a revealing update removes 
opportunistic behavior from the system a nd whether an normative update 
removes opportunislic behavior from the rational a lternat ives. Formally, we 
define non-opportunistic implemenlation as follows: 
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Definition 6. 7.1 (Non-opportun istic Implementation). Given a m·ulli-agent 
system M with two agents i and j in slates, a revealing update revea l(01 and 
a norm v , we say that revealing update reveal(()1 implem ents non-opportunism 
iff a; (s) I reveal(()1 n OPP('i, j, s )I reveal(()1 = 0, and that norm v implements 
non-opportunism iff a; (s) lv n OPP(i , j , s)lv = 0 . 
A revea ling update or a norm implements non-opportunism if and only if 
t he intersection between rat ional a lternat ives and opportunist ic behaviors 
becomes empty after the revealing update is performed or the norm is im-
plemented. C lear ly, th is concerns the update that they bring to the system. 
With our update logic of revealing updates and enforcement norms, we can 
discuss how a revea ling update and an enforcement norm inOuence a n agent 's 
decision-making and the identification of opportun istic behavior. 
Proposition 6. 7.1. Given a multi-agent system M with two different agents 
i and j in stales, and a revealing update revea 1(()1 , agent i 's rational altern-
atives will remain the same after revea l(()j is performed in states , which is 
formalized as 
Proof. Since revealing update reveal(()1 is performed by the system lo agent j , 
agent i 's epistemic structure will remain the same after reveal(Oi is performed. 
Hence, according to Definition 6.2.6 and 6.2. 7, agent i's subjectively available 
actions and rational alternatives will remain lhe same after revea1(01 is 
performed. 
Proposition 6. 7 .2. Given a multi-agent system M with two diff erenl agents 
i and j in states, and a revealing update reveal(()1 , opportunistic behaviors 
performed by agent i to agent j will not become more after revea l(()j is 
performed, which is formalized as 
OPP(i , j , s) :2 OPP(i,j, s)I reveal((k 
Proof. Given a value system profile for agent i and j , we can identify the set 
of opportunistic behaviors OPP(i,j,s) in a state. Because reveal(01 causes 
update of agent j ' knowledge, knowledge asymmetry will become fals e after 
reveal(()1 , and thus some actions will become non-opportunistic. Because the 
system might reveal the information that is not relevant lo any opportunistic 
behavior, it is possible that all the opportunistic behaviors remain unchanged. 
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If we limit a revealing update to the one tha t is performed to agent j , age nt 
i's rational a lterna tives will remain the same while opportunistic beha vio rs 
pe rformed by agent i to agent j will rema in the sa me o r become less, a fte r 
rcveal(Oj is performed . T herefore, if a revealing upda te can elimina te a ll t he 
act ions in t he intersection of rational a lternatives a nd opport unistic behav ior, 
it implements non-opport unism. otice t hat action a, which was opport unistic 
behavior , is s till in agent i's ra tional a ltern a tives, but it is not opportunistic 
a ny more because knowledge asy mmetry regarding opport unistic behavio r 
a is a lready removed . As fo r example 6 .2, we sec t ha t reveal(br oken)b can 
elimina te opport unistic behavior sell. Even though the seller can still se ll t he 
broken cup to the buyer , it is not opportunist ic behavio r a ny more because 
the buyer a lready know tha t he will have a broken cup. Therefore, we can 
conclude t ha t given a set o f va lue system profiles V = {( Vs, Vi )} sens ing 
act ion revcal(brok en)b implements non-opportunism. For enforcement norms, 
th ey a lte r both rationa l a lternatives and opportunist ic behav io r. Since a.ge nts' 
va lue systems a.re unknown to us, we need to exa mine those upda tes for eve ry 
poss ible va lue system profile in V. 
6.8 Discussion 
We propose two distinct mecha nisms, na mely epistemic a pproach and no rm-
a tive a pproach, to eliminate opportunism in mul t i-a.gent systems, which a rc 
consistent wi t h our assumption t ha t a.gents will no t pe rfo rm opport unistic 
behavior if t hey don 't have t he a bility o r the desire o f do ing tha t . Both 
of them can be conside red as upda tes to the system , a nd have their own 
advantages a nd disadva ntages . For the epistemic approach, in order to reveal 
useful in fo rmat ion to a.gents, t he system has to firs t ident ify if a. given act ion 
is opport unist ic behavio r wi t h a set of va lue system p rorilcs for t he age nts 
involved , a nd t hen reveal a ppropriate informa tion to the a.ge nts to eliminate 
opport unism. Those revealing updates should not be demotiva ted by the sys-
tem through setti ng pri vacy norms. This indeed puts a burden on the designer 
before implement ing any pri vacy norms, as agents ' va lue systems a.re ini tially 
unknown to t he system designer. F'or the normat ive a pproach, we discussed in 
Section 6.6 how an enforcement no rm with a ppropria te sanct ion demotiva tcs 
t he perform a nce of opport unisti c behavio r for a ll th e va lue system pro rilcs, 
ignoring t he possibili ty that such sanction can a lso ma ke non-opport unism to 
opport unism. In other words, in o rder to eliminate opportunist ic behav ior, it 
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is needed to guarantee the rational alternatives in the updated system a re 
non-opportunistic behavior . 
6.9 C hapter Summary 
Opportunism is a behavior that takes adva ntage of relevant knowledge asy m-
metry and results in promoting an agent 's own value a nd demoting another 
agent's va lue . As opportunistic behavior has und esirable results for other 
agents who pa rtic ipate in the system, we wa nt to design mechanisms to 
e liminate opportunism. In this chapter we deve loped two approaches to 
eliminate opportunism in multi-agent systems. In t his rirst approach, we elim-
inated opportunism by removing the precondition of opportunism knowledge 
asymmetry, whi ch made the performance of opportunism impossible; in the 
second approach, we eliminated opportunism by enforcing normative facts, 
which made the cho ice of performing opportunistic behavior not optimal. 
Although both of these a pproaches involved norms, they a re used for different 
purposes: knowledge asymmetry is removed by age nts' revealing upda tes, 
which might reveal the information tha t the system wanted to kee p private 
betwee n agents through setting privacy norms. So we investigated the balance 
between e liminat ing opportunism and respect ing agents' privacy. Enforce-
ment no rms with sanct ion are used to demotivate the choice of performing 
opportunistic behavior. Since agents' value systems a re unknown to us, we 
investigate the design of sanction given a ll the possible va lue system profiles. 
Finally, we re late our a pproaches to the theory of mechanism design. An 
agent performs opportunistic behavior when he has the ability and the desire 
of doing. We eliminated opportunism by removing the a bility in this pa per , 
future work can be done by removing the desire, namely making the choice of 
being opportunistic not optimal. As there ex ists trade-off between elimina ting 
opportunism and respect ing agents' privacy, it will be interest ing to eliminate 
opportunism through removing privacy norms. 
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In this cha pter , we will s umma ri ze our work for t his t hesis, highlighting our 
contributions from bo th t heoretical and p rac tical pers pectives. Besides, we 
will ex plo re poss ible venues for future work based on what we have done in 
this thesis. 
7.1 Conclusions 
At the beginning of t his thesis, we stated our research questions t ha t we 
needed to a nswer t hrough the t hesis. This section summa rizes how our work 
a nswers those quest io ns. We investigate opportunist ic behavior , wh ich is 
a concept from social sc ience, with the not ion of value in t he context o f 
multi-agent systems fo r different issues. ln order lo simplify our specification, 
most of t he time we assume tha t opportunist ic behavi or contains only one 
action and ha ppens between two agents . The no rms we use for the study of 
opportunism a re enforcement norms tha t agents in th e system are a ble to 
obey or vio late, a nd t hat lead to sa nct ion once t hey a re vio lated . 
Research Quest ion l asked whether we could fo rma lly defin e opport unistic 
behavior in t he context of mul t i-agent systems. We a nswered this question 
through Cha pte r 3. Oppor t unist ic behavio r is a selfis h behav ior that takes 
advantage of knowledge asymmetry a nd res ul ts in va lue opposit ion. We 
form a lly defined opport unism us ing the sit uat ion calculus as our technical 
basis, capturing t he features o f opport unism: knowledge asy mmetry as the 
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precondition, value opposition as the postcondition a nd intent ion as the 
mental state. We then extended the defi nition to t he case with multiple act ions 
a nd a no rmat ive context. Such a forma l defi ni t ion la id a solid foundation for 
a ny work we performed in the following cha pters. 
R esearch Question 2 asked whether we could develop a mecha nism for 
monitoring opportunism even though the system is not able to see its per-
formance. We a nswered this question through Chapter 4. We developed a 
logical fra mework based o n act ion specification, wh ich allowed us to detect 
opportunistic behavior with respect to different forms of norms off- line . In 
t his chapte r , t he system cannot see the performance of opportunis t ic beha-
vior directly but can detect it through verifying its pre- a nd post-condition. 
Moreover, we studied how to reduce the mo nitoring cost for opportunism. 
Research Question 3 asked whether we could develop a fram ework tha t 
a llowed us not only to reason about age nts' opportunistic propensity but 
a lso to design a mecha nism for eliminating opportunism. We a nswered this 
question through C hapte r 5 and Chapter 6. We developed a logical fra mework 
where agents were assumed to have their own value systems and incomplete 
knowledge a bout the syste m. In Chapter 5, agents form their rational a l-
ternatives, which might be opportunistic, based on their own value systems 
a nd incomplete knowledge. We characterized the s ituat ion where agents 
will perform opportunist ic behavior a nd the contexts where opportunism is 
imposs ible to occur. Based on t he same logical framework, in Chapter 6 
we desig ned two mecha nis ms to eliminate opportunism in the system. In 
the epistemic a pproach , a n agent 's knowledge got updated so that the other 
agent was not a ble to perform opportunistic behavior, a nd in t he normat ive 
a pproach the system was updated with a norm so that it was not optimal for 
a n agent to perform opportunistic behavior. Both mecha nisms corresponded 
to agents ' ab ility a nd desire of being opportunistic respectively. 
T his thesis has both theoretical a nd practical contr ibutions. Theoretically, 
the topic of opportunism in multi-agent systems is new. We take the ini t iat ive 
to build a formal theory of opportunism in the context of multi-agent systems, 
setting a foundation of any future work associated with this topic. Besides, 
we investigate different issues abou t o pportunism. We develop a logical 
fra mework to study each issue, which can be seen as a formal specification 
of multi-agent systems. Practically, us ing our logical fra meworks, we ha ve 
consistent form a l definitions of opportunism and the corresponding properties 
for the issues we investigate, which a llows us to answer the research questions 
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7.2 Future Work 
by checking the sat isfaction of some formulas in the system. Further, our 
thesis has applications in real multi-agent systems s uch as e-commerce systems. 
The situation of knowledge asymmetry between customers and sellers a bout 
transactions leads to the risk of fraud, which bring undesira ble results to the 
customers. Our thesis g ives ins ights into the ways of monitoring , predicting 
and elimina ting them. 
7.2 Future Work 
This thesis has opportunities for future research that should be noted . Firstly, 
while most of the time we st udy opportunistic behavior that contains one 
action, it is poss ible that opportunistic behavior conta ins multiple actions 
as we defin ed in C hapter 3. For monitoring opportunistic behavior with 
multiple act ions, s ince we have already proved that a sequence of actions 
is opportunistic while a n action within might not be opportunistic, it is 
important for the system to decide how many actions we eva luate as a whole 
to be opportunistic. For pred ict ing opportunistic behavior with multiple 
act ions, agents ' dec is ion making is done for a sequence of actions. In other 
words, agents max imize total reward over a finite number of steps, which 
a ltogether a re co ns idered as opportunistic behavior. 
Secondly, it might be interesting to study opportunism with responsibility 
since there is a strong connection between these two notions. Intuitively, 
opportunist ic agents a re responsible for the undes irable res ult that they bring 
to other agents, because they are the ones who are aware of the situation of 
knowledge asym met ry. ln this thesis, atomic act ions a re not labeled with 
agents. Tn order to reason about responsibility for opportunism, we need to 
know whether a n act ion is act ually performed by agent i in order to know 
whether this is opportunistic behavior of agent ·i. Therefore, our framework 
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Opportunist ic behavior (or opportunism) is a selfish behavior that inten-
tionally Lakes advantage of re levant knowledge asymmetry to achieve own 
gain , rega rdless of other agents ' value . lt is commonly ex isting in bus iness 
transactions and social interactions in the form of cheating, lying, betraya l, 
etc, thereby gaining much attention and invest igation from social science. l n 
multi-agent systems, it is normal that knowledge is distributed a mong differ-
ent agents, which creates the opportunity for agents to perform opportunistic 
behavior to other agents . Since opportunistic behavior has undesirable results 
for other age nts in the system, the aim of this thesis is to e liminate s uch a 
selfish behavior from the system. In order to reach this goal, we perform 
the invest igat ion of opportunism with t he notion of values for different iss ues 
in the context of multi-agent systems . Logical specification is used for our 
invest igation in order to prove useful properties with respect to the issue. 
Based on our understanding of the concept of opportunism in social science, 
we first provide a formal definition of opportunism using the s ituat ion calculus, 
capturing the features of opportunism: knowledge asymmetry as the precondi-
tion , intention as the menta l slate and value opposition as the postcondition. 
We t hen extend the definiti on lo the case where opportunistic behavior co n-
tains multiple actions and is situated in a context wi th norms. Such a formal 
definition of opportunism sets a theoretical foundation for a ny later research 
a bout opportunism. Because opportunistic behavior has undes irable results 
for other agents in the system but cannot be observed direclly, there has lo 
be a monitoring mechanism that can detect the performa nce of opportunistic 
behavior. We seco ndly prov ide a log ical fra mework lo specify monitoring 
approaches for opportunism. We investigate how to evaluate agents ' act ions lo 
be opportunistic with respect Lo different forms of norms when those act ions 
cannot be obse rved direct ly, a nd study how Lo reduce the monitoring cost for 
opportunism. In order for mo ni toring a nd eliminating mecha nisms to be put 
in place, it is important to know in which context agents will o r a re likely Lo 
147 
perform opportunistic behavior. Therefore, we develop a logical fra mework 
to reason a bout agents ' opportunistic propensity. Opportunistic propens ity 
refers to the potential for an agent to perform opportunistic behavior. We 
a rgue that agents will pe rform opportunistic behavio r when they ha ve the 
a bility a nd the desire of doing that. With t his premise, agents in the system 
a re assumed to have their own value systems a nd knowledge. Based on their 
value systems a nd incomplete knowledge a bout the state, t hey choose one of 
their rat iona l alternat ives, which might be opportunistic behavior. We then 
characte rize the situa tion where age nts will perform opportunist ic behavior 
and t he contexts where opport unism is impossible to occur. Finally, we reach 
our goal through designing two mecha nisms for eliminat ing opportunism: in 
the epistemic approach a n agent 's knowledge gets updated so that the other 
agent is not a ble to pe rform opportun ist ic behavior, a nd in the normat ive 
approach the system is updated with a norm so that it is not optimal fo r a n 
agent to pe rform opportunistic behav ior. Both approaches corresponding to 
agents' a bility and desire of being opportunistic respect ive ly. 
We take the initiat ive to build a form a l theory of opport unism in the con-
text of mul t i-agent systems, setting a foundat ion of any future work associated 
with this topic. Our research also has app lications in real multi-agent systems 
such as e-commerce systems, g iving ins ights into the ways of monito ring, 
predict ing a nd eliminat ing opportunist ic behavior in real life. Future wo rk 
can be done for opportunism with multiple act ions a nd responsibi lity. 
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Samenvatting 
Opportunistisch ged rag (oftewel opportunisme) is ego·ist isch gedrag waa rmcc 
intentioneel geprofiteerd wordt van kennis asymmet ri c voor eigen gcwin , 
ongeacht de waardes van andere agenten. Omdat het voorkomt in bcdrijf-
stransacties en soc ia le interacties in de vorm van bedriegen, liegen, misleiden 
en andere vormen, krijgt dit onderwerp vce l aandacht in onderzoek binnen de 
sociale wetenscha ppen. Jn multi-agent systemen is het normaal dat kennis 
gedistribueerd is onder de verschill ende age nten, wat de mogelijkheid creeert 
voor agenten om opportunistisch gedrag te verrichten jegens andere agen-
ten. Omdat opportunisme ongewenste resultaten oplevert voor de andere 
agenten in het systeem , is het hoofddoel van dezc thes is om zulk ego·istisch 
gcdrag te eliminc rcn uit het systeem. Om dit doe ! te bereiken onderzoeken 
we opportunisme aan de hand van waardesystemen in de context van ee n 
multi-agent systeem . Om nuttige eigenschappen te bewij ze n met betrekking 
tot opportunisme gebruiken we in ons onderzoek logica. 
Op basis van het sociaalwetenschappelijke begrip va n opportuinisme lev-
eren we eerst een forme lc definitie van opportunisme door gebruik te maken 
van het formalismc dat bekend staat a ls de 's ituat ion calculus'. Dit ste lt 
ons in staat om vcrscheidende facetten van opportunisme te vangen: kennis 
asy mmetric a ls de pre-cond itie, intentie a ls de menta le toestand en waarde-
tegenstelling a ls de post-conditie. Vervolgcns brc iden we deze definiti e uit 
naar gevallen waarbij opportunistisch gedrag bestaat uit verschillende han-
dclingen en gevallcn waarbij het gedrag plaatsvindt in de context van bepaalde 
normen. Deze formele definitie van opportunisme zet het theoretische fun-
dament voor later onde rzoek naar opportunisme. Omdat opportunistisch 
gedrag ongewenste resultaten oplevert voor a ndere agenten in het systeem 
maar niet rechtst recks geobserveerd kan worden , moet er een monitorend 
mecha nisme ingezet worden dat opportunistisch gedrag ka n waarnemen. We 
ontwikkelen cc n logisch raamwerk voor dit soort monitorende aanpa kken van 
opportunisme. We onderzoe ken hoe we de hande linge n van agenten kunnen 
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evalueren a ls zijnde opporlunistisch met, betrekking lot, verschillende vormen 
van normen wa nneer deze ha ndelingen niet, rechtstreeks geobserveerd kunnen 
worden, en we best uderen hoe we de kosten va n monitoren kunnen beperken. 
Om monitorende mecha nismen in te zetlen is het bela ngrijk om te welen in 
welke conlex len agenten vermoedelijk opportunistisch ged rag zullen uilvoeren. 
Om dit voor elkaar te krijgen ontwikkelen we een logisch raamwerk om te 
redeneren ove r de neiging lo t, opportunisme bij agenten. De ne ig ing Loi op-
portunisme hangt samen met het vermoge n van ee n agent om opportunislisch 
gedrag uit, le voeren. We betogen da t agenten opportunistisch gedrag zullen 
vertonen wanneer ze de mogelijkheid en het, verlangen hebben om dit te doen. 
Voor dit uitgangspunt is het van bela ng dat age nten in het systeem ieders 
een onafhankelijk en persoonlijk systeem va n waarden en kennis hebben. Ge-
baseerd op hun systeem va n waardes en incomplete kennis over een toesta nd 
kiezen ze een van hun ralionele alternalieven, wat mogelijk opportunislisch 
gedrag ka n zijn. Vervolgens karakte riseren we de situatie waa.rin agenten 
opporlunislisch gedrag zullen uitvoeren en de contexlen waarin opportunisme 
uitgeslolen is. Tenslotle be reiken we ons eerder geste lde doe! door twee 
mechanismen te ontwikkelen die opportunisme elimineren: in de Epislemische 
aanpak wordt de kennis van een agent gei.ipda tet op een manier zodal de 
a ndere agenlen niet in staat zijn om opporlunistisch gedrag uit te voeren, en 
in de normat ieve aanpak wordt het systeem gei.ipdatet, met een norm zoda nig 
dat he t niet meer optimaal is voor een agent om opportunistisch gedrag uit 
te voeren. Deze aanpakken corresponderen respectievelijk met het vermogen 
en verlangen van de agent, om opportunislisch te zijn. 
Wij nemen hel inilia tie f om een formee l raa mwerk voor opporlunisme te 
ontwikkelen in de contex t, va n multi-agent, systemen . Hiermee zetten we he t, 
fund a ment voor toekomst ig onderzoek naar dit onderwerp. Ons onderzoek 
heeft ook toepassingen in a lledaagse multi-agent systemen, zoals e-commerce 
systemen, en levert daarmee inz icht in manieren om opportunisme in de 
werkelijkhe id le monitoren, voorspellen en te elimineren . In opvolgend o n-
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